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Preface1
1 The procedures and opinions expressed in this book are not intended to be authoritative. Rather, they 
are the opinions of this author, and are to be relied upon in the context of providing guidance in the 
WebTrust area. We encourage each of you to modify the procedures provided to meet the practices 
followed by the firm in which you practice.
For the CPA/CA practitioner who seeks additional guidance in  planning and executing a 
WebTrustSM engagement, there is assistance available. This book will provide you with insightful 
data about actual WebTrust engagements by presenting information based on practical 
WebTrust engagement experience.  
A word here about WebTrust terms and definitions is in order. The rate of development of 
new terms relating to this rapidly expanding field is explosive. Therefore, we’ve included an 
Internet Dictionary in Appendix A. However, because of the rapidly developing field with 
its related new technology and terms, it might be a good idea to visit the website 
http://www.dictionary.com for additional assistance with required terms.
A note about the field of eCommerce before we begin. The area of eCommerce, by its nature, is 
an ever-changing and exciting practice area that provides new practice opportunities for the 
proactive accountant. Because of the rapid and constant transformation of technology and 
eCommerce, we can expect information about WebTrust Principles and Criteria to change often. 
Therefore, we plan to update this manual as needed to reflect the important changes in the tech­
nology industry as they relate to WebTrust and eCommerce issues for the practitioner.
We know that the wave of technology and all the related changes it brings is upon us and is un­
avoidable. We can choose to either act and ride this wave, or we can choose to do nothing and let 
it bury us. The outcome is up to us, the practitioners, to find a way to move along with the wave 
and become aware. Becoming knowledgeable about technology and involved in eCommerce 
and WebTrust will go a long way toward providing us with the tools and information we need to 
service clients better in this electronic age.
It is my hope that as we explore this new vista we will learn together how to better serve our 
clients and the public in general. Should you have comments or suggestions for updates to this 
material, I hope you will let me know. I look forward to hearing from you. As always—good com­









The WebTrust Engagement—Getting Started
WebTrust: A Brief Overview
The following exhibit, Internet Commerce Market, illustrates 
the rapid growth predicted for the Internet commerce market.
Although various information sources debate the size of the market, most experts tend to 
agree that the years 1997 to 1998 marked the beginning of tremendous Internet com­
merce growth and related market opportunity for accountants and their clients. This op­
portunity still exists today!
Internet Commerce Market
Billions
Source: The Yankee Group, 1996 and 1997
“The total value of goods and services traded between companies over the Internet will 
reach $8 billion this year and $327 billion in the year 2002,” according to Forrester Re­
search. Service and responsiveness to consumer concerns will replace price and brand 
name as the major components in the consumer decision-making process. As accoun­
tants, we should take the lead in empowering clients in this global eCommerce market 
place.
Our profession is becoming more responsive to both the business consumer and the indi­
vidual consumer. In response to consumer concerns regarding transacting business 
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on-line, the WebTrust program was developed and continues to evolve for the ever-chang­
ing eCommerce marketplace.
Never before in the history of the accounting profession have we had the type of opportu­
nity this WebTrust program offers: to make a direct impact on the bottom line of our 
clients’ financial statements as well as tame the market channel known as the World Wide 
Web. Let’s turn now to a discussion of the WebTrust family of products to better under­
stand the WebTrust framework.
WebTrust: Its Family
The WebTrust “family” of products includes WebTrust for Business-to-Consumer elec­
tronic commerce and WebTrust-ISP for Internet Service Providers in electronic com­
merce. Practitioners may wish to refer to the “Guide to Auditors and Users of a Third- 
Party Service Provider Audit Report in a WebTrust Engagement.” You can download this 
document from the AICPA’s website at http://ftp.aicpa.org/public/download/ 
webtrust/tpsp625.doc. This guidance is similar to the type of report described in SAS No. 
70, “Reports on the Processing of Transactions by Service Organizations,” (AICPA, Profes­
sional Standards, vol. 1, sec. 324). Under current development by the Electronic Com­
merce Assurance Task Force is WebTrust for Certification Authorities and WebTrust for 
the Business-to-Business marketplace.
For an Internet site to be considered for a WebTrust engagement, it must have embodied 
all WebTrust principles and criteria for a minimum of two months. If, during the two- 
month period, there have only been a minimal number of transactions, practitioners 
should consider a longer period of time as a requirement. This time-related requirement 
is in place to provide ample opportunity for the site to test and evaluate its own policies 
and procedures.
The constant state of change of the Internet and its corresponding technologies will re­
quire changes and updates to WebTrust whose principles and criteria are the core of this 
program.
WebTrust Principles and Criteria: Business-to-Consumer
WebTrust for Business-to-Consumer electronic commerce covers three broad areas that 
we refer to as principles: (1) Business Practices and Information Privacy Practices, (2) 
Transaction Integrity Controls, and (3) Information Protection Controls. These three 
principles and the corresponding criteria that support these principles are the basis of 
the examination for WebTrust for Business-to-Consumer electronic commerce. The most 
current version of the principles and criteria can be found at http://www.aicpa.org/ 
webtrust/princrit.htm.
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WebTrust Priniciples and Criteria: ISP
WebTrust-ISP for Internet Service Providers in electronic commerce, although similar to 
the WebTrust for consumers, focuses on the business-to-business transaction between an 
ISP and its customer. This program concentrates on four broad principles: (1) Business 
Practice and Information Privacy Practices, (2) Availability, (3) Security and Privacy, and 
(4) Service Integrity. Again, there are corresponding criteria related to these principles 
that are the basis for the WebTrust examination. The most current version of the princi­
ples and criteria for WebTrust-ISP can be found at http://www.aicpa.org/webtrust/ 
ispfin.htm.
We describe WebTrust principles and criteria in more detail throughout the rest of this 
book and also include a table summarizing WebTrust principles in the next chapter.
New Client Acceptance
One cannot emphasize enough the importance of choosing your clients carefully and 
wisely. All too often, we are so excited about having a new client that we forget to take 
prudent care in determining whether the client is suitable for our practice.
Consider for a moment the importance of client selection in terms of the risk and expo­
sure that a major SEC client poses to an accounting firm. If the practitioner performs fi­
nancial statement work for this SEC client, he or she must consider who the intended 
third-party user of the financial reports will be. Stockholders, portfolio managers, banks, 
and other financial institutions, as well as potential investors, are all possibilities. Now 
consider the much wider spectrum of the WebTrust engagement. Here, the intended 
third-party user of the accountant’s report will be anyone who visits the website and sees 
the WebTrust seal, whether or not they even read the report. Therefore, in reality, the en­
tire world is a potential user of your WebTrust report! Such exposure is worthy of serious 
consideration.
Many firms currently use a form or checklist to help identify 
factors related to accepting a new client. If your firm has such a docu­
ment and uses it—bravo! If your firm does not have such a document 
or if you are looking for other ideas about how to sort through the is­
sues that relate to client selection, we have included an acceptable 
checklist for your use. See the form “Engagement Acceptance” in Ap­
pendix C. Now we examine some of the major factors to consider re­
garding new client acceptance.
Is Going Concern an Issue for Engagements?
There has been much discussion regarding the need to verify the financial fitness of the 
business before issuing a WebTrust seal. It is important to understand that a WebTrust 
engagement is not intended to provide any assurance on the financial viability of a com­
pany. Rather, WebTrust is intended to provide assurance in specific consumer-oriented 
areas as outlined by the WebTrust principles regarding a company’s electronic commerce 
disclosures, controls, policies, and procedures.
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That being said, it is important for the practitioner to assess the risk in accepting a client 
that may have difficulty in meeting its current obligations. Also, there is an implied un­
derstanding that a customer order will be fulfilled according to the site’s disclosed busi­
ness practices. Therefore, the fact that a client site is able to meet its obligations accord­
ing to its disclosed business practices, even though there has been a
going concern opinion issued, would not preclude the practitioner 
from issuing a WebTrust seal. However, the practitioner is urged to 
apply due professional care in accepting the engagement and in 
monitoring this situation in an on-going WebTrust engagement.
Background Information
This section of the checklist would cover information such as the 
client name, address, telephone number, in addition to information 
about the key shareholders, officers, and management. Make sure 
you include the client’s e-mail address and URL for the client web­
site.
How the Client Was Acquired
A good understanding of your referral sources can alleviate a lot of worry about your new 
client. Was the referral from another client who knows and understands your firm’s prac­
tices? Or was the referral from another business relationship such as an attorney, banker, 
or professional association? Your new client checklist is a good place to accumulate this 
type of information. It’s also a good idea to find out why the new potential client is chang­
ing affiliations with its current accounting firm. Is there a dispute with the prior accoun­
tant that could impair the service you will be performing? Or is there no prior accountant 
at all—is this a new, start-up company?
Many practitioners may be a little hesitant in accepting a new client without some type of 
retainer until they have established a comfortable working relationship with the potential 
client. However, it is important to understand that this traditional approach may result in 
the loss of some premier clients. Clients involved in eCommerce and the Internet tend to 
be younger, more entrepreneurial, and eager to try new approaches to business on the 
net. Your next client could be the next Amazon Book or Dell Computer. How would you 
feel if you did not accept them as a new client simply because they had no prior accoun­
tant? This is not to say that you should exercise no caution with new clients. We are simply 
trying to get you to look at new client acquisitions in a different light, especially when 
working on the Internet.
Fees
Accountants can be terrible bill collectors, either because the tradition of our profession 
allows us to believe that our clients are willing to pay our invoices, or because we are too 
timid to ask for our fees after rendering our services. Some clients know this and are will­
ing to use you as a bank. Consider this recommendation based on the policy we have for 
dealing with new clients in our firm. When we meet with a new client, we explain that we 
have two rules in dealing with our clients:
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• We expect to do an outstanding job for our clients
• We expect to be paid in a timely manner for our services
You need to determine what a timely manner is for your firm, communicate it to your 
client, and then stick to your agreement. In the long run, your client will respect 
and value the service you render. This is not to say, however, that there will not be 
exceptions.
Independence
Because WebTrust is an attestation service, independence will be of paramount impor­
tance. A lack of independence will preclude you from performing the engagement. As 
such, it should be addressed in your new client checklist. Rule 101 of the AICPA Code of 
Professional Conduct (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 2, ET sec. 101) is the authorita­
tive guide in this area. For those of you who have not reviewed these rules for some time, 
you may be surprised by your understanding (or lack of understanding) in this area.
Take this short quiz and then consult Rule 101 to see how you did.
1. CPA has been engaged to provide assistance in selecting and installing a computerized 
accounting package. Eight months later CPA is requested to do an audit for this client. 
Independent or not? (Hint: Does CPA have decision-making authority?)
Answer: The CPA may still be independent if the CPA has NOT made management 
decisions during the installation process.
2. You just got off the telephone with Microsoft who has asked you to conduct their 
WebTrust engagement. Your partner has one share of Microsoft stock. Independent 
or not? (Hint: tell your partner to sell or give away his stock)
Answer: Even with one share of stock, independence has been impaired, albeit the ap­
pearance of independence.
3. Your firm has a nominal ($10,000) line of credit with Bank A, which was negotiated at 
an arm’s length and is similar to other lines of credit that Bank A has. Bank A has just 
requested you perform their WebTrust engagement. Independent or not? (Hint: How 
important is your $10,000 line of credit?)
Answer: The firm’s independence is impaired.
4. Same facts as number 3 except that you have your mortgage rather than a line of 
credit at Bank A. Independent or not? (Hint: When did you take out your mortgage 
with Bank A?)
Answer: The firm’s independence MAY be impaired. It depends on when the mort­
gage was taken out.
It is important that independence be protected and documented. Many of our clients will 
look to us when setting up eCommerce systems, in the same way that they looked to us to 
set up their computer systems and networks a few years ago. As we become involved in 
this process, we need to make sure we differentiate between firm-wide independence and 
team-wide objectivity. What do the terms, “independence” and “objectivity” mean? Inde­
pendence is the ability to form an unbiased conclusion about the reliability of an asser­
tion, no matter what that assertion may be. Objectivity is the ability to make a fair, impar­
tial, and detached assessment of work product or process.
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With these terms in mind, team objectivity occurs when a different group of professionals 
performs a WebTrust examination than the team that implements the eCommerce system 
for a particular client. Objectivity is an attribute that can be regained after being compro­
mised much easier than regaining lost independence.
Required Skills for Engagements
The last area we will discuss concerning new client acceptance is whether 
the firm acquiring the new client has people with the required skills to 
perform the proposed engagement in a competent professional manner. 
It is important to look at our firm’s resources to ascertain whether we can 
offer our potential clients the appropriate level of expertise that their 
jobs require.
Success in the next century will depend greatly on the strategic alliances we are able to 
form with various partners. These partners will not only serve as a resource to our firms 
and clients, but will also be a valuable referral source as well. For example, consider the 
option of becoming a partner with telecommunication, networking, and other technol­
ogy companies to broaden the resources you are able to offer to your clients.
In a WebTrust engagement, practitioners will need to use skills from the audit and ac­
counting environment, in addition to technology skills. A strong foundation in the tradi­
tional accounting professional standards is a must. A practitioner should understand “at­
testation standards” (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AT sec. 100), ethics guidelines, 
as described in “Principles of Professional Conduct” (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 2, 
ET secs. 51-57), and quality control guidelines, as described in, “Quality Control” 
(AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 2, QC secs. 20 & 30) for a WebTrust engagement.
Because WebTrust engagements take advantage of the opportunities of the World Wide 
Web, technology skills will play a major role in the engagement. As much as 30-60% of a 
typical engagement may have a technology component. Factor in the rapid change of 
technology and the accounting professional is faced with a formidable task. So how does 
an accountant keep up with firewalls, data scopes, cryptography protocols, and other 
technology-related issues in addition to tax and accounting changes?
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If your firm does not have the skills on staff, you need to make a commitment to acquire 
those technology skills. We suggest three ways to acquire the necessary skills, outlined in 
order of personal preference:
1. Hire an individual who has the skills you need
2. Contract with an individual who has the skills you need, until the demand for these 
skills is full-time
3. Train an individual on staff with the skills you need
Although there will be some disagreement with the ordering suggested, it has been our 
firm’s experience that the least effective way to acquire new skills is training from within 
the firm. Within-firm training is often more costly than the alternatives and can be very 
time-consuming. Therefore, we recommend that you look outside your firm for special­
ists. So where do we get qualified specialists?
The first place to look for another specialist is within our profession. Many state societies 
have created or are in the process of creating a data base of other accounting profession­
als and their associated skills. This data base is normally available at the state society web­
site. The AICPA also has an Information Technology Membership section that provides 
additional opportunities to network with other technology professionals. If your state soci­
ety does not have these resources available to you, ask how you can get involved to make 
them available.
Other resources to consider in your search for technology professionals are local colleges 
and universities as well as user groups. All of these organizations should be able to point 
you in the right direction.
One final word of caution when using an outside specialist—make sure you obtain rea­
sonable assurance of the specialists’ qualifications and skills. Review AICPA, Professional 
Standards, vol. 1, AT sec. 100, particularly para. .12-.13, for further guidance in this area.
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Practicing Across State Lines or International Boundaries
Electronic commerce provides ample opportunities for the practitioner to practice across 
state lines. The AICPA is currently working with the National Association of State Boards
of Accountancy (NASBA) to work out a uniform licensing agreement with the United
States and its territories. This agreement has not been reached; therefore, 
accountants practicing across state lines should contact the licensing 
agency for the state in which they desire to practice and obtain the re­
quired license.
Because WebTrust is a global service, it is conceivable that an engagement 
may be obtained outside the country in which the accountant normally 
practices. If this is the situation, the practitioner should exercise due pro­
fessional care in contacting the country where the report will be issued 
and complying with any licensing requirements of that jurisdiction.
Included in Appendix B is a summary of the state-by-state temporary practice rules. This 
information has been obtained from the AICPA/NASBA Digest of State Laws and State 
Board Regulations—1998 (Product No. 064041). Contact AICPA’s Member Satisfaction 
Team at 1-800-777-7077 for ordering information.
If a portion of the engagement takes place in another state—for example, if the server is 
physically in New York, but the client offices are in California, a New York license would 
not be required, because the report would be issued for the client in California. This situ­
ation would be analogous to an inventory observation where the client offices are in Col­
orado, but the inventory is stored in New Mexico. The Colorado CPA would not be re­
quired to obtain a license from the state of New Mexico. A simple rule to keep in 
mind—you should be licensed in the state where the accountant’s report will be issued.
Third-Party Arbitration
Because of the unique nature of electronic commerce, customers who 
visit a website are concerned about how their complaints are addressed. 
If the company with the website is unwilling or unable to address the 
concerns of a consumer, what recourse does the consumer have? If 
the consumer is in one country and the business is in another, how will 
the rights of the consumer be protected?
As you know, traditional dispute resolution through the court system can be both time­
consuming and expensive (in addition to frustrating!). Some governments, for example, 
France, England, and Germany, already require consumer recourse procedures to ensure 
consumer protection. The consumer recourse provision in WebTrust meets the require­
ments mandated by the European Union (EU) and other regulatory bodies around the 
globe.
What Can the NAF Do for Dispute Resolution?
To facilitate dispute resolution matters for both the consumer and the online business, the 
National Arbitration Forum (NAF) has assisted in the design of a program for eCommerce 
and, specifically, for WebTrust. The program allows users to file forms and complaints
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electronically, over the telephone, or through the postal service. Through NAF affiliations 
around the world, global consumers now have access to low cost expedient arbitration.
Companies that already have a dispute resolution mechanism would continue to use their 
current resolution process but would apply the consumer recourse rules that relate specif­
ically to WebTrust. A complete version of the Code of Procedure can be found at the 
NAF website, www.arb-forum.com. The consumer recourse provisions of WebTrust cover 
not only privacy issues but also address any aspect of the consumer purchase at the 
website.
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes said justice is found in “known rules, con­
sistently applied.” The NAF believes arbitration must be based on the rules of law, applied 
consistently. The NAF “Code of Procedures”2 must also be applied fairly and without prej­
udice to either of the parties involved in a dispute. To that end, the NAF has developed 
twelve principles that form the basis of the arbitration process. These principles will be 
applied to all WebTrust engagements, whether the NAF is retained for the arbitration 
process or an alternate organization is selected. The principles are as follows:
2 National Arbitration Forum, “Code of Procedure” (June 1, 1999).
1. FUNDAMENTALLY FAIR PROCESS—All parties in an arbitration process are enti­
tled to fundamental fairness.
2. ACCESS TO INFORMATION—Information about arbitration should be reasonably 
accessible before the parties commit to an arbitration contract.
3. COMPETENT AND IMPARTIAL ARBITRATORS—The arbitrators should be both 
skilled and neutral.
4. INDEPENDENT ADMINISTRATION—An arbitration should be administered by 
someone other than the arbitrator or the parties themselves.
5. CONTRACTS FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION—An agreement to arbitration is a con­
tract and should conform to the legal principles of contract.
6. REASONABLE COST—The cost of an arbitration should be in proportion to the 
claim.
7. REASONABLE TIME LIMITS—A dispute should be resolved with reasonable 
promptness.
8. RIGHT TO REPRESENTATION—All parties have the right to be represented in an 
arbitration if they wish, for example, by an attorney or other representative.
9. SETTLEMENT & MEDIATION—The preferable process is for the parties themselves 
to resolve the dispute.
10. HEARINGS—Hearings should be convenient, efficient, and fair for all.
11. REASONABLE DISCOVERY—The parties should have access to the information they 
need to make a reasonable presentation of their case to the arbitrator.
12. AWARDS AND REMEDIES—The remedies resulting from an arbitration must con­








The WebTrust Engagement—Planning Tools
In this chapter, we briefly discuss website development and then look at 
the various tools a practitioner may wish to use in planning a WebTrust 
engagement. We will discuss the self-assessment document prepared by 
the AICPA as well as the WebTrust engagement letter. Then, we will de­
scribe how to put together a strategy for performing the actual engage­
ment.
Website Development
Business websites typically have been developed by a marketing department. The market­
ing orientation of site developers often results in sites with few accounting controls, be­
cause the marketing focus is on the message more than accounting controls. If websites 
were developed by accounting personnel, there’s a good chance that those professionals 
would want to place too many controls at the website. Too many controls could restrict 
and even curtail the success of a site. What can organizations do to achieve a better bal­
ance of functional views on their websites?
An organization that forms a group made up of the controller (or accounting personnel), 
members of the marketing department, and the company owner can help create a dy­
namic website development team. You, as the technology professional, can play an invalu­
able role for your client, because you offer the balance between the freedom the market­
ing department needs, and the control the accounting department requires.
Self-Assessment Document
The self-assessment document was developed by the AICPA Electronic Commerce Task 
Force to assist both practitioners and their clients in ascertaining WebTrust readiness.
You can obtain a copy of the self-assessment document in Appendix B of “WebTrust Prin­
ciples and Criteria for Business-to-Consumer Electronic Commerce” (AICPA/CICA, 15 
October 1999) online at http://www.aicpa.org/webtrust/princrit.htm as well as in Ap­
pendix C of this guide.
The self-assessment document is divided into several parts. The first part of the docu­
ment is intended to provide additional background information to the practitioner. 
The next sections are devoted to the WebTrust principles mentioned in Chapter 
One.
The next section of the self-assessment form addresses the issues of site management 
and providing notification of any changes to the practitioner. These requirements of
11
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WebTrust are a real hurdle for both practitioners and clients due to practitioners’ prior 
business practices, which we discuss in the following paragraph.
Historically, auditors have gone to their clients, including many review and compilation 
clients, at the end of the client’s fiscal year to prepare for the scheduled engagements. At 
that time, auditors asked their clients to determine whether there have been any changes 
made to the internal control environment and whether there are any other significant 
policy changes that are important for auditors to know. Then, auditors would update the 
permanent files and audit procedures and perform the audit.
Guidelines for WebTrust require that our clients inform us of any change in the manner 
in which the client complies with the WebTrust Principles and Criteria before imple­
menting such change! This revision in approach requires that both the client and the 
practitioner make a change in their habits. Although the criteria place the burden on the 
client to inform the practitioner of any changes, it would be a good idea for practitioners 
to be more pro-active with clients regarding changes made at the website that affect how 
the site qualifies for the WebTrust seal. As a matter of good practice, this management of 
change could be beneficial if adapted to other areas of practice.
One helpful practice tip is that involving staff with this change process works well. The 
staff of most firms understands how to use the Internet and sometimes uses the Internet 
with company hardware—and on non-billable time. Requiring the engagement team staff 
members to visit a WebTrust site each day looking for any indication of change to the site 
helps turn surfing the Internet into productive time. Requiring that the staff regularly 
visit websites keeps the staff alert to possible changes that may affect the manner in which 
a company achieves the WebTrust Principles and Criteria. However, we are not so naive 
as to believe that all changes to the site will be reflected in the specific pages of a website. 
Therefore, the manager of the engagement should review the site at least monthly and re­
port any findings to the engagement partner.
The final section of the self-assessment documents, called “other matters,” includes all 
other matters not previously discussed. Items in this section may include anticipated 
change in the organizational structure, soon-to-be-released technology that may impact 
the business, or specific laws governing the industry in which the client operates. By no 
means are these items to be considered all-inclusive.
In fact, the entire self-assessment documents should not be considered all-encompassing 
in its scope. The practitioner should feel free to modify the document to meet the par­
ticular needs of the firm and client. As the WebTrust Principles and Criteria continue 
to go through development and refinement, the self-assessment document will change 
as well.
Each practitioner should become familiar with the AICPA website and the specific URL 
for the WebTrust principles, criteria, and the self-assessment document. At the AICPA 
website, you can obtain an electronic copy of these documents and thereby avoid out-of- 
date documentation. The address for the WebTrust Principles and Criteria is 
http://www.aicpa.org/webtrust/princrit.htm. While you are at the AICPA site, look at the 
information regarding the Yankolovich study on consumer attitudes and trends to eCom­
merce.
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Assessing Risk and Materiality
In any attest engagement, there are three types of risk: (1) inherent 
risk that is beyond the control of both the practitioner and the client; 
(2) control risk that is within the control of management; and (3) de­
tection risk that is within the control of the accountant.
Professional standards require the practitioner to reduce the overall engagement risk to 
an acceptable level. This comment begs for a definition of what is an “acceptable level.” 
Most practitioners would agree that an acceptable level is one that the firm is willing to 
take on under normal circumstances. Section 37 of ATI 00 (AICPA, Professional Standards, 
vol. 1) requires “careful exercise of professional judgment.”
In a WebTrust engagement, the practitioner should consider gathering evidence from in­
dependent sources outside the entity as the highest source of information needed to sup­
port the reduction of risk. Next, consideration should be given to evidence obtained by 
first-hand experience with or knowledge of the client. This may include observations and 
inspection of the transactions. Last, the practitioner should consider the internal controls 
of the client, because these controls relate to the client’s eCommerce model and website.
It could be argued that if an audit client has no internal controls, an audit is still possible. 
In this situation, testing of transactions would have to be greatly expanded—possibly to 
100%. In a WebTrust engagement if no internal controls exist, a WebTrust seal is NOT 
possible because WebTrust is all about controls, procedures, and policies.
In addition to consideration of the sources of evidence the practitioner gathers in assess­
ing risk, we should revisit new client acceptance for just a moment. Give careful consider­
ation to this step because it has a direct impact on the overall risk of an engagement.
Clients should understand their responsibility in complying with the WebTrust Principles 
and Criteria.
Materiality is a concept that many practitioners in the audit environment have struggled 
with for some time. In a WebTrust engagement, materiality is more difficult to determine 
due to the complexity and scope of the Internet. To illustrate this point, take a site that 
sells books on-line. Assume that the annual sales for this company exceed $5,000,000. 
Now further assume that this site decides to add a line of rare out-of-print books to its 
product mix.
To the overall engagement, the rare book line will probably be immaterial to the engage­
ment. However, consider the consumer who buys only rare books and has purchased a 
book from this site at a cost of $2,000. To the individual consumer, the purchase of a sin­
gle book is material.
The practitioner should review the guidelines for materiality that are found in AT sec­
tions 400 and 500 of AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1 for additional guidance. As with 
any engagement, the practitioner should exercise due professional care and judgment at 
all times.
Another practice note here—the question constantly comes up regarding any prohibi­
tions on sites that are pornographic in nature. The AICPA does not issue any statements 
or prohibitions in this area. Similarly, the AICPA has not issued any audit guidelines with 
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regard to this type of industry. The practitioner should exercise care and forethought, 
however, as to whether the practitioner’s firm desires to display this association. Remem­
ber the accountants’ report will be displayed at the client website for the entire world to 
see.
Periodic Updates
“How much?” and “how often?” are the two questions most often 
posed regarding the WebTrust program, from both the practitioner 
and client. Let’s address the “how often” part of this question first.
For sites that have little change, a three-month examination period 
should be sufficient. Change should NOT be equated with changes 
to the hypertext markup language (html) documents. A mere 
change in form does not necessarily mean there are changes to the
underlying manner in which a client meets the WebTrust Principles and Criteria. A 
change in an html document is equivalent to a store on Main Street changing its window 
display.
Consider change by evaluating the changes made to a website that has met the criteria for 
a WebTrust engagement. For example, a new firewall added to the system, moving to an­
other Internet Service Provider (ISP), or adding a new product line are all situations that 
would require some additional work before issuing a new accountant’s report. If these 
types of changes occur during a three-month cycle, the practitioner will need to consider 
the effect they have on the engagement and the materiality of such changes. Then, he or 
she should consider performing an examination before the end of a normal three-month 
period.
If the change is not material, for example, adding a new product line that uses the same 
systems and procedures as other products, the practitioner may not need to accelerate 
the examination of the website.
For sites that are constantly changing, a shortened examination period may be desirable. 
Because these sites undergo change rapidly, the practitioner’s risk may be greater. The 
practitioner may also wish to have a shortened engagement period for clients that are 
new to electronic commerce or for sites that are undergoing rapid growth. After obtain­
ing experience with new or changing sites, a three-month period may be appropriate.
Having considered the “how often” part of periodic updates, let’s consider the other part 
of the equation—the “how much.” Although no standards have been developed in this 
area, we have found that a good rule of thumb to follow is to perform some work in each 
of the criteria. For example, if a specific criteria has several points, the practitioner may 
choose to test one or more of those points. Certainly, the practitioner should test any cri­
teria that have been affected by a change the client has made.
The practitioner should devise a plan of testing specific criteria so that all criteria will be 
tested in a calendar year on a rotating or rolling basis. Controls deemed to be material or 
critical to the overall client system or client business practices should always be tested on 
every update. For example, in a WebTrust engagement for an on-line bank where encryp­
tion is critical, the practitioner should consider testing all of the controls for encryption 
for each examination period.
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Once again, the practitioner should use professional judgment in deter­
mining how much is enough. Factors to consider are risk, materiality, and 
internal controls the client has in place.
Consider the following suggestion of a schedule of how to monitor a site in 
between your fieldwork:
• Weekly—staff assigned to the engagement should visit the site and note any changes. 
Note—a visual change at a website does not necessarily indicate a change in which a 
company meets the WebTrust Principles and Criteria but can be a good indicator of 
“behind-the-scene” changes taking place.
• Monthly—a manager or partner in the engagement should contact the site by tele­
phone to ascertain whether the client has made any changes to the site.
• Other—consider the practice of placing an email address, specific to the site, on the 
accountants’ report. By having a separate mailbox for each engagement, it is possible 
to monitor those sites that may be having problems quickly.
Engagement Letter
The engagement letter is one of the most valuable tools for the prac­
titioner to use. It helps the client understand the services to be per­
formed and the client’s responsibilities to the engagement, improves 
overall engagement management, and is required by the WebTrust 
license. Take time to put the engagement letter together carefully 
because of the potential exposure it can cause. See a sample Engage­
ment Letter in Appendix C.
In a WebTrust engagement, the engagement letter is mandated by the WebTrust license 
agreement and communicates specific requirements to the client. Among these are:
1. Need for hypertext within the WebTrust seal and the independent accountant’s re­
port.
2. Duration of the seal—this is not to exceed three months in any circumstance.
3. Requirement of the client to inform the practitioner regarding changes to the website 
that affect the manner in which the client meets the WebTrust Principles and Criteria.
4. Information regarding use of the WebTrust seal and other related service marks in ad­
vertising and other print or electronic media.
5. Acceptance of the subscriber agreement and related expiration date of the certificate 
of authority. (Currently VeriSign is acting in this role.)
6. Understanding control over the WebTrust seal and corresponding digital certificate.
7. Need for the client’s consent to a review of the work papers and other documents for 
quality control.
8. Need for management to provide a representation letter at the end of the engage­
ment.
9. Need for a third-party arbitration mechanism, for example, the National Arbitration 
Forum (NAF—refer back to Chapter One for related information) to cover transac­
tions at the website.
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A common question addresses the issue of whether the engagement letter should be an 
annual letter or should be prepared for the initial engagement and then for each subse­
quent update. Because the digital certificate awarded by the practitioner expires one year 
after it has been issued, an annual engagement letter covering the initial engagement and 
all updates would be appropriate. However, no professional guidelines have been issued; 
therefore, the practitioner should feel free to adapt the engagement letter to his or her 
practice.
Three points that need to be made regarding engagement letters:
1. Use an engagement letter as a matter of practice.
2. Review engagement letters periodically for needed updates.
3. Explain the engagement letter to the client and the staff.
One final comment—the importance of an engagement letter cannot be overempha­
sized.
Year 2000 Issues
Hanging over our heads is the year 2000, or Y2K, problem. Experts are at odds about 
placing a dollar amount on this problem; the SEC is requiring little disclosure related to 
year 2000 matters, and attorneys are gearing up for full employment.
Because of the nature of the year 2000 issue, a WebTrust engagement is not intended to 
reveal problems in this area, nor is the engagement expected to give any assurance re­
garding the Y2K readiness of a company.
Many individuals have said that the Y2K issue would not be a challenge 
for a WebTrust engagement until the quarter before and after the year 
2000. However, the practitioner should consider Y2K effects of some 
product and sales cycles that may go beyond a quarter or year; e.g., sale 
of annuities and purchase of mortgages.
Practitioners should add the following wording to both the engagement 
letter and the accountant’s report regarding the Y2K issue. Any conclu­
sions, based on our findings, to future periods is subject to the risk that 
(1) changes made to the system or controls, (2) changes in processing
requirements, or (3) changes required because of the passage of time [such as to accom­
modate dates in the year 2000] may alter the validity of such conclusions.
Sample Accountant’s Report
The accountant’s report would then read as follows:
To The Management of ABC Company, Inc.:
We have examined the assertion [hot link to management’s assertion] by the 
management of ABC Company, Inc. (ABC) regarding the disclosure of its elec­
tronic commerce business and information privacy practices on its website and 
the effectiveness of its controls over transaction integrity and information pro­
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tection for electronic commerce (at WWW.ABC.COM) during the period Au­
gust 1, 2000 through October 31, 2000.
These electronic commerce disclosures and controls are the responsibility of 
the management of ABC Company. Our responsibility is to express an opinion 
on management’s assertions with regard to the AICPA/CICA WebTrust Criteria 
[hot link] based on our examination.
Our examination was conducted in accordance with attestation standards estab­
lished by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants and, accord­
ingly, included: (1) obtaining an understanding of ABC Company’s electronic 
commerce business practices, its controls over the processing of electronic com­
merce transactions, and the protection of related private customer information; 
(2) selectively testing transactions executed in accordance with disclosed busi­
ness practices; (3) testing and evaluating the operating effectiveness of the con­
trols; and (4) performing such other procedures as we considered necessary in 
the circumstances. We believe that our examination provides a reasonable basis 
for our opinion.
Because of inherent limitations in controls, errors or fraud may occur and not 
be detected. Furthermore, the projection of any conclusions, based on our 
findings, to future periods is subject to the risk that (1) changes made to the 
system or controls, (2) changes in processing requirements, or (3) changes re­
quired because of the passage of time, such as to accommodate dates in the 
year 2000, may alter the validity of such conclusions.
In our opinion, during the period August 1, 2000 through October 31, 2000, 
ABC Company, in all material respects:
• disclosed its business and information privacy practices for electronic com­
merce transactions and executed transactions in accordance with its dis­
closed business practices;
• maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that cus­
tomers’ orders placed using electronic commerce were completed and 
billed as agreed; and
• maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that private 
customer information obtained as a result of electronic commerce was pro­
tected from uses not related to ABC’s business based on the AICPA/CICA 
WebTrust Criteria.
The CPA WebTrust seal of assurance on ABC’s website for electronic commerce 
constitutes a symbolic representation of the contents of this report and it is not 
intended, nor should it be construed, to update this report or provide any addi­
tional assurance.
This report does not include any representation as to the quality of ABC’s 
goods or services nor their suitability for any customer’s intended purpose.
X, Y & Z (name of CPA firm) 
Certified Public Accountants 
City, State
November 4, 2000 (date of report)
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Going Concern Issues Revisited
We discussed the Going Concern issue in Chapter One and need to reconsider this topic as 
we plan the initial WebTrust engagement and subsequent updates to the seal.
The question of the financial stability of a company often comes into question before and 
during a WebTrust engagement. It is important for practitioners to understand that the 
WebTrust service does not address the going concern opinion, which is a financial condi­
tion.
The criteria for Transaction Integrity (introduced in Chapter One) state that the company 
“maintains effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that customers’ orders 
placed using electronic commerce are completed and billed as agreed.” A strict interpre­
tation of this principle should lead the practitioner to question the financial ability of an 
organization to purchase the goods that customers are ordering.
Should a company in Chapter 11 bankruptcy be denied the opportunity to earn the 
WebTrust seal? Our first reaction may be to say yes. How can a business in bankruptcy 
(and with a going concern opinion) be eligible for the WebTrust seal? Although no 
definitive answer can be provided, note that Macy’s Department Stores were in Chapter 
11 for several months and still were able to carry on business. In any event, the practi­
tioner should give special consideration to the financial stability of a company and assess 
the risk this adds to the engagement.
Engagement Forms, Procedures, and Considerations
The next section of this document covers examples of workpapers and 
the associated procedures the accountant would perform in a routine 
WebTrust engagement. Information presented here is not intended to be 
all-inclusive or authoritative. The recommendations presented here are 
for the practitioner’s guidance; therefore, due professional care is recom­
mended in applying this information to a specific engagement.
Self-Assessment Document Revisited
Because of the importance of the self-assessment document discussed in 
Chapter One, we revisit this topic here. (The document is included in Ap­
pendix C of this guide.) We include information about how you might 
consider using this document based on our experience.
Consider proceeding as follows when interacting with your client about 
the self-assessment document. Provide the self-assessment document to
the client and ask him/her to complete as much of the document as possible. Explain 
that some of the information will not be relevant, and other information may not be 
known. It might be a good idea to stress that the process of completing the document is 
important for the client’s own assessment as to readiness for the WebTrust seal. Also men­
tion that the document should be filled out as completely as possible and not to worry if 
there are some areas left blank. You might consider encouraging the client to involve
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other individuals from their company in completing this assignment and, perhaps, rec­
ommend the sales/marketing manager (many times this is the company president), the 
controller or accounting manager, and the webmaster. Each of these individuals has a 
unique perspective concerning the company’s website.
At the end of one week, meet again and review the document. Prepare for the meeting by 
visiting the client’s website and copying pages that have any type of disclosure relating to 
the WebTrust Principles and Criteria. At the meeting, discuss the client’s readiness for 
the engagement and also make some specific recommendations to the client regarding 
any weaknesses noted based on information in the document.
In one specific engagement situation, it was our experience that the client requested a 
two-week extension on preparing the document. When we met three weeks later, this 
client had redesigned its website to meet (and, in some cases, exceed) the requirements 
set forth in the WebTrust Principles and Criteria. In another engagement, the client real­
ized that the ISP they were using provided no security for their transactions. The lack of 
security prompted the client to change to another ISP that provided the protection the 
client wanted.
When the self-assessment document is complete, the practitioner would have a basis for 
putting together a work program. Without the self-assessment document, both the practi­
tioner and the client lack important information.
Analytical Procedures
Analytical procedures involve comparing actual results with industry statistics or antici­
pated results. Because the area of eCommerce is relatively new, 
the accountant may find it impossible to find any meaningful in­
dustry numbers for analytical comparison. In this case, the practi­
tioner will need to rely on experience with the client to interpret 
the results.
Because a WebTrust engagement is not an examination of the finan­
cial statements of a company, traditional ratio analysis will be of little 
benefit. However, trend analysis and reasonableness tests should 
provide some help in ascertaining information regarding the elec­
tronic activities of a client.
Trend analysis compares the actual dollar amounts or percentage 
change in specific accounts over time. For example, the practitioner may wish to analyze 
the change in warranty service for goods purchased electronically over a period of time. 
Then, the practitioner could compare the results to the warranty service account for 
goods purchased in a traditional manner. Major fluctuations would require additional in­
quiry from the accountant.
Reasonableness tests can involve ratios or estimating account balances. For example, cer­
tain expenses are estimated with ratios:
• Commission expense ÷ electronic commerce sales
• Shipping expense ÷ electronic commerce sales
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• Estimating electronic commerce sales based on the number of sales on the Internet
• Estimating warranty expense based on total sales X Internet sales
The purpose of reasonableness tests is to provide a means for the practitioner to 
determine where more inquiry or analysis may be required. Experience with the client 
and the industry will assist the practitioner in drawing meaningful conclusions from 
the results. Keep in mind the following factors when evaluating the results of any 
analytical test:
• Expected fluctuation. Some fluctuation should be expected and may be affected by 
outside and predictable influences.
• Materiality. Any fluctuation should be analyzed from the standpoint of overall materi­
ality to the engagement.
• Experience with electronic commerce. If the client has little history with electronic 
commerce, or is in a strong growth period, analytical procedures may not be benefi­
cial.
WebTrust Principles Summary
Because there have been two additional principles introduced as a result of the recent 
issuance of WebTrust ISP and Version 2.0 of the principles and criteria, the following 



















Chapter 2: The WebTrust Engagement—Planning Tools
Business and Information Privacy Practices Disclosures
eCommerce often involves transactions between strangers. Appearances can be deceiving. 
How can a consumer know whether an entity that presents a well-constructed Web page 
will really fill its orders for goods and services as it claims? How can a consumer know 
whether the entity will allow the return of goods, or whether there are product 
warranties?
The anonymity of eCommerce and the ease with which the unscrupulous can establish— 
and abandon—electronic identities make it crucial that people know that those entities 
with which they are doing business disclose and follow certain business practices. Without 
such useful information and the assurance that the entity has a history of following such 
practices, consumers could face an increased risk of loss, fraud, inconvenience, or unmet 
expectations.
Information privacy can be a two-edged sword. One the one hand, merchants need cer­
tain information to process a customer order. On the other hand, the customer does not 
want this information provided to others without their permission. In addition, errors can 
occur in a company database that the consumer should be able to correct or amend as 
needed. Without a process for error correction in place, decisions can be made that 
could negatively impact the consumer.
Global Impact of Privacy Criteria
eCommerce by its nature is global. As companies cross international boundaries, they are 
faced with the challenges of meeting standards and complying with laws regarding pri­
vacy. Merchants who wish to tap into the global market place may find that, without ade­
quate privacy standards at their site, they may be prohibited or restricted in the manner 
in which they are able to do business.
Consumers from other areas in the world are also concerned about how their informa­
tion will be used, how it is protected, what process is in place that will allow them to 
correct erroneous information, and who will have access to this information. Without 
proper criteria, procedures, and controls in place and without properly related 
disclosure, these consumers may choose to do business at another site where there are 
adequate controls.
Countries around the globe are setting policies in place to assure their citizens that their 
information is kept private. The European Union (EU) directives for the European com­
munity took the lead in this area with the Online Privacy Alliance (OPA) with the United 
States close behind. WebTrust meets or exceeds all critical requirements regarding pri­
vacy and consumer recourse as imposed by these two organizations and will continue to 
monitor changes in this area to make sure WebTrust remains compliant.
The disclosure criteria are, perhaps, one of the easiest for the practitioner to document— 
either the disclosure is present or it is not. It is important to remember that a site must 
have been compliant to this (and all) principles to receive the seal. One may ask—how 
will I know whether a specific disclosure has been at a website for two or more months?
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Simply put, you won’t know how long a particular disclosure has been on a website if you 
do not have first-hand knowledge as to when the disclosure was made. This knowledge 
may come from information gathered at the time the practitioner met with the client dur­
ing the self-assessment stage, from work history with the client, or by some other means. 
In reality, there will instances where the practitioner does not have or cannot obtain inde­
pendent information regarding the dates certain disclosures were placed on the website 
and made public. For this reason, the practitioner may wish to include the following 
wording in the management representation letter:
“We represent that the business practices disclosures for <www.abc.com> are current, 
accurate, and complete and have been on our website since July 1, 200X.”
The practitioner should also obtain supporting documentation from the client in the 
form of company policy manuals, shipping policies, sales policies, and other company re­
lated information.
Transaction Integrity
The principle of Transaction Integrity is the principle that most accountants are accus­
tomed to and, therefore, comfortable with. The intent of this principle is to provide assur­
ance that orders placed through electronic commerce will be fulfilled with the correct 
merchandise, information or service, and in the correct quantity. The principle also is in­
tended to provide a means by which customers may follow up on historic information re­
garding their order(s).
One of the weaknesses we have encountered is that of compatibility of electronic com­
merce systems with current accounting systems. Many pioneers in eCommerce have 
“patched” together a system that allows them to transact business on the Internet. These 
patched systems are, for the most part, manual in nature and, therefore, require the prac­
titioner’s special attention. As with most manual systems, the chance for human error in­
creases dramatically as the information from the eCommerce site is re-entered into the 
client’s order entry and accounting system.
This situation provides an excellent opportunity for consulting with the client and au­
tomating this process. One word of caution, however, the concepts of independence and 
objectivity may be compromised without due professional care.
From a “30,000-foot” vantage point, we can look at both the disclosure 
principle and the transaction integrity principle and see that these two 
principles encompass much of what the accounting profession calls an 
audit. With this in mind, we can see that WebTrust has provided a new 
attest service by using many of the tools that the practitioner is already 
using. The new skill set required for a WebTrust engagement comes 
into play with the Information Protection principle.
Availability Principle
The availability principle characterizes WebTrust-ISP. Because a customer’s own elec­
tronic commerce business can be totally reliant on the ISP providing its service and ensur­
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ing that the service is available, it is critical that a customer’s access to the Internet is avail­
able as advertised and promised by the ISP in its service-level agreement. If the ISP’s ser­
vice is unavailable for a significant period of time, each of the ISP’s customers may suffer 
temporary loss of revenue, impaired cash flow, and/or diminished public image.
In this regard, policies concerning matters such as customer notification of planned out­
ages (for system updates), repair time notification and alternative arrangements, if any, 
for emergency outages also should be disclosed. This principle applies only to 
WebTrust-ISP engagements and is not a consideration for WebTrust for Business-to- 
Consumer eCommerce engagements.
Service Integrity Principle
It is important that the ISP maintains effective controls over the electronic processing of 
its customers’ information. Like the availability principle, Service Integrity is a principle that 
is a characteristic of WebTrust-ISP.
The customer’s information may take the form of, for example, an e-mail message, an 
electronic commerce purchase order, a credit card authorization or, simply, a file transfer 
protocol (FTP) request. In the business and information privacy practices disclosure prin­
ciple, the ISP discloses its significant business practices related to its ISP services. The ser­
vice integrity principle addresses the controls that the ISP has in place to effectively meet 
its disclosed business practices. If the ISP’s service integrity is poor for a significant period 
of time, each ISP customer may suffer temporary loss of revenue, impaired cash flow 
and/or diminished public image. As a result, it is important that controls are maintained 
to provide reasonable assurance that incoming messages are processed and delivered ac­
curately and completely to the correct IP address and that outgoing messages are pro­
cessed and delivered accurately and completely to the ISP’s Internet access point. It is 
also important that controls exist to provide reasonable assurance that the ISP’s services 
perform at the bandwidth and throughput levels advertised for each generally available 
class of service. Finally, it is also important that transaction histories are retained in a se­
cure location, may not be altered without appropriate authorization, and are retrievable 
for review/investigation. In this way, the customer has available evidence that they are re­
ceiving the quality of service that they have contracted for.
Information Protection/Security and Privacy
Before beginning the discussion on Information Protection/Security and Privacy, let’s review 
the definition of private customer information applied to WebTrust.
Private customer information includes individually identifiable information about the 
customer. Such information includes, but is not limited to, his or her family (name, 
address, telephone number, social security or other government identification num­
bers, employer, credit card numbers, etc.), personal or family financial information, 
personal or family medical information, employment history, history of purchases or 
other transactions, credit records, and similar information
Because customers provide private information to the website or ISP, it is important that 
this information is protected from uses not related to the entity’s business. It is important 
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for customers to have confidence that they are using a secure site and that the business 
represented at the site is taking appropriate steps to protect private customer informa­
tion. Although it is relatively easy to establish an Internet-based business, the underlying 
technology can be complex and can entail a multitude of information protection and se­
curity issues. The confidentiality of sensitive information transmitted over the Internet, or 
retained by an ISP or website, can be compromised. For example, without the use of basic 
encryption techniques, which we discuss later in this book, consumer credit card numbers 
can be intercepted and stolen during transmission. Without appropriate firewalls and 
other security practices, which we also describe later in this book, private customer infor­
mation residing in an on-line computer system can be intentionally or unintentionally 
provided to third parties not related to the customer’s business. Security breaches also 
may include unauthorized access to corporate networks, including related operating sys­
tems, Internet/Web servers, and even access to the consumer’s Internet connection (for 
example, a connection from his or her home computer). Potential participants in elec­
tronic commerce may seek assurance that there are effective information protection con­
trols and a history of protecting private customer information.
In an AICPA study (the WebTrust study conducted by Yankelovich in August 1997), more 
than 60% of the individuals surveyed listed security and privacy as their number one con­
cern about doing business on-line. The European community also lists their number one 
concern as privacy and security. Similar reactions in both geographic areas reinforce the 
idea that privacy and security are paramount concerns for those who engage in on-line 
business.
The Information Protection/Security and Privacy principle offers the criteria that require 
some technological expertise on the part of the practitioner. The required level of exper­
tise may be found within the consulting division of the firm and, therefore, would provide 
an opportunity for the accounting and the consulting departments to work together on 
an engagement. If the expertise is not found within the firm, the practitioner will need to 
look outside to perform the engagement in a professional manner. Consider the merits 
of looking at a strategic alliance with another CPA firm or other professional who can 
provide the technological expertise service required (see the section, “Required Skills for 
Engagements” in Chapter One of this book for additional guidance).
For the practitioner to better understand the potential risks involved regarding informa­
tion protection issues, we present the following information from a recent FBI survey 
about computer crime.
FBI Computer Crime Survey
The 1999 FBI Computer Crime Survey details the practices of 521 companies from vari­
ous industries and of various sizes regarding securing their computer systems. The results 
highlight why security is a top concern for all kinds of businesses and what security-related 
issues every business needs to pay attention to.
In summary, the survey results show that:
• 61 percent of the organizations surveyed have experienced losses due to unauthorized 
computer use.
• 32 percent of the organizations surveyed are now using digital IDs.
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• The average loss from theft of proprietary information is over $1.2M.
• The average loss from data or network sabotage is over $1.1M.
• 50 percent of all organizations reported insider abuse of net access.
• 94 percent of organizations now have Web sites.
Here’s a closer look at some of the survey questions and results:
What types of security technology do you use?
• Access control, 89%
• Encrypted files, 59%
• Reusable passwords, 59%
• Firewalls, 88%
• Encrypted log-in sessions, 44%
• PCMCIA smart-cards, 37%
• Intrusion detection, 40%
• Digital IDs, certificates, 32%
What is the most likely source of an attack?
• Independent hacker, 74%
• U.S. competitor, 53%
• Disgruntled employee, 86%
Which of the following types of electronic attack or misuse has caused your organiza­
tion financial loss?
• Theft of proprietary information, 12%
• Sabotage of data or networks, 9%
• System penetration by an outsider, 10%
• Insider abuse of net access, 35%
• Unauthorized access to info by insider, 16%












Internet Security Problems and Remedies
What Internet Security Problems Pose Challenges?
The threat to computer resources is reaching new heights. Victims range from Fortune 
500 companies to home offices, from government laboratories to classroom workstations, 
and from transportation systems to retail stores. This escalation in computer resource 
threats is a result of, in large part, the mad rush to wire into the Internet regardless of 
risk. As the popularity of the Internet as both a place of business and recreation source in­
creases, the threat to computer systems by crackers appears to be climbing.
The threat to the world’s computer systems comes from two sources: (1) increasingly so­
phisticated crackers and (2) systems administrators who are under-equipped to confront 
today’s security hazards.
The best way to confront system threats is to understand the types of crackers and how 
systems administrators can better educate and prepare themselves to deal with system vio­
lations. Internet attacks range from simple probing to extremely sophisticated forms of 
information theft.
Exploiting weak passwords, piggy backing off other programs, sometimes called Trojan 
Horses, routing attacks, exploiting the use of dangerous Unix functions such as finger, send- 
mail, NFS, NIS, today’s crackers possess a truly diversified arsenal of tools.
(NOTE: Refer to Appendix A, “Internet Dictionary,” for terms used in this and other sec­
tions of the guide. Also see definitions on pages 36 and 37.)
• In February 1995, the worldwide media widely reported the arrest of one of the 
world’s most notorious computer criminals, Kevin Mitnick. Mr. Mitnick is typical of to­
day’s sophisticated crackers. He is highly educated, motivated, and possesses intimate 
knowledge of computer networks and their security systems. Using a laptop computer 
equipped with a radio modem, Mitnick managed to tap into several long distance 
phone companies’ call-routing systems and, from there, to crack into numerous com­
puter systems across the world. He had the ability to play upon the weaknesses of 
packet filtering software that brought Mitnick his best results. Though Mitnick’s moti­
vation for his activities has yet to be explained, the incentives for other attacks seem 
much clearer, for example, for financial gain, for prestige, or for the thrill of doing it.
• Some of the most famous attacks were those highlighted in Clifford Stoll’s “The 
Cuckoo’s Egg.” In this account, Stoll details how a group of East German intelligence 
agents systematically attacked U.S. government and scientific computer networks via 
an astronomical laboratory. Stoll uncovered the plot thanks to a 38-cent discrepancy in 
a telephone bill. Espionage, both political and corporate, is the primary reason for at­
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tacks on computer networks. The former director of the FBI Computer Crime group 
recorded a 400 percent rise in cases of corporate espionage from 1992 to 1993 alone. 
Since then, the same type of growth has continued to occur throughout the remainder 
of the decade.
• In 1992, U.S. and European crackers broke into Pentagon computers by “fooling the 
system into thinking they were Dan Quayle.” Files on domestic anti-terrorist activities 
were targeted. In a celebrated case of corporate warfare, Virgin Atlantic Airlines suc­
cessfully sued British Airways when it was discovered that BA cracked Virgin’s reserva­
tion system in an attempt to steal passengers. British Airways was ordered to pay $4 mil­
lion in damages and legal costs. In 1994, the CERT Advisory “Ongoing Network 
Monitoring Attacks” reported that crackers using a Trojan Horse program captured ac­
cess information for tens of thousands of system. All systems offering remote access via 
rlogin, telnet, and FTP were at risk.
• In the fall of 1994, a 16-year-old British boy using cracked accounts on U.S. military 
computers in Rome transferred hundreds of classified documents from the South Ko­
rean Nuclear computer system.
• Compounding the problem, the casual cracker has re-emerged as a dangerous threat 
to networks security. The casual cracker, often stereotyped as the bored college stu­
dent joyriding through various sites on the information highway, gained new tools in 
1994. The most perilous of these was the suite of tools packaged as SATAN. SATAN 
uses a graphical interface to assist even the most novice crackers in organizing a series 
of attacks against a given host, with the results displayed in an easily understandable 
format. Because it searches for all known security holes in a matter of minutes, SATAN 
can help a cracker find an accessible system in a fraction of the time it would otherwise 
have taken. SATAN exploits known problems with NFS, NIX, rexd access, sendmail, TFTP 
file access, unrestricted x-server access, and wu-ftp vulnerability.
Methods of Attack
This section discusses several methods of attack to illustrate the nature of the 
Internet security problem. This is not intended to be a complete list of the 
methods. Systems have been breached with simple techniques that take ad­
vantage of security loopholes in common system utilities. Other approaches 
are considerably more sophisticated and require a significant amount of pro­
gramming.
Trojan Horse
A Trojan Horse is a program that a cracker inserts into a system to replace an existing 
function with a hidden additional function. Trojan Horses can be extremely difficult to 
detect because they can have the same name, file size, and last changed date as the mim­
icked function. Often, by the time a Trojan Horse is discovered, significant damage has 
occurred.
Trojan Horses have been used to capture User IDs and passwords exposing large num­
bers of systems, even though only one system was originally compromised. When users 
login to other systems across the Internet, their User IDs and passwords travel in the 
open. Intruders exploit this loophole using a Trojan Horse that collects legitimate User
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IDs and passwords traveling on the net. The intruder can then use the legitimate User IDs 
and passwords to gain unauthorized access to other systems. The breached system accepts 
the intruder as legitimate. Once the intruder has gained access to the first system on a pri­
vate network, the remaining systems on the network are easy prey.
CGI Exploitation and Web Vandalism
Since March 1996 there have been increasing numbers of attacks on web 
servers by exploiting the system’s cgi-bin scripts. The most common attack 
uses the “PHF” program installed by default on several commercially available 
http servers. Crackers use the PHF to obtain copies of the /etc/passwd file, 
add and delete files, modify existing files, and open terminal windows. Using 
this security hole, crackers managed to attack the FBI and CIA websites in 
1996 replacing pages with modified text and obscene photos. Intruders often 
rename the PHF program so that its use will go undetected and to ensure that 
administrators cannot delete the program.
It is possible to use weaknesses in the cgi-bin scripts as opposed to the PHF program to 
delete the web server operating system, send fake e-mail, and attain root privileges.
Malicious Java and ActiveX
Despite assurances from SUN and Microsoft about the security of these programming and 
scripting languages, Java and ActiveX are inherently insecure and dangerous for today’s 
web browsing community. Holes in the Java class loaders and the bytecode verifier can be 
exploited so that malicious applets can execute arbitrary machine code. In February 1996, 
Princeton researchers demonstrated how using Java applets that exploited DNS weak­
nesses could force browsers to unwittingly make network connections.
Some web browsers offer user restrictions on Java allowing Java applets and Java Script to 
be deactivated and not read. It is possible using Java and ActiveX Scripts to insert mali­
cious code that will skirt these controls and run all scripts regardless of the user’s desire 
or without his knowledge.
Hostile or malicious applets are proliferating on the Internet at an alarming pace. There 
are several sites that distribute source code for malicious applets that can read, alter and 
delete files, or disrupt the normal operation of the browsing machine. Recorded hostile 
applets can:
• lock the browser
• lock the browsing machine’s keyboard
• make the browser begin barking and then exit
• open a window asking for a user name and password and then return the information 
to the offending machine
• kill other applets, running programs, and defend against an attempt to use other pro­
grams such as ThreadDeath to shut the hostile applet down
• forge and send e-mail
29
WebTrust Practitioners’ Guide
• create a myriad of windows, calculations, noise, run other programs, and report back 
the results
• disseminate not only Windows-based, but also UNIX-based viruses at an alarming rate
Applets run with the full permission level as the browsing user, so that if a user browses 
with full root access, any applet it encounters will have the same access permissions.
It is possible to filter applet classes using packet filtering, but weaknesses in the Java Re­
mote Method Invocation class loader and security manager make it possible to dynami­
cally load hostile classes or reclassified hostile classes.
Java and ActiveX scripts are even more dangerous than applets. Scripts are harder to sep­
arate from the html transmission than applets and can run before a browser can refuse 
the script. Like applets, scripts run with the full access of the browsing user. ActiveX 
scripts can run any application on the browsing machine and make calls to the operating 
systems. In February 1997, German television reported of an ActiveX control that opened 
Quicken, the personal finance program, and attempted to transfer funds, add transac­
tions, and modify the application’s reports.
Web Spoofing and Hi-Jacking
In the Web Spoofing and Hi-Jacking attack, crackers set up a mali­
cious web server on the Internet between unsuspecting users and 
the rest of the Web. The spoofing server then hi-jacks all http con­
nections initiated by the browser and forces access to all other sites 
to pass through. The cracker can then sniff and tamper with all 
transactions, including previously considered “secured commer­
cial” transactions via the Secure Sockets Layer, pick up account 
and password information, and permit and deny access to Web resources. In some cases, 
the spoofing server has inserted offensive material to antagonize the surfer.
Lax Password Security
If a cracker can gain access to the password file on a UNIX or Windows machine, then he 
or she can apply a fast decryption algorithm to a list of common passwords and permuta­
tions on account and user names. Using fast workstations, it takes little time to break into 
the first account. On a medium to large network, there is bound to be at least one ma­
chine for which a cracker can obtain the password file using an unprotected UUCP link, 
an unplugged loophole in sendmail, or ftp. Because most users select relatively simple 
and easy-to-guess passwords, the method of table lookup works very well.
In a study conducted by Daniel Klein using password file entries from a database of 
15,000 accounts, the following level of success was reported. Using a DECstation 3100, he 
was able to crack 368 passwords in only fifteen minutes and 3,000 passwords in the first 
week. Today, crackers have access to faster machines. Using the “Crack” program, they 
can compromise a system containing 50 accounts in less than a minute. A determined 
cracker with access to a cluster of parallel workstations using the “Crack” program can 
achieve access to multiple accounts in a matter of minutes.
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Obtaining System Information
There are several UNIX tools an intruder can use to obtain information about your sys­
tem. With detailed information about users and network configuration, a cracker can bet­
ter focus his or her attacks. Some of the most dangerous ones include the following:
• The finger command is extremely dangerous in the hands of an intruder because they 
can learn account names, when the account was last used, the account’s home direc­
tory name, and from what host they logged in. This information is very useful for 
launching an attack on your system.
• The showmount command displays a list of all clients that have remotely mounted a 
file system.
• The rpcinfo-p command probes the portmapper on a system and prints a list of all reg­
istered Remote Procedure Call (RPC) programs. Many system services such as the Net­
work Information System (NIS) developed by Sun Microsystems and licensed to many 
different UNIX vendors use RPCs. If the system runs NIS and the intruder determines 
the NIS domain name, the intruder can get the domain maps by issuing the appropri­
ate RPC call.
X-Window
X-Window, if improperly configured, allows an intruder to transparently watch the user’s 
display and capture mouse and keyboard input. When the user logs in to another system, 
the intruder can see the login ID and password used for that system. If the user does a 
su to root, then the intruder will know how to access root on that system. A sophisticated 
intruder can remain undetected while changing the user’s input before passing it on to 
the program. The first hint of tampering could be the discovery of a catastrophic prob­
lem.
Sendmail
Sendmail is a commonly used complex mail program that offers endless 
flexibility. Unfortunately, crackers exploit this flexibility to obtain unau­
thorized access to system data. Using sendmail, crackers have mailed 
the /etc/passwd file to their system. Some sendmail bugs have only re­
cently been fixed. Many systems continue to use older versions of sendmail.
Denial of Service Attacks
To reliably establish or terminate a connection, three messages are exchanged:
(1) synchronization (SYN) segment—messages used to create a connection; (2) finish 
(FIN) segment—messages used to close a connection; and (3) retransmit segment— 
messages used to retransmit a connection. These three messages make up what is called, 
in practice, the three-way handshake.
In September 1996, a wave of denial of service attacks using SYN Flooding and extremely 
large Pings (“Ping o’ Death”) effectively shut down major Internet providers in the North­
east. Source code to tools that exploited weaknesses in the three-way handshake spread 
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across the Cracker journals and the Internet. The SYN Flood attack sends a high volume 
of SYN packets to a target host and never responds with the rest of the handshake infor­
mation, thus filling the targets data structures. This prevents legitimate processes from 
starting, paralyzing the target machine. Both known machines behind packet filtering 
routers and firewalls themselves are targeted, which disrupts individual and network ser­
vice.
The Ping o’ Death takes advantage of IP’s ability to fragment packets. Extremely large 
Pings are broken into smaller processable packets that are then sent to the target. The 
targeted machine receives and attempts to reassemble the huge packet overflowing the 
16-bit internal variables causing the system to crash.
The major UNIX vendors have distributed patches to attempt to quell these attacks, each 
meeting with a reasonable margin of success. There are no NT solutions to these attacks 
at this date.
Packet-Filtering Weaknesses
Major American corporations, U.S. government agencies, their contractors, and 
 others discovered that sophisticated crackers easily defeat packet-filtering routers.
& Although routers provide useful functions and a modest level of security, many 
companies augment routers with firewall systems that sit between the public unse­
cured and the private secure networks.
Advanced routers provide packet-filtering capabilities. Packet filters drop, reject, or per­
mit packets based on destination IP address, source IP address, and application port num­
bers. Packet filters allow communications specifically with applications on other “trusted” 
systems.
Filters base decisions on the contents of the current packet only, with no general context 
maintained in relationship to other packets. Crackers exploit this situation to leak infor­
mation past the router (see #7 below for more related information).
Packet filtering is insecure for the following reasons:
1. Packet filtering is a dangerous and error-prone process. To do it right, one needs inti­
mate knowledge of transmission control protocol (TCP) and user datagram protocol 
(UDP) port utilization on a number of different operating systems. When a site has 
more than a dozen non-contiguous Class C networks in internal use, routers are often 
configured with several hundred filters per port. As Steve Wilkens of Simitar Systems 
indicates, “This is one of the reasons we do not like packet filters very much: if you get 
these tables wrong you may inadvertently let in the Bad guys.”
2. IP addresses make up the basis for packet filtering. Thus, you have to trust everyone 
on the system. If the trusted host is cracked, the cracker can get through your packet 
filter.
3. Routers that do not provide for strong user authentication should never allow users 
into protected systems. During the past year, Trojan Horses that sniffed user IDs and 
passwords on the Internet compromised more than 100,000 user IDs and static pass­
words.
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4. Routers are subject to various attacks that divert packets through crackers’ machines. 
A routing attack program can use the Routing Information Protocol (RIP) to send bo­
gus routing information to a host. Such actions allow the attacker to create a “new” 
route for the entire network, enabling the intruder to receive all the packets destined 
for that network.
5. Crackers can mimic the IP addresses of trusted machines, bypassing packet filters and 
gaining access to systems. The software on this malicious machine-in-the-middle can 
pass the legitimate traffic through, thus going undetected. Kevin Mitnick blindly sent 
command packets bearing trusted internal IP address into networks until the router al­
lowed him access.
6. Some routers do not provide logs of systems, user activity, or records of successful and 
unsuccessful attempts to use the system. Logging is a fundamental component of Level 
C2 security and above.
7. Packet filters can leak sensitive information in IP packet fragments. Except for the first 
packet fragment, other fragments do not contain port numbers, so there is little infor­
mation to base a filtering decision. Nothing prevents someone from building bogus 
non-initial fragments and converting them back to packets on some other machine.
8. Routers do not hide internal network structure. Thus, a cracker can easily obtain host 
names and IP addresses to mount attacks.
9. Three major services are not handled well by packet filters: FTP, DNS, and X11. Nor­
mal operation of FTP and X11 both require the use of incoming calls. Even though 
the FTP client may reside on an internal host, it will require the external FTP server 
to open an in-bound port for file transfer. Some services use a range of port numbers, 
thus requiring a range of ports to be allowed access by a packet filter.
10. The complexity of router tables and rules requires large chunks of an administrators’ 
time to monitor and maintain.
Other Problem Areas
• If the system allows read/write access to Network File System 
(NFS) mounted directories, then it is possible for an intruder to 
add a .rhosts entry in a guest user home directory. This will allow 
the intruder to perform a rlogin without having to supply a pass­
word.
• If the system is running anonymous ftp, it is possible for an intruder to get in since ftp 
is often misconfigured. If the ~ftp/etc/passwd file is a complete copy of the 
/etc/passwd file, then an intruder can retrieve the password file, which can then be 
cracked using a previously discussed method. If the ftp home directory is writable, 
then it is possible to add a forward file, allowing the intruder to mail the /etc/passwd 
file back to his/her machine. This is another example of a single program that pro­
vides multiple opportunities for the wily cracker.
• If a system runs the trivial file transfer program (tftp) and is accessible from the Inter­
net, then watch out. The tftp does not require any user password and, if improperly 
configured, will allow anyone to read or write any data on the system.
• Some older systems may not have the patches for the ftp bug that allowed a remote 
user to obtain root privileges.
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• If the system runs Network Information System (NIS), then it is inherently insecure. NIS 
uses client server technology to share a single copy of the password file over the private 
network. NIS is insecure because there is no authentication between client and server. 
NIS also presents serious security exposures if the /etc/passwd file on the NIS server sys­
tem is incorrectly configured, thus allowing anyone to login to the NIS server using a plus 
sign “+” at the login prompt. Improper configuration of the /etc/passwd file on a client 
NIS system can allow anyone to login as root on the client if the NIS server is down.
• The list of potential security problems and defenses has been the subject of numerous 
books.
• Bill Cheswick (the self-described “hacker in residence” of Bell Labs) published a re­
search report on attempted break-ins at AT&T Laboratories. The most important les­
son learned in the study was “if a hacker obtains a login on a machine, there is a good 
chance he can become root sooner or later: There are many buggy programs running 
at high privilege levels that offer opportunities for a cracker. If he gets a login on your 
computer; you are in trouble.”
• Fortunately, the technology exists to not only plug the known security loopholes, but 
also to strengthen a site’s security and to defeat the intruders.
Security and Privacy Components
Security and privacy at any website may include several or all of the following components:
• Physical access restrictions
• Data backup




It is not the intent of this work to provide a detailed explanation of the preceding con­
cepts; however, we will attempt to give some introductory material. We have also provided 
some our favorite websites in Appendix D of this book, where you can find additional in­
formation.
Physical Access and Backups
Often overlooked as a real source of concern, physical access, or the lack there of, can 
provide real dangers to information systems. Common sense in this area is often the best 
guide. Is there limited access to the room in which the file server, commerce server, and 
backup drives are located? Are video surveillance cameras necessary?
The lesson of access to critical hardware was learned the hard way by one of my clients 
several years ago. Early on a Monday morning, the controller told me that the server was 
gone and that, as a result, no one was able to work. Upon arriving at the 
client site, imagine my surprise when I learned that the file server was not 
down as I had thought but, indeed, it was physically "gone.” Apparently, over 
the weekend, someone had broken into the office and stolen the file server 
that was on a desktop in the copy room.
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The client’s physical setup allowed free access for anyone who entered the building to the 
copy room. The only asset missing was the file server—no other equipment was taken. 
With this in mind, don’t overlook the need to limit access to hardware as an easy step in 
site security.
No one can really place the value on a good backup until it is needed. 
Backups should be stored in a protected environment off-site, and the 
entire system—including operating system and program files—should be 
included in the backup. (See next section.)
Physical access includes everything that happens before you start typing 
commands on the keyboard. It’s the alarm system that calls the police de­
partment. It’s the key lock on the computer’s power supply that makes it 
harder to simply turn off the computer. It’s the surge protector and backup power supply 
that protects the computer from surges and power outages.
Most of the publicity surrounding computer crimes comes from dramatic break-ins from 
outsiders. What escapes the press is the fact that most security problems are caused by 
people who have a legitimate reason to use the system, for example, company officers or 
trusted employees. Don’t overlook this potential security problem in your analysis of a 
commerce system.
Data Backup
As I have often said, there are three rules for data backup:
1. Backup the entire drive(s) daily
2. Backup the entire drive(s) daily
3. Backup the entire drive(s) daily
I don’t think there is another more underutilized procedure in common practice. No 
matter how secure a site may be, it is never going to be foolproof. The practice of backing 
up your data can save a lot of time and effort if there is a break in (physical or electronic) 
to a website. Any damage done can quickly be mitigated with a good backup 
program.
Remember the client who had their file server stolen? The rest of that story is that our of­
fice provided the client with a similar machine in which the backup could be restored. It 
was surprising to discover that the client diligently backed up the system and rotated the 
tapes. However, the entire tape library was stored next to the file server and, unfortu­
nately, was stolen along with the server.
We did locate a month-old tape of the client. When it was inserted into the tape drive, the 
tape software was unable to read the tape. We even took the tape to a disaster recovery 
specialist to evaluate the viability of the tape. It was not too surprising to learn that there 
were no data that could be recovered because there was nothing on the tape. Even 
though the backup system reported no errors upon completion of the backup routine, 
nothing was backed up!
There are two lessons to be learned from this story. One, make sure your clients follow 
the practice of storing backup tapes off-site, and, two, test the tape backup at least once a 
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month. Your client will thank you even though this will cost the client a little more time. 
Backup beats the alternative my client faced—entering eight years of customer informa­
tion including sales and cost of sales information!
Firewalls and Routers
The most important and highly fortified component of a medieval castle was its gateway. 
It allowed the inhabitants of the keep to come and go while barring entrance to its 
enemies.
Firewall gateways perform the same function. Firewalls allow access to the outer world 
while shielding the protected areas from attack. Permission to access the protected net­
work must rely on secure authentication of an individual.
Management must not consider the installation of a firewall as the solution to all of its se­
curity problems when connected to the Internet. Firewalls provide a wide variety of con­
trol, but, in the end, they are only a tool. A firewall is part of a diversified defense strategy 
that identifies what must be protected and identifies the potential threats.
It seems obvious, but there is more to protecting a network than just protecting the 
hardware and software. Security comes from the union of superior technology, active 
and alert systems administrators, and management decisions regarding user access to 
the Internet and other computer resources. Prudence demands the development of a 
comprehensive plan to deal with system security. A working group created by technical 
personnel who implement part of the policy, management who has the authority to en­
force policy, and representatives of the user-community must, at a minimum, do two 
things:
1. Identify assets to be protected.
2. Identify and assess the risks to those assets.
Firewalls are an important component in the overall security between the Internet site 
and the client’s internal or private network. A firewall is comprised of both software ele­
ments and hardware components. An improperly configured firewall is as effective as 
putting a chain link fence around a tent.
Because this is an area new to most accountants, the following definitions of terms may 
be helpful:
• Bastion host—a general-purpose system used to control access between the internal 
network and Internet. Much like a castle and drawbridge (when the drawbridge is low­
ered, information can flow in both directions), the keeper of the drawbridge deter­
mines who/what is allowed in or out. This system allows information to flow in both di­
rections and grants certain privileges to users on the network. Typically, the bastion 
program runs on a UNIX platform.
• Access control list (ACL)—as the name implies, this list is the matrix to which the fire­
wall or router points to allow or deny access and privileges.
• Router—this is a physical device that allows networks to connect to one another. A 
router will typically route or manage various network functions and can filter out 
unauthorized or unwanted information packets.
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• Packet filtering—this is the process where a router passes information through the 
ACL and accepts or rejects the information packet. By default, most routers accept all 
network traffic.
• Proxy server—this is a process where a server will act on behalf of another server and, 
therefore free up the host server for other functions. The process works as follows: a 
URL points to a proxy server where there is a request from an end user. The proxy 
fetches the desired information from the host and transmits it to the user.
• Application gateway—this is a firewall made up of at least one bastion host and acts as 
a proxy server for a specific application. The clients that access an application gateway 
must be properly configured to take advantage of this firewall. By default, an applica­
tion gateway allows no information to pass and, therefore, is the most secure firewall, 
because it must be specifically configured to allow access.
There are two basic implementations for firewall systems—the dual-homed gateway and 
the screen-host gateway. In the dual-homed gateway, the firewall machine has two net­
work cards. One is attached to the internal network (local area network) and the other is 
connected to the untrusted network—or Internet. The machine is configured so that net­
work packets reaching one card are not passed over to the other card. By default, then, 
the two networks are completely isolated.
However, because there is always a need for some communication between the two net­
works, specialized programs, called proxies, are run on the firewall machine. The job of 
the proxy is to selectively filter and forward information from one network to the other. 
Usually, a different proxy is responsible for each service—one for mail, one for FTP, and 
so on. Proxies can determine which network packets to forward by looking at the source 
and the destination addresses, by examining packet types, by examining the source and 
destination ports, or even by checking the data contained within the packet.
Network packets are never transferred directly. The data is first extracted and repackaged 
in new packets before transferring the data across the gateway.
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In a screened-host gateway approach, a network router is used to control access to the lo­
cal area network. The router’s function is to restrict communication between the inner 
and outer networks by ensuring that packets originating from the Internet can only reach 
the well-secured bastion machine where proxies repackage and transmit data to the inner 
network. As with the dual-homed gateway, the packets are examined and data checked 
before transmission occurs.
The nodes on the inner or local area network are invisible to the Internet machines. Out­
bound packets from the inner network are either restricted to the firewall machine, 
where they must be shepherded to the Internet through a proxy program, or the packets 
are allowed to pass directly through the router after being filtered to ascertain they are 
safe.
The figure below illustrates the screened-host gateway firewall configuration:
Gateway (Bastion)
Screened Host Gateway Firewall
Blocked
Screened-Host Gateway Firewall
Another variation of the screened-host configuration is the “screened subnet gateway.” In 
this scenario, the router gives the outer network access to a small subnetwork known as 
the demilitarization zone (DMZ; see page 45 for diagram). The bastion host sits in the 
DMZ as well as all other servers that are to be made available, such as web or FTP servers. 
Another router, situated between the DMZ and the internal network, provides an addi­
tional layer of security.
In a well-designed firewall system, there is no real difference between the dual-home and 
screened-host systems. In each scenario, the local area network appears to the outside 
world as a single well-protected machine—the bastion host. All outgoing traffic appears to 
originate from the bastion, and all incoming traffic is directed to the bastion host. Soft­
ware on the bastion checks each packet as it arrives, logs it, and allows it to pass through if 
it meets the rules and regulations set down by the system administrator.
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When analyzing a firewall, don’t be fooled by vendors that claim their firewall is certified. 
All this certification means is that it has been certified under certain conditions and spe­
cific configuration. Some vendors also claim that their firewall meets the US Department 
of Defense Orange Book standards. Again, this only means that the firewall was config­
ured to pass a series of tests.
Make sure the firewall and router are configured properly for the conditions under which 
it will operate. Then, test the firewall and make sure it is doing its job (see the Firewall 
Evaluation Worksheet in Appendix C.) Finally, a word of caution about firewall configu­
ration: a configuration must be constantly monitored and updated to reflect both 
changes in the network(s) it protects and advances in technology.
At the time this publication goes to press, seven vendors accounted for the majority of the 
commercial firewall market.
1. AltaVista (Digital Equipment Corporation) This firewall system uses a combination of 
packet filters, application-level proxies, and circuit level proxies. It runs on hardened 
versions of UNIX and Windows NT. Its major distinguishing features are extensive and 
customizable logging and log filtering. Tunneling is provided as an add-on feature.
2. BorderWare (Secure Computing Corporation) This package is a UNIX only system. It 
provides both application-level proxies and packet filtering. Administration is by 
graphical interface only. Tunneling is provided as an add-on feature.
3. CyberGuard Firewall (CyberGuard Corporation) This package is a UNIX only system 
that covers all the basic areas—packet filtering, application proxies, and stateful in­
spection. Its features are configured and managed using a graphical user interface.
4. Eagle (Raptor Systems) Eagle uses application and circuit level proxies. It is available 
for NT as well as a variety of UNIX systems. Currently no tunneling is provided nor is 
support for certain protocols, e.g. S-HTTP r Quicktime.
5. Firewall-1 (Checkpoint Software Technologies) This system provides a combination of 
packet filtering and stateful inspection. It is available for NT as well as a variety of 
UNIX systems. The system has an intuitive graphical interface and provides support 
for a large number of protocol, including some of the newer multimedia formats. 
Tunneling is available as an add-on feature.
6. Gauntlet (Trusted Information Systems) This system is available as a software only 
package or as a turnkey hardware and software system. Gauntlet uses application level 
proxies for filtering. A general circuit level, plug-in proxy is available as well as packet 
filtering. Tunneling is provided as an add-on feature.
7. ON Guard (ON Technology Corporation) This product is distinguished from others 
in that is uses SMLI filters. ON Guard is the only firewall in this group to run on a 
hardened version of Windows 95/98. Tunneling is not yet available.
Firewall Requirements
Although it is possible to make a single system fairly secure, it is more difficult to secure 
all systems on a private network, because a private network provides too many opportuni­
ties for program errors or configuration errors. If it were possible to secure each machine 
on the network, its users would probably dislike the required restricted functions.
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Using a secure firewall between the Internet and the private network does not eliminate 
the need for sound security practices on the systems inside the private network. The fire­
wall, when placed in the configuration mentioned, will, however, significantly enhance 
overall system security by presenting an extremely daunting barrier to the external 
intruder.
To succeed in repelling unwanted intruders while still providing access to the outside 
world, the firewall must meet the following requirements:
• The firewall MUST NOT forward IP packets between two networks unless the packets 
have the firewall system as their destination or origin address. Consequently, a user on 
an external system must, first, login to the firewall system before gaining access to a 
protected system. This step adds an extra level of complexity but greatly enhances se­
curity.
• The firewall must hide the structure of the internal protected network from the out­
side network, so intruders do not have this information when attempting to breach sys­
tem security.
• The firewall MUST NOT provide dynamic routing, because this can be used to sup­
port multiple security attacks such as route spoofing. The system administrator should 
provide static routing.
• The firewall must provide outbound telnet, ftp, Mosaic, and gopher services for users 
on protected systems.
• The firewall must provide a strong user authentication scheme that does not rely on 
static User ID and passwords, because they can be compromised.
• External ftp users should NEVER be allowed, because ftp relies on the use of static 
User IDs and passwords. If a cracker acquires a legitimate user ID and password, then 
the cracker can ftp to the users system and execute the ftp subcommands. Subcom­
mands provide the cracker with ample opportunity to acquire, alter, or destroy data 
accessible by the compromised user account.
• The firewall should reject protocols that have dangerous security exposures and 
should not be used by people outside the protected network access-protected systems. 
These include the following protocols: rexec, rlogin, rsh, rwho, and tftp. X-window ap­
plications running on unprotected systems should not be accessed directly from a pro­
tected system.
• The firewall must NOT allow an external user to login as root.
• The firewall must reject unknown protocols.
• The firewall must provide Internet Domain Name Services (DNS) to the outside net­
work for systems in the protected network.
• The firewall must distinguish whether a user comes from an external unprotected sys­
tem or an internal protected system.
• The firewall must be able to enforce tighter controls on user function when the user 
logs in from an external system versus an internal system.
• The firewall must eliminate the telnet “open” command.
• The firewall should act as a “simple mail transfer protocol” (SMTP—a protocol used 
to transfer email from server to server) mail gateway. The systems administrator
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should configure the firewall so that all outgoing mail appears to come from the 
firewall machine. The firewall system should translate all the mail header fields 
containing internal addresses (To:, From:, CC:) to an external form such as 
user@bubblegum.com. Because all external mail is routed through the firewall, the 
system should have a complete set of aliases to redirect the mail to the appropriate in­
ternal system and user.
• Only internal users who need access to the outside network and external users who 
need access to the internal network should have User IDs and passwords on the fire­
wall.
• The firewall system should deactivate all unnecessary functions.
• The firewall should create, maintain, and protect an audit trail of system activity from 
modification or destruction. Part of the trail of activity should include all successful 
and unsuccessful attempts to use the system. The audit record should include the 
user’s name, type of event, the event’s success or failure, and the origin (IP address) of 
the event, including date and time.
• The firewall should provide automated procedures to verify that the Trusted Comput­
ing Base (TCB) has not been modified. The system should check its own integrity.
• The firewall should provide high levels of performance at a reasonable cost. FTP per­
formance should be limited by the LAN speed not by the firewall. If the firewall is too 
slow then users will bypass it.
• The firewall must not detract from easy Internet use.
• Access of authenticated authorized users entering the secure network from the Inter­
net must be controlled.
Configuring a Firewall
The remainder of this section will be devoted to the issues of configuring a fire­
wall. To keep the discussion generic when describing routing tables, we will use a 
table-based format that is not specific to any particular company, and one that has 
been tested over time. To discuss the application level proxies, examples used in 
many text-based configuration systems, you may wish to use the TIS Firewall
Toolkit. This toolkit can be obtained from: ftp://ftp.tis.com/pub/firewalls/toolkit/.
With a firewall installed, there are two basic issues to address: (1) how to allow people 
within an organization to safely browse the Internet, and (2) how the client’s web site is 
made available to others when browsing the Internet.
Outgoing connections to the Internet are usually controlled through a pack filter. If the 
firewall is of the older variety, filter exceptions need to be provided for outgoing connec­
tions to the HTTP (port 80), FTP (port 21), SSL (port 443), and Gopher (port 70) ser­
vices as well as for data sent back in response to those connections. The following table 
shows a stylized representation of a firewall’s filter table.
The first column shows the appropriate action to take—to either block or allow packet 
flow. The ’’Service” and “Port” columns represent the source of the packet by TCP/IP ad­
dress and by port. In the service column, {I Net} represents the organization’s network ad­
dress. The ’’Destination” and “Port” columns show the intended recipient by the destina­
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tion address and port. The column labeled “Flags” contains TCP header fields that can be 
used for filtering. In this example, the only important flag is ACK, representing a continu­
ation of a network conversation initiated earlier.
Action Service Port Destination Port Flags Common
Block * ★ * * * Blocked all by default
Allow {I Net} * * 80 * Outgoing web
Allow ★ 80 * ★ ACK Incoming web
Allow {I Net} * * 21 * Outgoing FTP control 
channel
Allow ★ 21 ★ ★ ACK Incoming FTP control 
channel
Allow {I Net} * * >1024 * Outgoing FTP data
Allow * ≥1024 * * ACK Incoming FTP data
Allow {I Net} * * 443 * Outgoing SSL
Allow ★ 443 * * ACK Incoming SSL
Allow {I Net} * * 70 * Outgoing Gopher
Allow * 70 * * ACK Incoming Gopher
The filtering rules shown above represent the minimum structure needed to support web 
browsers. Other rules will be necessary for outgoing email (port 25), SSL (port 443), plus 
other services provided by the server.
If application-level proxies are used to provide Internet access to the firewall, separate 
proxies will need to be enabled for each protocol. The TIS Toolkit comes with a proxy 
called http-gw. This proxy handles both HTTP and Gopher protocols. The kit also con­
tains a proxy, ftp-gw for FTP.
The proxy’s functions are to allow incoming connections from one side of the firewall, fil­
ter them, and then forward the packets to the other side of the firewall. When proxies are 
first installed, they do not distinguish whether the proxies will service requests from the 
local area network or from the Internet. Distinguishing these actions is done by configu­
ration and by policy. In a basic configuration, all hosts on the local area network are al­
lowed access to the proxies—everyone else is denied access.
Assume that the LAN has a TCP/IP address at 192.44.187. Here is a simple illustration of 
this configuration:
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The first six lines set up the rules for the FTP proxy including the messages to deliver 
when a user: (1) is denied access (denied.txt); (2) is permitted access (hello.txt); or (3) 
needs help (help.txt). The line containing deny-hosts prohibits the use of the proxy by any 
machine that does not have a domain name entry. This prohibition is a good control, be­
cause it restricts FTP service originating outside the local area network. The line contain­
ing permit-hosts allows any host in the internal network to use all proxies. All others outside 
the local area network are denied access by default.
Once the HTTP and FTP proxies (and any other services to be offered by the server) are 
properly configured, the browser needs to be configured as well. To overlook this step is to 
leave the back door open. The figure below shows a screen with the browser configuration 
from Internet Explorer. A similar configuration screen exists for Netscape Navigator.
Browser Configuration from Internet Explorer
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The port numbers used should be the standard port numbers unless a nonstandard con­
figuration exists. A complete listing of standard ports is included in Appendix G. The se­
cure field is for SSL (not being used in our example). If a private web server or Intranet 
is running on the internal network, then no proxy server for addresses box should be filled 
in. Filling in this information would prevent the browser from trying to access a proxy 
server. Socks host should be left blank, unless the firewall uses that service.
If socks is being used for a circuit level proxy, it will be necessary to configure the proxy to 
allow outgoing connections through the Web, FTP, SSL, and Gopher ports. The following 
basic configuration for a socks proxy is set up to allow hosts inside the network 
(199.44.187) to get out but prohibits the use of all proxies from outside hosts.
#action #source #netmask #destination #netmask
#deny the world access to the proxy
deny 0.0.0.0 O.0.0.0. 192.44.187.0 255.255.255.0
#permit access to the proxy from anyone on the internal network 
permit 192.44.187.0 255.255.255.0
Once the socks proxy is configured, make sure the browsers have the correct configura­
tion as well.
Now that outgoing traffic has been secured through the firewall, it is time to address the 
challenge of permitting the world access to the web server. There are really only three 
places where a web server can be placed in relationship to a firewall, although several 
combinations and configurations exist. The web server can go behind the firewall on the 
inner network, outside the firewall on the outer network, or it can be run on the firewall 
machine itself.
It may seem at first glance that a good place to put the web server is on the same machine 
as the firewall. This is sometimes called the Judas server. The problem with this configura­
tion, shown below, is that the web server software cannot be trusted. Any weakness in the 
server software that is compromised could permit access to the firewall system.
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The safest place for a web server is outside the firewall, in the area between the firewall 
and the connection to the Internet service provider. This configuration is sometimes 
called the sacrificial lamb and appears below.
Sacrificial Lamb Configuration
In this configuration, the server is locked outside the protection of the firewall and ex­
posed directly to the attempts of intruder break-ins. With the server isolated, the server 
should be made as secure as possible. Frequent backups and monitoring of the server logs 
should be a priority. If the worst-case scenario occurs and the server is compromised, 
backups and monitoring logs can help ensure that the company network is protected and 
integrity is not compromised.
If the firewall system creates a DMZ—a segment of network that is separated by routers on 
both the local area network and the Internet sides—it is possible to create a web site that 
is not as exposed as it is in the sacrificial lamb configuration. See the figure below, which 
illustrates the configuration of a server inside a DMZ. By simply placing the server inside 
the DMZ and configuring the routers and gateway so that the hosts on both the LAN and 
Internet can establish HTTP connections, there is server protection to both the web 
server and the LAN. All non-HTTP connections should be rejected.
Server Inside DMZ
Zone
The following table illustrates rules for filtering that provide for strong security for the 
screened-host firewall. The logic here is similar to the filtering already discussed for 
generic firewalls but more focused for the screened-host.
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Action Service Port Destination Port Flags Comment
Block * * * * * Blocked all by default
Allow {world} * Gateway * * World can talk to 
gateway
Allow {I Net} * Gateway * * Internal net can talk to 
gateway





Encryption, or the coding of messages, has been around for as long as we have had se­
crets to keep. The methods we use to encrypt or decrypt are a key issue in the protection 
of private customer information. Most encryption today is based on 
mathematical techniques and formulas called algorithms.
A key is used with the algorithm to convert the text or other material to 
encrypted text called ciphertext. This same key is used to decrypt the 
information as well.
There are many symmetric key algorithms in use today. A summary of 
some of the algorithms commonly used on the World Wide Web in­
cludes:
Name Description
DES The Data Encryption Standard was adopted as a US government standard in 1977 and as an ANSI 
standard in 1981. The DES is a block cipher that uses a 56-bit key.
DESX DESX is a simple modification to the DES algorithm that is built around two whitening steps. These 
steps improve the security of the algorithm and render key searches impossible.
Triple-DES Triple-DES is a way to make the DES at least twice as secure by using the DES encryption algo­
rithm three times with three different keys. Triple-DES is currently being used by financial institu­
tions as an alternative to DES.
Blowfish Blowfish is a fast, compact, and simple block encryption algorithm invented by Bruce Schneier. The 
algorithm allows a variable length key, up to 448 bits, and is optimized for execution on 32- or 64- 
bit processors. For this reason it is popular with today’s processors. The algorithm is unpatented 
and is in the public domain.
IDEA The International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA) was developed in Zurich by James Massey 
and Xuejia Lai and published in1990. IDEA uses a 128-bit key and is used by PGP (Pretty Good 
Privacy) encryption program.
RC2 This block cipher was developed and kept a trade secret by RSA Data Security. The algorithm al­
lows for keys between 1 and 2048 bits. The key is often limited to 40 bits and used in software sold 
for export.
RC4 This block cipher was developed and kept a trade secret by RSA Data Security. The algorithm al­
lows for keys between 1 and 2048 bits. The key is often limited to 40 bits and used in software sold 
for export.
RC5 RC5 allows for a user-defined key length, data block size, and number of encryption rounds.
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Cryptographic Strength
All forms of encryption are NOT equal. Some systems are not very 
good at protecting data. Others are quite strong and resistant to the 
most determined attack. The ability of cryptographic systems to pro­
tect information from attack depends on many factors, including:
• The secrecy of the key
• The difficulty of guessing the key—longer keys are generally more difficult to guess or 
find
• The existence (or lack of) back doors or other ways by which an encrypted file can be 
decrypted without knowing the key
• The ability to decrypt an entire message from knowing the way that a portion of it de­
crypts—often called a known plaintext attack.
• The properties of the plaintext and knowledge of those properties by an attacker. For 
example, a cryptographic system may be vulnerable if all messages are encrypted with 
a known piece of plaintext at the beginning or end of the message.
Cryptographic strength can almost never be proven; instead, it must be disproved. Cre­
ators of new algorithms believe that the new algorithms are perfect. There is evidence 
that the newly developed algorithm is resistant to specific known attacks. As time passes, 
new attacks are developed, and if a weakness is discovered, information about the weak­
ness is quickly published on the Internet.
Attacks on Encryption Algorithms
Attacks against encryption information fall into three main categories:
1. Key search—or brute force attacks
2. Cryptoanalysis
3. Systems-based attacks
The simplest way to crack a code is by trying every possible key, one after the other. This 
method of code cracking is called a key search attack. Most key search attacks will not be 
successful, although it is possible to crack an encryption code in this manner. There is no 
way to defend against a key search attack, but such attacks are extremely inefficient.
How easy is it to break the code? The amount of time it takes to break the code depends 
on the length of the key used to encode the message. A 56-bit key has 256, or roughly 
72,057,594,037,900,000 different keys. The following table gives the estimated times to 
crack symmetric algorithms with various key lengths with current technology.
Key Length
Cost ($)
Thousands to Invest Millions to Invest
40 bits Seconds <1 second
56 bits Days Hours
64 bits Months Days
80 bits Eons Millennia
128 bits >Age of the Universe >Age of the Universe
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Cryptoanalysis is the “science” of encryption. By using mathematics and computers, the 
cryptoanalyst has two possible goals. If the analyst has the ciphertext, he or she might want 
to discover the plaintext message, or if the analyst has the plaintext, he or she might want to 
discover the encryption key. By using pure mathematics and the power of today’s desktop 
computers, some encrypted messages can be deciphered without knowing the key.
Another way of breaking the code is to attack the system that uses the cryptographic algo­
rithm without attacking the algorithm itself. An example of one such attack occurred 
when there was an attack on the random number generator that SSL uses to generate its 
session key. A weakness was discovered where the random number generator was by­
passed, therefore eliminating the need to guess a key.
Consider the following examples reflecting two types of cryptography: (1) single-key and 
(2) public/private key.
Single-Key Cryptography
Bob has one secret key. If Alice wants to send Bob a secret message:
• Bob sends Alice a copy of his secret key
• Alice encrypts message with Bob’s secret key
• Bob decrypts message with his secret key
• Problems:
• How does Bob get his secret key to Alice?
• What if Alice is a double agent?
• What if Alice, Bob, Charley, and Dan need to exchange messages? In this case, they 
would need n! secret keys
Public/Private Key Cryptography
Bob has two complimentary keys. What one key encrypts, only the other key can decrypt
• Bob keeps one key private (private key)
• Bob keeps one key public (public key)
• If Alice needs to send Bob a message
• Bob sends Alice a copy of his public key
• Alice encrypts message with Bob’s public key
• Bob decrypts message with his private key
• Advantages:
• Bob can distribute public key freely
• If Alice is a double agent, she can’t do any harm with Bob’s public key
• Bob only needs one key pair, no matter how many people he speaks to
• Bob can digitally “sign” messages by encrypting with his private key
For additional information on the workings of public/private key encryption visit 
http://www.verisign.com/server/whitepaper/secure/nav.html.
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The following information summarizes the public key systems in common use today:
• Diffie-Hellman key exchange
A system for exchanging cryptographic keys between active parties. This system is not ac­
tually a method of encryption and decryption; instead, it is a method of creating and shar­
ing private keys over nonsecure public channels. The system works by having the two par­
ties agree on common numerical values; then, each party creates a key.
• RSA
RSA, developed by MIT professors, is perhaps the most well-known public key cryptogra­
phy system available for both encrypting data and serving as the basis of a digital signa­
ture system. Digital signatures can be used to authenticate the data or prove authorship. 
The key can be any length and depends on the implementation used.
• ElGamal
This system bears the name of its creator, Taher ElGamal, and is a public key encryption 
system that is based on the Diffie-Hellman key exchange.
• DSS
The Digital Signature Standard (DSS) was developed by the National Security Agency 
(NSA) and has been adopted as the Federal Information Processing Standard by the 
National Institute for Standards and Technology. DSS can only be used for digital 
signatures.
Attacks on Public Key Algorithms
In theory, attacks on public key algorithms are easier because the attacker has the public 
key of the algorithm. The job of attacking public key algorithms is made even easier be­
cause the public key message identifies which public key encryption algorithm was used. 
There are two basic methods of attacking a public key algorithm:
• Factoring attacks
• Algorithmic attacks
Factoring attacks are the most common type of attack on public key encrypted messages, 
because they are the easiest to understand. Attacks of this nature attempt to derive the 
private key from the corresponding public key. For example, an attack on an RSA key 
would be performed by factoring a number that is associated with the public key. Other 
public key attacks would use similar methods involving complex mathematical equations.
The strength of RSA and other algorithms comes from the difficulty of factoring large 
numbers. RSA is confident with its algorithms so much so that it sponsors factoring chal­
lenges from time to time. You can obtain a complete list of the current challenges along 
with the corresponding cash reward by sending a message to challenge-rsa-list@rsa.com.
Algorithmic attacks are more difficult to perform because these attacks are based on the 




Although cryptography is an important element in Web security, it is not all-powerful.
The following scenarios are beyond the scope of cryptography and require other forms of 
security:
• Cryptography cannot protect unencrypted data
• Cryptography cannot protect against stolen/compromised keys
• Cryptography cannot protect against denial-of-service attacks
• Cryptography cannot protect against encryption software bugs or flaws
• Cryptography cannot protect against mistakes or collusion
Current Working Encryption Systems
There are two basic categories of encryption systems in widespread use: those that encrypt 
emails, e.g. PGP and Secure/MIME (S/MIME); and network protocols used to provide 
confidentiality, authentication, integrity, and nonrepudiation, e.g. SSL, S-HTTP, SET, 
and SSH.
• PGP
One of the first widespread public key encryption programs, “Pretty Good Pri­
vacy” (PGP, developed by Phil Zimmermann) was released in June 1991. PGP, in 
addition to being a complete system for encrypting emails and files, is a set of 
standards that provide layouts for messages, keys, and digital signatures.
PGP is a hybrid system that uses RSA public key encryption for key management 
and IDEA symmetric cipher for the bulk encryption of data. One of the main draw­
backs of PGP is the management and certification of public keys. The key never expires. So, 
when a key is compromised, it is up to the holder of the key to distribute a special PGP revo­
cation certificate to everyone with whom they have communicated.
• S/MIME
The Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) is a standard for sending messages 
with binary attachments. S/MIME extends this standard to allow for encrypted email. 
S/MIME was implemented as a toolkit designed to be added to existing packages as op­
posed to being a stand-alone program.
This toolkit comes from RSA Data Security and includes all of the needed licenses, algo­
rithms, and patents. Because many technology companies already have a business rela­
tionship with RSA, it would appear that S/MIME would be adopted by most vendors in 
preference to PGP.
• SSL
SSL, or Secure Socket Layer, is a general-purpose cryptographic protocol for securing 
communication channels both coming from and going to a server. It is commonly used 
with the TCP/IP protocol. SSL connections are initiated on the Internet through the use 
of a special URL such as “https” to indicate a secure http session or “snews” for a secure 
news session.
Confidentiality is achieved through the use of a user-specific algorithm. Each new SSL session 
generates a new key. Microsoft’s version of SSL is called PCT. It would appear, however, that 
PCT will not become an industry standard, despite Microsoft’s backing. See more information 
about the features of SSL in the section “Understanding More about SSL” below.
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• S-HTTP
S-HTTP is a system for encrypting and signing data over the http protocol. S-HTTP was 
developed before SSL was adopted.
• SET
Secure Electronic Transactions (SET) is a protocol designed for sending encrypted credit 
card numbers over the Internet. SET offers confidentiality for credit card numbers, be­
cause they are encrypted and sent directly to the clear bank or agency. Other informa­
tion, such as the customer name and address is not protected.
• SSH
SSH is the secure shell. It allows for encryption and protection of the virtual terminal 
(Telnet) and file transfer (rcp) functions. SSH is available for UNIX, Windows, and Mac­
intosh systems.
Other Protocols
We present a summary of current working encryption systems below, including other pro­
tocols such as DNSSEC and others that are not common but have some Internet use.
Summary of Current Working Encryption Systems
System Definition Algorithms Used Provides
PGP Application program for 
encryption of email
IDEA, RSA, MD5 Confidentiality, authentication, integrity 
& nonrepudiation
S/MIME Format for encryption of 
email
User specified Confidentiality, authentication, integrity 
& nonrepudiation
SSL Protocol for encryption 
of TCP/IP transmissions
RSA, RC4, RC5, 
MD5
Confidentiality, authentication, integrity 
& nonrepudiation
PCT Protocol for encryption 
of TCP/IP transmissions
RSA, RC4, RC5, 
MD5
Confidentiality, authentication, integrity 
& nonrepudiation
S-HTTP Protocol for encrypting 
HTTP
RSA, DES Confidentiality, authentication, integrity 
& nonrepudiation
SET Protocol for sending 
secure payment
RSA, MD5, RC2 Confidentiality of credit card 
information, integrity of entire 
message, authentication of buyer and 
seller & nonrepudiation of transaction
DNSSEC Secure domain name 
system
RSA, MD5 Authentication & integrity
Ipsec and Ipv6 Protocol for encrypting 
IP packets—low level 
encryption
Diffie-Hellman Confidentiality, authentication & 
integrity
Kerberos Network security service 
for securing high level 
applications
DES Confidentiality & authentication
SSH Encrypted remote 
terminal functions
RSA, Diffie-Hellman, 





Understanding More about SSL
Because many web sites will make use of SSL for securing transactions, we revisit the topic 
here in more detail. Developed by Netscape, SSL was first used in Netscape’s browsers 
and web servers. The SSL concept was developed to encourage the sale of Netscape’s web 
server by providing a free client in the browser that utilized the same cryptography proto­
col.
Now, SSL is incorporated into most browsers and servers, because it has become a neces­
sity for Internet security. The Internet Engineering Task Force is now in the process of 
creating a Transport Layer Security (TLS) based largely on SSL version 3.0.
SSL is a layer that exists between the TCP/IP protocol and the application layer. Standard 
TCP/IP sends anonymous, error-free data between two computers; SSL adds several fea­
tures including:
• Authentication and nonrepudiation of the server using digital signatures
• Authentication and nonrepudiation of the client using digital signatures
• Data confidentiality through the use of encryption
• Data integrity through the use of message authentication codes
SSL uses separate algorithms for encryption, data integrity, and authentication with dif­
ferent keys or secrets for each function. This feature is much like segregation of duties 
that provides functionality and protection. The primary advantage of this segregation of 
duties is to allow for longer keys for authentication and data integrity than the key length 
used for privacy. Because key length is an issue for products exported outside the US and 
Canada, SSL is well suited for global applications. The Federal government has placed 
limitations on key length for confidentiality, but not for authentication or data integrity.
The choice of the algorithm and corresponding key length used is determined first by 
SSL server and then limited by the client.
Efficiency is another feature that makes SSL a useful Internet tool. Public key encryption/ 
decryption is a time-consuming process. Rather than repeat this process for each commu­
nication between the server and the client, SSL caches a “master secret” that is preserved 
between SSL connections. This allows new SSL connections to immediately begin secure 
sessions with the need to produce another public key.
SSL was designed initially for TCP/IP communications but can run on top of any reliable 
protocol, such as X.25 or OSI. A nonreliable protocol such as UDP (User Datagram Pro­
tocol) will not permit an SSL connection. The following exhibit shows the ports that SSL 
uses and their functions:
Keyword Decimal Port Function
https 443/tcp Secure HTTP
Ssmtp 465/tcp Secure send mail
Snews 563/tcp Secure Usenet news
ssl-ldap 636/tcp Secure LDAP
spop3 995/tcp Secure receive mail
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SSL was specifically created to protect against “Man-in-the-Middle” and “Replay Attacks.” 
In a man-in-the-middle attack, an attacker intercepts all of the communication from the 
client and server, making the client think it has communicated with the server and the 
server with the client.
Man in the Middle
Appears to be web server to user 
Appears to be user to the server
Web Server
SSL provides protection from this type of attack by using digital certificates to allow the 
client to “learn” the validated name of the web site.
A replay attack includes an attacker who captures the communications between the server 
and the client and then replays the messages. For example, an attacker may capture per­
sonal financial data, e.g., credit card numbers and passwords, while the customer is mak­
ing a payment for merchandise.
Encrypted data cannot be compressed because good encryption algorithms remove any 
repetition or self-similarity that is typically removed for compression. If data can be com­
pressed after it has been encrypted, then the encryption program has serious flaws.
Because encrypted information cannot be compressed, SSL allows for the data to be com­
pressed before it is encrypted. SSL supports many compression algorithms. More infor­
mation can be obtained about SSL from the following source:
http:// developer.netscape.com.
As stated previously, a task force has been created that is putting together standards re­
garding security. Information concerning the history, standardization and on-going activi­
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Virus-Scanning Software
Viruses come in all shapes and sizes. Viruses are the topic of many news groups and 
emails, and new ones spring up all the time. For these reasons, virus software companies 
have a hard time keeping up with the rapid pace of change required. Nevertheless, virus­
scanning software is a must on any system accessing the World Wide Web.
The best protection against viruses is only as good as the software re­
lease. Make sure the virus software you have is the most current ver­
sion of the product with the correct patch installed. Then make sure 
that you have the most up-to-date copy of the virus list with its associ­
ated “footprint.” The footprint is how the software detects a virus or 
potential virus. All viruses leave their mark or footprint on a file. By 
looking for this footprint, the software can detect and hopefully re­
move a virus.
Because viruses change at such a fast rate, it might be a good idea to consider running 
two different scanning softwares on systems at all times. What one software misses the 
other should pick up. The overall overhead of running two softwares might reflect some 
losses in system efficiency. However, the losses experienced are not significant when com­
pared with the gains offered in added protection.
In a biological world, differences between species prevent germs and illnesses from be­
coming a plague that will wipe out all life forms. No two individuals are exactly alike— 
some are susceptible to a disease, whereas others are resistant. In a software/hardware 
world, the differences in operating systems are equivalent to biological variability. A virus 
that is harmful in a Windows environment does not affect a Macintosh machine. This 
phenomenon, however, is changing.
As we move toward network platforms that allow for access of data among Windows, 
Macintosh, Unix, and other systems, there is a need for these machines to run the same 
programs and share files and other information in a seamless manner. The most likely 
sources of this cross-platform equalization are Sun Microsystem’s Java and Microsoft’s 
ActiveX.
If Java and ActiveX programs can run on all computers, so can Java and ActiveX viruses. 
Although these viruses don’t exist, as this document goes to press, they will exist in the 
foreseeable future. These viruses will be able to spread from machine to machine across 
the Internet, unimpeded by small details like operating systems and hardware type. This 
situation is similar, but perhaps more threatening, to the cross-platform Microsoft Word 
macro viruses that spread, easing from Windows to Macintosh machines in concealed 
Word document files.
For this reason, it is imperative that you stay current with the developments in the area of 
viruses and changes in virus-related programs. Not only should you ensure that your virus 
software is current, but also make sure that you remain abreast of developments in this 
area. Sites like http://ciac.llnl.gov/ciac/CIACWelcome.html, Computer Incident Advi­
sory Capability, provides information regarding computer security incidents, hoaxes, and 
viruses or http://kumite.com/myths, Computer Virus Myths, are an excellent source of 
virus information readily available on the Internet.
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Passwords
Easily implemented and often overlooked, passwords are in every facet of our society. The 
problem with passwords is that most people either don’t use them or, if they do, everyone 
in the office knows what the password is.
The following are some tips that the practitioner should consider in an evaluation of the 
password policy for a WebTrust client. You may use these tips in your own security 
document.
• Passwords should not be the same as a log-in name or other familiar 
piece of information (birthday, street address, type of car, etc.).
• Passwords should not be comprised of cute or clever phrases such as 
“password,” “comein” or “letmein.”
• Make passwords longer than 4 characters and require non-alpha nu­
meric characters in the password - #, $, &, ^ etc.
• Make sure passwords do not contain repeated (bbbbbbb) or sequen­
tial digits (12345678 or zxcvzxcv).
• Create passwords from everyday phrases and use the first letter of each word to form 
the password—one small step for man becomes ossfm# (adding the # for more protec­
tion).
• Passwords should not be a word found in the dictionary or words from the dictionary 
appended with a digit (computer7). Dictionaries are the first place a cracker goes.
• If the system is case-sensitive, use mixed case passwords for additional security— 
wiLdmAn, for example.
One final comment about passwords—don’t keep a listing of passwords where it is easy to 
copy. For example, a document containing a password list stored on-line is vulnerable; 
also, the password written on a “post it” note and stuck to the monitor or under the key­
board is likely to be compromised. Common sense in password protection cannot be 
overemphasized.
Major Host Security Problems
Many times security problems at a site result more from not paying attention to details 
rather than from some other issue. We provide a checklist of details for your information:
• Failure to think about security as a fundamental aspect of systems setup and design— 
no established security policy
• Transmission of plaintext, reusable passwords over networks
• Failure to use security tools—COPS, SATAN, etc.
• Failure to obtain and maintain software that is free of bugs and security holes
• Failure to track security developments (and published bugs) and take preventive ac­
tion
• Lack of adequate logging




Security is defined by policy. In some environments, every user is allowed access to install, 
modify, and delete web content. In other situations, only a few individuals with the right 
permissions have this ability. The topic of policy is so complex that we only outline some 
of the major points about policy. Give consideration to the following policy-related items:
• Who is allowed access, what is the nature of that access, and who authorized such ac­
cess?
• Who is accountable for security, upgrades, backups, and maintenance?
• What kind of material is allowed on server pages?
• Which sites and external users are to be allowed access to pages and data?
• What testing and evaluation must be performed on software, pages, and scripts before 
they are installed?
• How are complaints and requests about server and page content to be addressed?
• What is the procedure to handle security incidents?
• What is the process to monitor, evaluate, and update the security policy itself?
Password Policies
Undoubtedly, the most significant security risk on the Internet today is the use of plain­
text, reusable passwords. Usernames and passwords are the most common way to authen­
ticate users. For that reason, it is important for organizations to follow a clear and consis­
tent policy regarding passwords. Consider the following aspects of password attributes:
• Structure—length and character composition




• Common words or phrases
Security Tools
A security tool is a special program that is executed to evaluate, enhance, or 
monitor the security of a site. Most security tools were written at universities or 
by independent specialists and are freely distributed over the Internet. You 
can bet that potential intruders are using these tools to find, and possibly ex­
ploit, security weaknesses. There are four types of tools to consider:
(1) Tools that take a “snapshot” of the system and look for potential weaknesses:
• COPS—UNIX
• Tiger—UNIX
• Kane Security Analyst—Windows NT
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A snapshot program should be run on a regular basis—no less than once a month and 
ideally once a week. The client should not leave the output from a snapshot program in a 
place where it is accessible to others, because by definition, the holes that these programs 
reveal can be exploited by others.
(2) Tools that monitor the system over time, looking for unauthorized changes:
• Tripwire—UNIX
• Intrusion Detection—Windows NT
It is important to monitor the system on a regular basis for unauthorized changes. The 
first thing an attacker usually does after gaining access to the system is to modify it to 
make it easier to regain access in the future. Most break-ins go unnoticed for some time, 
therefore, change-detecting tools may be the only way your client will be alerted to an in­
truder’s presence so that he or she can take appropriate action.
(3) Tools that scan the network, looking for network-based weaknesses:
• SATAN—UNIX
• ISS (Internet Security Scanner)—UNIX
• SomarSoft—Windows NT
Tools that scan the network automate many security procedures on the network. They 
check for well-known security-related bugs such as sendmail and ftpd. Your client’s sys­
tems are certain to be scanned by crackers interested in gaining access to your systems, so 
your client should run these programs and learn what weaknesses they reveal.
(4) Tools that monitor the system and network looking for attacks in progress:
• Stalker and WebStalker—Haystack Labs
• NetRanger—WheelGroup
• Gauntlet ForceField—Trusted Information Systems
Monitoring tools are the operation system equivalent of a burglar alarm. As their name 
implies, these tools scan a computer as it runs, watching for telltale signs of a break-in, 
much like a virus-scanning software.
Software—Patches, Bugs, and Updates
Another potential area of weakness in your client’s systems will 
be the software that runs on the system itself. The presence of 
bugs can cause the server or client to crash or corrupt the in­
formation, or, worst of all, bugs can allow outsiders unautho­
rized access.
When purchasing new software consider the following:
• Proof of good software engineering practices in the design, coding, and testing
• Documentation showing the results of operational and stress testing in an environ­
ment similar to the one you intend to use
• A written statement of the vendor’s policy for accepting, documenting, responding, 
and communicating reports of product faults
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Your client should also subscribe to the software vendor’s newsgroup to remain informed 
on a timely basis of new versions or patches for the specific programs the client is using. If 
the vendor does not provide such a system, you should consider an alternative method of 
gathering and implementing this information.
Most of the patches and fixes to software are security-related. Failure to follow develop­
ments made with patches and fixes will make the system vulnerable. In addition, services 
not being used should be turned off so that you can consider services in use when main­
taining and updating the systems. Therefore, these older services will have had time to 
have their weaknesses revealed and exploited.
The following table provides a listing of known server and CGI Script problems:
Software Versions Description
UNIX Web Server
NCSA httpd 1.0-1.5a Remote users can execute UNIX command with server privileges
Apache 1.0-1.1.1 Remote users can execute UNIX command with server privileges; 
remote users can obtain directory listings even when the feature is 
turned off
Windows NT Web Servers
Netscape 1.0-1.12 Remote users can execute NT commands with server privileges
WebSite Server 1.0-1.1b Remote users can execute NT commands with server privileges
Microsoft IIS 1.0 Remote users can execute NT commands with server privileges
Microsoft IIS 1.0-3.0 Remote users can obtain CGI script contents
CGI Scripts and Server Extensions
Mindshare Out 
Box webdist.cgi




1.0-1.1 Unauthorized users can overwrite and/or append existing files. 





All versions If server side includes turned on, users can execute commands 
with server privileges
nph-test.cgi All versions Remote users can obtain file listing from any directory on web 
server
nph-publish.cgi 1.0-1.1 Remote users can overwrite files outside document directory if web 
server permission permit
PHP extensions Various versions Remote users can execute commands with server privileges
AnyForm 1.0 Remote users can execute commands with server privileges
FormMail 1.0 Remote users can execute commands with server privileges
phf phone book All Versions Remote users can execute commands with server privileges
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Server Logs
Logging
Log files are invaluable when recovering from a security-related incident. Logs can tell 
you how an attacker broke through your security system and even provide clues to the 
identity of the attacker. Log files can be submitted as evidence in a court of law for crimi­
nal or civil suits. Be warned, however, that one of the first things done after a successful 
break-in will be changing the log files to cover up the intrusion. For this reason, you may 
wish to set up secured log server either inside or outside your firewall.
The log server should be a system that offers no service to the network and does not support 
user accounts. Setting up the server in this manner helps avoid having people break into 
the log server after they have compromised other servers. You should have logging enabled 
for all of the servers on the system and be sure to examine the logs on a regular basis.
Note that on NT systems, all auditing is shut off by default. As a minimum, you should en­
able logs to catch bad login attempts and to watch the IP services you offer.
Log files have other, non-security-related uses. They can show:
• Utilization of external network connection
• Utilization of internal network
• CPU load of the servers
• Disk utilization
System Logs
UNIX/NT keeps a series of logs. Depending on the system used, they have various names 
and can be found in various locations. The usual locations include /var/log, /var/adm, 
/usr/adm. The standard system log allows for customization of what is and what is not 
recorded. Control over what is captured and stored in the systems configuration file, 
/etc/syslog.conf, is well-documented in the UNIX or NT manual.
Although the location of the log files varies, the format is similar from system to system. 
The following is a sample listing from a web server named “yoda.”
March 8 16:25:20 yoda sshd[388] : Connection from bozo port 1022
March 8 16:25:23 yoda sshd[388] : Password authentication for r2d2 accepted
March 8 16:25:54 yoda su : r2d2 on /dev/ttyp1
March 9 03:30:56 yoda sshd[13615] : connect from vader port 1023
March 9 03:30:56 yoda sshd[13617] : executing remote command as root: ps auxwww
March 9 03:30:58 yoda sshd[13619] : connect from vader port 1023
March 9 03:30:58 yoda sshd[13620] : executing remote command as root: ps auxwww
March 9 04:30:08 yoda rdist[16307] : c3po: LOCAL ERROR: Response time out
March 9 19:15:32 yoda in.telnetd[3212] : connect from 148.45.57.125
March 9 19:15:55 yoda login: 2 LOGIN FAILURES FROM h125n57.names.hal.com, quit
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March 9 19:15:59 yoda login: 3 LOGIN FAILURES FROM h125n57.names.hal.com, end 
March 9 19:16:02 yoda login: 4 LOGIN FAILURES FROM h125n57.names.hal.com, stop 
March 9 19:16:10 yoda login: 5 LOGIN FAILURES FROM h125n57.names.hal.com, quit 
March 9 19:16:15 yoda login: 5 LOGIN FAILURES FROM h125n57.names.hal.com, finish 
March 9 19:16:29 yoda login: 6 LOGIN FAILURES FROM h125n57.names.hal.com, out
The first excerpt starts at 4:25 in the afternoon when a user named r2d2 used the en­
crypted secure shell program to login to yoda from a machine named bozo. After logging 
in he used the su command to become root.
Because we know that r2d2 is an authorized system administrator and his workstation is 
named bozo, this information provides nothing to arouse suspicion. If r2d2 were to 
login on a machine outside the local network, a machine other than bozo, or if he were 
logging in outside his normal working hours, this would be cause for concern and addi­
tional analysis.
The next excerpt shows user root on a machine named vader logging in and trying to exe­
cute the command ps auxwww twice. This is expected—it is part of the automated purge 
and backup procedure that runs on vader.
At 4:30 AM, there is a time-out error message from the rdist program. This machine uses 
the rdist command to mirror its server logs to a backup server named c3po. After some in­
quiries, it was discovered that c3po was down due to hardware failure, so no additional in­
vestigation was required.
The final excerpt shows a more suspicious series of entries starting at 7:15 PM. The in­
coming telnet program that has been left running on this machine for emergency pur­
poses (not a real good idea) reports a connection from IP address 148.45.57.125. Seconds 
later the log shows a series of login failures as the person connected tries a series of in­
valid user names. This could be evidence of a break-in attempt, but an analysis of the user 
names used (quit, end, stop) point more toward a neophyte who wandered into the sys­
tem, started the telnet, and did not know what to do.
Best practices indicate the need to log everything and then run the entire log nightly 
through a script that will filter out expected patterns. After this is done, it is a good idea 
to examine what remains to follow up on unusual entries performed.
Because logs can be evidence of unauthorized access, intruders will often try to delete or 
remove unwanted entries. If an attacker has gained access to the root directory, there is 
no way to protect information, files, and other data stored on the local system. However, 
many versions of the syslog program allow for redirection of the log files to other servers. 
This makes it more difficult for attackers to gain access to log files.
Web Server Logs
Logs created by the server are also very helpful in detecting problems. Most servers create 
at least two logs—the access log and the error log. The access log provides the details, re­
quest by request, of all requests made to the server. Included within this log is the URL re­
quested, host name of the requester, and the day and time of the request.
The error log, as the name implies, records errors—requests for documents that don’t ex­
ist, attempted access to protected documents or CGI scripts that produce internal errors.
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The following is an excerpt from an access log:
portio.wi.mit.edu - - [15/March/1999 : 22:46:58 -0500] “GET /index.html 
HTTP/1.0” 200 1523
Each line in an access file represents a separate request for a URL. There are seven fields 
in each line—host, rfc931, username, [date/time], request, status, bytes.
1. host: The name or IP address of the user’s machine. In our example protio.wi.mit.edu
2. rfc931: The user’s login name on the local machine. This is provided by the “ident” 
command. This command runs on some UNIX machines, so the field is usually dis­
played as -.
3. username: For password-protected pages, this field holds the account name provided 
by the user. The field is - id not applicable.
4. date/time: The local time of access.
5. request: The URL requested, including any CGI script parameters if any.
6. status: The status code of the server’s response - 200 for OK.
7. bytes: The number of bytes transferred, or - if not applicable.
The error log has a simpler format in which time-stamped error messages from the server, 
CGI scripts, and server plug-ins are recorded. A typical excerpt follows:
[Tue Feb 3 22:01:53 1998] httpd: malformed header from script 
ppmtogif: computing colormap. . .
ppmtogif: 4 colors found
[Tue Feb 3 22:10:11 1998] httpd: malformed header from script
g[Tue Feb 3 22:11:45 1998] killing CGI process 638
[Wed Feb 4 12:15:22 1998] httpd: connection times out for ml .abc.mil
Identifier “main::q” used only once: possible type at test line 1
Tie: no such file or directory
The error log grows at a much slower rate that the other logs, and its entries warrant anal­
ysis, if only to identify problems with the site. Some error messages that can be expected 
are:
• “File does not exist” or “no multi in this directory.” These messages let you know that 
someone tried to access a nonexistent directory or URL. This message is usually the re­
sult of a broken link in one of the web documents or a user’s typographical error. 
Sometimes it can indicate a URL-based attack if the message is occurring at a high 
rate.
• “File permissions deny server access.” The server has tried to retrieve a document but 
did not have sufficient permissions to read. This problem could indicate that a docu­
ment needs to have its permissions updated, or it could indicate that the server is mis­
configured and that someone is using it to try to get at files outside the document tree.
• “Passwords mismatch.” This error indicates that a user tried to access a document 
and entered the wrong password. Often, this is a user error, but a series of this type of 
error may indicate an attempt to break-in to the system.
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• “Client denied by server configuration.” Access to a directory was restricted to specific 
IP addresses, and someone outside the list of approved IP addresses has tried to gain 
access. A series of these errors may also indicate an attempt to gain unauthorized ac­
cess.
• “Malformed header from script.” This is a warning that CGI script is producing bad 
output that the server cannot interpret. These messages should be taken seriously be­
cause weak CGI scripts are often the first foothold an attacker has.
Like the strategy used with system logs, a good strategy to consider using with Web system 
logs should be to attempt to filter out the expected events and ones that are benign in na­
ture. Make sure the procedure for filtering out and organizing logs makes sense and is ap­
plied on a consistent basis. Also check the frequency with which logs are filtered and ana­
lyzed. The following figure represents several of the commercial programs that are used 
to filter and organize web logs.
Program Manufacturer Operating System Notes
Analog Stephen Turner NT/UNIX Freeware
Wusage Boutell Corporation NT/UNIX
Wwwstat Roy Fielding NT/UNIX Freeware
Site Tracker Tucker Info. Services All OS Subscription service
net.Analysis net.Genesis NT/UNIX
Firewall Logs
Firewall logs provide an additional tool that allows you to monitor activity on the Internet 
and to detect possible break-ins. Ordinarily, the server should be fairly quiet with regard 
to network traffic. Connections between the LAN and the Internet servers should be lim­
ited to outgoing connections initiated by the company’s employees. If the server sud­
denly starts initiating its own connections to the firewall there is a potential problem.
An early sign of an attack is the “door rattling” approach of scanning all ports on the fire­
wall to find out which ones are active. Many firewall logs track this information, and be­
cause it is a good sign of potential problems, this feature should not be turned off. An ex­
ample of port scanning might look like the following:
Mar 22 03:13:10 gw kernel: tcp from www/192.44.187.62:1320 to gw/192.44.187.63 on unserverd port 19
Mar 22 03:13:12 gw kernel: tcp from www/192.44.187.62:1321 to gw/192.44.187.63 on unserverd port 20
Mar 22 03:13:14 gw kernel: tcp from www/192.44.187.62:1326 to gw/192.44.187.63 on unserverd port 21
Mar 22 03:13:20 gw kernel: tcp from www/192.44.187.62:1327 to gw/192.44.187.63 on unserverd port 22
Mar 22 03:13:25 gw telnet-proxy: [1414]: deny host=www/192.44.187.62 use of gateway
Mar 22 03:13:30 gw kernel: tcp from www/192.44.187.62:1331 to gw/192.44.187.63 on unserverd port 24
In the following example, here is what might appear in the firewall logs if a compromised 
server makes repeated attempts to access the gateway’s FTP server using guessed pass­
words (FTP is used in this example, however, SMTP, WWW, or any other service running 
on the server could be used).
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Mar 22 04:04:33 gw ftpd [2940] : failed login from www/192.44.187.62, guest 
Mar 22 04:04:38 gw ftpd [2949] : failed login from www/192.44.187.62, system 
Mar 22 04:05:03 gw ftpd [2957] : failed login from www/192.44.187.62, root
It is important to note that the activity to cause concern for your analysis is activity initi­
ated by the Internet to the firewall.
A comprehensive discussion of a physical security and disaster recovery plan is beyond the 
scope of this publication. However, you should consider the following items related to 
physical security and recovery plans:
• Create a physical security plan—and make a physical inventory
• Make sure there is adequate protection against fire, smoke, explosions, dust, and hu­
midity
• Protect against earthquake, storms, and other natural disasters
• Protect against lighting and electrical noise
• Provide adequate ventilation and humidity controls
• Restrict food and drink from mission-critical computers
• Restrict physical access to computers
• Physically secure computers so they cannot be stolen or vandalized—mark them with 
indelible inventory control markings
Protect the network cables from eavesdropping and destruction
Sample Security Policy
We include an example of an adequate company security policy for ABC Company in the 
following table.
ABC Company, Inc Security Policy 
Current as of May 31, 19XX
PERSONNEL
Access Levels
The Web site grants five levels of access:
1. The public—read only access to all URLs with the exception of the /private direc­
tory where no access is granted
2. Employees of ABC company—ready only access to all areas of the site including 
access to the /private directory
3. HTML authors—ability to create, modify, and delete HTML files in the document 
tree
4. Site administrators—ability to modify the server configuration files, install CGI 
scripts, start and stop the server. Site administrators inherit all privileges of levels 
1,2, and 3.
5. System administrators—ability to modify the server host configuration, start and 





For access levels 3, 4 and 5, personnel must obtain written authorization from the CIO 
or CEO. This authorization will then be presented to a system administrator who will 
set up an appropriate account and access privileges. Level 2 access is automatically 
granted to all new employees when they are given a network password and email 
account.
Revocation Procedure
For access levels 2 through 5, authorization may be canceled at any time without 
warning at the discretion of the CIO or CEO. In the case of an emergency, a system 
administrator may also revoke access temporarily. This action must be ratified by the 
CIO or CEO within 24 hours.
ACCESS PRIVILEGES
Local Login
Local (console) login to the server host is allowed for system and site administrators 
only. Logins are for the purpose of site maintenance only.
Network Login
All forms of network login are prohibited—including file sharing.
Authoring Access
HTML authors and site administrator can make changes to the document tree. All 
such access is via FTP machines located within the company domain. These modifi­
cations shall be time/date stamped and logged. Except in rare emergencies, direct 
modifications to the document tree is not permitted, and a detailed exception report is 
due within 24 hours of the modification.
Remote Server Administration
Prohibited. ALL server administration is to be done locally.
Browsing Access
With the exception of the /private directory, anonymous browsing is allowed. The 
/private directory is restricted to systems in the company domain.
CGI Script Installation
CGI scripts can be installed by site administrators after two or more members of the 
site administrators group have reviewed and approved the code and tested it on the 
test server. CGI scripts that do not have code are not allowed on the server without 
written approval from the CIO or CEO.
Access to the /private Directory
The /private directory contains information that is confidential or proprietary to the 
ABC Company. Access to this directory is password protected and restricted to sys­
tems within the company domain (abc.com).
NETWORK SERVICES
Web
The Internet will serve static HTML documents and the output of CGI scripts. Incoming 
data is limited to customer feedback, order forms, and discussion groups whose
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scripts deposit their information in the appropriate and separate databases. Neither 
the CGI scripts nor the server shall initiate connections with other databases, files or 
other services on the LAN without authorization of the CIO.
FTP
Both incoming and outgoing FTP is allowed solely for the purpose of updating web 
pages. FTP access is restricted to HTML authors, site and system administrators. FTP 
access is restricted to machines located within the company domain. ALL anonymous 
FTP and access from outside the company domain is strictly prohibited.
Other Services
No other services (Gopher, Finger, etc.) are provided by the web host.
MAINTENANCE
24 x 7 Operation
The site will be accessible 24 x 7, except for a one-hour maintenance period on the 
first Sunday of each month between 8 AM and 9 AM. The UPS and other backup 
equipment should be tested monthly during this maintenance interval.
Backups
A complete backup of the server will be done daily. The company will maintain 14 
generations of backup tapes off-site in a secure facility.
Software
A site administrator is responsible for maintaining all software at current release levels 
with the appropriate patch installed. Virus-scanning software should be checked and 
updated weekly if appropriate.
Monitoring
A system administrator is responsible for monitoring the server host logs for errors 
and other unusual activity. A site administrator has similar responsibilities for web 
server logs. Both COPS and SATAN program shall be run weekly and the results 
studied. ANY suspicious activity should be brought to the attention of the CIO immedi­
ately. If there is any reason to suspect that the integrity of the system has been com­
promised, a system or site administrator is authorized to immediately take the server 
off-line.
File Access Rights Summary
User Configuration Tools Logs CGI Documents
System Administrator RW R R RW RW
Site Administrator R R R RW RW
HTML Author — — — R RW
Users — — — R R
R=Read access; W=Write access
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Minimizing Risk by Minimizing Services
An important way to reduce the risks the web server is exposed to is to minimize the other 
services offered by the computer that acts as host for the web site. The table below out­




Berkeley “r” commands 
(rlogin, rsh, rdist, etc.)
These commands use IP addresses for authentication and should be disabled.
The only exception to this is if you use a version of these commands that are based 
on SSL.
Chargen, echo These services are typically used to launch data-driven or denial-of-service attacks.
Domain Name System 
(DNS)
Weaknesses in DNS implementations can be used to compromise the web server. 
DNS should be run on its own secure server.
Finger Finger can be used to gather information about another computer system. Informa­
tion gathered can allow an attacker access to launch programs, copy/delete files, 
etc.
FTP Standard FTP sends user names and passwords in an unencrypted format. If FTP 
is required another control should be used e.g., one-time passwords, SecurelD 
keys. FTP should only be used to update the web server. If anonymous FTP is re­
quired it should be run on a separate computer
Mail (SMTP) Inherent weaknesses in sendmail and other mailers can be used to break into an­
other system.
Netstat, systat Netstat and systat have the ability to display a system’s configuration and usage 
patterns. From this information an attacker can gain access to the server.
Telnet Interactive logins should be prohibited to anyone except the webmaster. Telnet 
should only be used in its encrypted form (ssh). If this is not possible use another 
control like one-time passwords. Telnet allows access to the root directory.
System Security Clues
Hackers prey on the weaknesses of specific software and operat­
ing systems. As a result, the indications that a site’s security has 
been breached are similar. The following list represents areas to 
examine when testing the security of a site:
• Examine log files for connections from unusual locations or 
other unusual activity.
For example, look at the ‘last’ log, process accounting, all logs created by syslog, 
and other security logs. If the firewall or router writes logs to a different location 
than the compromised system, remember to check these logs also. Note that this is 
not foolproof unless you log to append-only media; many intruders edit log files in 
an attempt to hide their activity.
• Look for setuid and setgid files (especially setuid root files) everywhere on the system.
Intruders often leave setuid copies of /bin/sh or /bin/time around to allow them 
root access at a later time. The UNIX find(l) program can be used to hunt for 
setuid and/or setgid files.
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• Check your system binaries to make sure that they haven’t been altered.
Intruders have changed programs on UNIX systems such as login, su, telnet, net- 
stat, ifconfig, ls, find, du, df, libc, sync, any binaries referenced in /etc/inetd.conf,
and other critical network and system programs and shared object libraries. Com­
pare the versions on the system(s) with known good copies, such as those from the 
initial installation media. Be careful of trusting backups—backups could also con­
tain Trojan Horses. Trojan Horse programs may produce the same standard check­
sum and timestamp as the legitimate version. Consequently, the standard UNIX 
sum(l) command and the timestamps associated with the programs are not suffi­
cient to determine whether the programs have been replaced. The use of cmp(l), 
MD5, Tripwire, and other cryptographic checksum tools is sufficient to detect these 
Trojan Horse programs, provided the checksum tools themselves are kept secure 
and are not available for modification by the intruder. Additionally, you may want 
to consider using a tool (PGP, for example) to “sign,” or fingerprint, the output 
generated by MD5 or Tripwire for future reference. Use fingerprints to compare bi­
naries and other system files. The fingerprint produces a hash of the file. A 
single-bit change in the file produces a completely different hash. There is no way 
currently known to discover a file that produces a particular hash—making file
forgery virtually impossible.
Check the system(s) for unauthorized use of a network-monitoring program, 
commonly called a sniffer or packet sniffer.
Intruders may use a sniffer to capture user account and password information.
• Examine all the files that are run by ‘cron’ and ‘at.’
Intruders have been known to leave back doors in files run from ‘cron’ or submit­
ted to ‘at.’ These techniques can let an intruder back on the system (even if you be­
lieve you had addressed the original compromise). Also, verify that all files/ 
programs referenced (directly or indirectly) by the ‘cron’ and ‘at’ jobs, and the job 
files themselves, are not world-writable.
• Check for unauthorized services. Inspect /etc/inetd.conf for unauthorized additions 
or changes.
In particular, search for entries that execute a shell program (for example, /bin/sh 
or /bin/csh), and check all programs that are specified in /etc/inetd.conf to verify 
that they are correct and haven’t been replaced by Trojan horse programs. Also 
check for legitimate services that have commented out in the /etc/inetd.conf. In­
truders may turn on a service that was previously turned off, or replace the inetd 
program with a Trojan Horse program.
• Examine the /etc/passwd file on the system and check for modifications to that file.
In particular, look for the unauthorized creation of new accounts, accounts with no 
passwords, or UID changes (especially UID 0) to existing accounts.
• Check your system and network configuration files for unauthorized entries.
In particular, look for ‘+’ (plus sign) entries and inappropriate non-local host 
names in /etc/hosts.equiv, /etc/hosts.lpd, and in all .rhosts files (especially root, 
uucp, ftp, and other system accounts) on the system. These files should not be 
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world-writable. Furthermore, confirm that these files existed before any intrusion 
and were not created by the intruder.
• Look everywhere on the system for unusual or hidden files (files that start with a pe­
riod and are normally not shown by ‘ls’)
These files can be used to hide tools and information (password cracking pro­
grams, password files from other systems, etc.). A common technique on UNIX 
systems is to put a hidden directory in a user’s account with an unusual name, 
something like ‘...’ or ‘.. ’(dot dot space) or ‘..AG’ (dot dot control-G). Again, 
the find(l) program can be used to look for hidden files, for example: find 
/-name “.. ” -print -xdev find /-name -print -xdev | cat -v. Also, files with 
names such as ‘.xx’ and ‘.mail’ have been used (that is, files that might appear 
to be normal).
• Examine all machines on the local network when searching for signs of intrusion.
Most of the time, if one host has been compromised, others on the network have 
been, too. This is especially true for networks where NIS is running or where hosts 
trust each other through the use of .rhosts files and/or /etc/hosts.equiv files. Also, 
check hosts for which your users share .rhosts access.
Network Monitoring Tools
Practitioners might benefit from acquiring the following monitoring tools 
to help the practitioner in a WebTrust engagement. Many of these tools 
will be running on the system(s) used by the client in the client’s eCom­
merce system.
• Argus
Argus is a network-monitoring tool that uses a client-server model to capture data and as­
sociate it into “transactions.” The tool provides network-level auditing and can verify com­
pliance to a router configuration file. It allows information to be easily adapted to proto­
col analysis, intrusion detection, and other security needs. Argus is available from many 
sites, including ftp://ftp.sei.cmu.edu/pub/
• Swatch
Swatch, the Simple WATCHer program, is an easily configurable log file filter/monitor. 
Swatch monitors log files and act to filter out unwanted data and take one or more user- 
specified actions based on patterns in the log. Swatch is available from 
ftp://ftp.stanford.edu/general/security-tools/swatch/.
• Crack
Crack is a freely available program designed to identify, by standard guessing techniques, 
UNIX DES encrypted passwords that can be found in widely available dictionaries. The 
guessing techniques are outlined in the Crack documentation. Many system admin­
istrators run Crack as a regular system administration procedure and notify account 
owners who have “crackable” passwords. Crack is available from 
ftp://info.cert.org/pub/tools/crack/.
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• Shadow passwords
If your UNIX system has a shadow password capability, use it. Under a shadow password 
system, the /etc/passwd file does not have encrypted passwords in the password field. In­
stead, the encrypted passwords are held in a shadow file that is not word-readable. Con­
sult the system manuals to determine whether a shadow password capability is available 
on your system and to get details of how to set up and manage it.
• TCP/IP wrapper program
The TCP/IP wrapper program provides additional network logging information and 
gives a system administrator the ability to deny or allow access from certain systems or do­
mains to the host on which the program is installed. Installation of this software does not 
require any modification to existing network software. This program is available from 
ftp://info.cert.org/pub/tools/tcp wrappers/.
• ISS (Internet Security Scanner)
ISS is a program that will interrogate all computers within a specified IP address range, 
determining the security posture of each with respect to several common system vulnera­
bilities. ISS is available from many sites, including http://www.iss.net/~iss/.
• SATAN (Security Administrator Tool for Analyzing Networks)
SATAN is a testing and reporting tool that collects a variety of information about net­
worked hosts. SATAN is available from many sites, including 
ftp://ftp.win.tue.nl/pub/security/.
• COPS (Computer Oracle and Password System)
COPS is a publicly available collection of programs that attempt to identify security 
problems in a UNIX system. COPS does not attempt to correct any discrepancies 
found; it simply produces a report of its findings. COPS is available from 
ftp://info.cert.org/pub/tools/cops/.
• Tripwire
Tripwire checks file and directory integrity; it is a utility that compares a designated set of 
files and directories to information stored in a previously generated database. Any differ­
ences are flagged and logged, including added or deleted entries. When run against sys­
tem files on a regular basis, Tripwire enables you to spot changes in critical system files 
and to immediately take appropriate damage control measures. Tripwire is available from 
many sites, including ftp://info.cert.org/pub/tools/tripwire/.
Evaluating a Credit Card Payment System
There are a number of credit card systems available for use on the In­
ternet. Any cards listed here would be out of date by the time this 
book was published. So, rather than listing systems and other sources, 
we provide the following list of criteria to consider in making an anal­
ysis of an Internet payment system:
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• If the system stores credit card numbers and other information on the customer’s 
computer (usually by using cookies), the information must be encrypted.
• If the system stores credit card numbers and other information on the web server, this 
information must be encrypted. Credit card and other information should be stored 
off the web server for optimal security and credit card information should only be 
stored if recurring charges are expected.
• Unless recurring charges are anticipated, all credit card information should be purged 
at the end of the transaction.
• The system should validate the credit card information from the on-line merchant 
bank or by using the check-digit test while the customer is still on-line.
• The system should allow for credits to be posted from time to time. Check on the pro­
cess to allow the posting of credits. Does there need to be a matching charge, special 
password, or other access restriction? Are there exception reports for the processing 
of credits? Issuing credits to a credit card is one of the easiest ways to steal money 
from a business.
• The system should allow for customer charge-backs. Does the charge-back automati­
cally get entered into the customer’s account, or is the process handled manually?
Web Privacy
A recent Business Week/Harris poll confirms that Americans care 
deeply about their privacy and that their concerns about the lack of 
privacy on-line are keeping many would-be-users off the Internet. The 
poll, published in the March 16, 1999 issue of Business Week, reveals 
that almost two-thirds of non-Internet users would be more likely to 
start using the Internet if the privacy of their “personal information 
and communications would be protected.” Privacy was the number 
one reason individuals are choosing to stay off the Internet, coming in well ahead of cost, 
concerns with complicated technology, and concerns with unsolicited commercial email.
There is a rising tide of concern about privacy on the Internet, as we’ve mentioned previ­
ously. The extent of this concern is evident when examining other results showing that 
more than half the respondents believe government should regulate the use and collec­
tion of personal information on the Internet and that 65% are “very” and 15% “some­
what” concerned about using a credit card to make an on-line purchase. This concern has 
components of security as well as privacy.
A recent article in the Los Angeles Times noted that the State of California plans to sell in­
formation from quarterly and annual payroll reports to banks and other agencies. Much 
of this information is provided to the California Employment Development Division 
(EDD) electronically. It is anticipated that banks will use this information in evaluating 
loan worthiness. The EDD stated that the consumer will have to provide permission be­
fore the bank can obtain this information. Within a matter of days after this story ap­
peared, the law was removed due to strong public outcry, underscoring the value the pub­
lic places on privacy.
In October of 1998, the European Union (EU) adopted privacy standards for companies 
doing business with member countries. The FTC has adopted safe harbor provisions that 
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are an attempt to meet the European regulations. At the time this work will be going to 
press, it is unclear whether the safe harbor provisions will be adopted.
WebTrust has had elements of privacy since its inception. However, in future releases of 
the Principles and Criteria, privacy standards will be focused and refined. The greatest 
risk to privacy is information that is voluntarily provided to a web site. User feedback 
forms, requests for additional information, on-line orders, and posts to news groups may 
be stored for an indefinite period of time and used as the site desires.
On the other side of the coin, however, researchers, advertisers, and Web sites use cus­
tomer information to tailor site content, provide better products and improve the overall 
browsing experience. So the challenge becomes one of balance. Time, technology, and 
perhaps, government regulation will provide solutions and additional problems to the 
privacy conflict.
Server Logs and Privacy
Much of the information that is captured during a web session is recorded in the log files 
of the server. To understand just how much information is gathered on-line, we provide 
the following log excerpt from a server’s log over a two-minute period:
ppp.byu.edu - - [09/May /1999:20:31:56 
ppp.byu.edu - - [09/May /1999:20:31:58 
ppp.byu.edu - - [09/May /1999:20:32:10 
ppp.byu.edu - - [09/May /1999:20:33:22
-0500] “GET / HTTP/1.0” 200 4029
-0500] “GET /www/lcalogo.gif HTTP/1.0” 200 620
-0500] “GET /www/wt.gif HTTP/1.0” 200 154
-0500] “GET /cgi-bin/wwwais?webtrust+privacy HTTP/1.0” 200 527
Each line contains information about a separate request or hit. In the previous example, 
four requests came from a user at ppp.byu.edu. In the first line, the user requests the 
home page by downloading the URL. This page contains two graphics, lcalogo.gif and 
wt.gif. The next two lines in the example show the request for these graphics files. In the 
last line, the user performs a search using the words webtrust and privacy.
What else can we learn from these four lines in the log file? More than you might think. 
For example, the user is probably someone who works for Brigham Young University and 
is probably working from home. We can deduce this because it is 8:30 PM and because 
the remote address indicated the use of one of the university’s PPP lines.
Information that is recorded on server log files can be customized. In addition to the in­
formation contained in the example above, server logs can record:
• The URL of the referring document, showing the page the user was viewing before re­
questing the current page
• The browser’s manufacturer and version number
• The user’s operating system
• The amount of time taken to process a request
• The list of MIME types that the browser supports that can reveal which “plug-ins” are 
installed
Other Logs
Other information available to the website comes from various sources. One such source 
is a referrer log. The referrer log maintains information similar to that the server log con­
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tains, but reveals where the user came from before browsing the current web site. For ex­
ample, if a user had come to our site from link at CPAWEBTRUST.ORG we might see the 
following entry in our server’s referrer log:
User1.abc.com http://www.cpawebtrust.org/map.html -> / lca.html
In this example, a user (user1) at abc.com visits cpawebtrust.org. On that page is a link 
from the map.html page to our home page. This information is one way marketing pro­
fessionals measure the success of their efforts.
A bookmark referral looks like the following:
gate.swm.de http://ws084242.swm.de/~brudder/bookmarks.html ->
This entry shows that someone behind a firewall in a German company (de denotes Ger­
many) named Brudder has a link to my homepage in his bookmark file.
This search engine referral shows that a user whose IP address is not listed in the domain 
name system has used the Lycos Web search engine to search for documents containing 




He located the Why WebTrust html—a good choice.
Because of the potential for the referrer field to “leak” information from one web site to 
another, referrer logs can lead to some serious privacy issues. A recent case involved the 
leakage of credit card numbers. The problem occurred in the following manner:
1. The user browsed a web site and decided to make a purchase
2. The user entered the credit card number into the on-line form and submitted it after 
confirming that the site has SSL running
3. The user received a confirmation of the order
4. The confirmation page contained an advertisement that pointed to another site
5. The user clicked on the advertisement and jumped to the new site




How could something like that happen when SSL was running at the merchant’s site? 
The problem can be found in the scripting of the form the customer filled out. The de­
signers of the site used the GET rather that the POST command for submitting the con­
tents to the CGI script that handles the form. This situation illustrates why it is extremely 
important to evaluate the impact CFI scripts have on the engagement.
In another scenario, consider this entry that was occurring with frequency in the log file 
of a small company whose stock was falling in value:
dg7231.mcig.com fileWSRVR1\HOT\stocks2sellshort.html -> /index.html
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This entry indicates that a document named stocks2sellshort.html located on the com­
pany’s internal server at the MCIG company has a link to the company’s homepage on 
the Internet. The presence of a firewall system would be entirely ineffective at preventing 
this information leak unless it was specifically configured to strip out the referrer field 
from outgoing web requests.
Web proxies are modified web servers that act as middlemen between the user and the re­
mote server. When a proxy is in use, all requests for documents are indirect. Proxies are 
used to reduce network traffic and in many instances make use of caching for quicker 
speed. Proxies are a requirement for many firewall systems.
Proxies maintain logs called, proxy logs (no surprise here). Proxies are generally trans­
parent to the user and web access occurs normally. Because a proxy server acts as a mid­
dleman by definition, the proxy server logs everything.
Every URL, along with user identification, time and date, and referrer information is 
logged. The implication of this structure is that the proxy log from a corporate firewall 
can be used to determine who is surfing non-business-related sites on company time. In­
ternet Service Providers can compile detailed statistics on their customers’ habits and as­
sociate them to specific sites, thus compromising privacy.
Cookies
Cookies were designed with the best of intentions to solve the 
problem of providing dynamic content in a static HTTP environ­
ment. Cookies come in all sizes and shapes—that is they can con­
tain a large amount of information or little information. For example, cookies can con­
tain the entire contents of a shopping cart or simply the identity of a repeat visitor to a 
specific site.
Cookies have two basic forms. Cookies that disappear when the browser session is termi­
nated are called “transient.” Cookies that remain and are stored on the hard drive of the 
user are called “persistent.” Cookies also have names, and a server can hand a single 
browser several cookies, each with a different name to track. Some cookies are restricted 
to certain parts of a site’s document tree, or they can be made to act only in an SSL ses­
sion.
The cookie protocol was designed to prevent leakage of information from one site to an­
other in two basic ways: (1) the ability to designate secure cookies for SSL sessions, and 
(2) the fundamental inability to share cookies among sites. Although a web site can create 
cookies that are valid on more than one server within its own domain (www.abc.com and 
ftp.abc.com), it is currently impossible to make a browser return a cookie to a foreign do­
main.
In addition, because a cookie is generated by the web server and not the browser, a 
cookie cannot hold information that the user has not voluntarily provided to the site. For 
example, a cookie cannot hold an email address unless the user supplied the email ad­









Up until now, this guide has been concerned with the specific tasks in performing a 
WebTrust engagement. Perhaps the greatest challenge the practitioner will find is in 
marketing and selling a WebTrust engagement to potential and current clients. So, al­
though we may know all of the ins and outs of performing an engagement, if we don’t 
have an engagement to perform, that skill is moot. For this reason, it is important to 
address the unique attributes and challenges in marketing a WebTrust engagement.
Many practitioners are constantly ask how to market the WebTrust service to clients and 
potential clients. My answer is always the same—one prospect at a time. Accountants are 
sometimes considered to be lacking in marketing skills and to have entered the account­
ing profession because it historically did not require the disposition it takes to become a 
salesperson. Those days are gone. The accounting profession needs to be more respon­
sive to consumer needs, wants, and concerns if it is to survive into the next century. Here 
are some of the most common objections offered by potential WebTrust clients and cor­
responding suggested answers for each:
Comment: This is a great program, but I can’t afford it right now.
Response: You can’t afford not to! Then ascertain how important the Internet is to
the company’s overall sales program. If the Internet is critical, review the 
data about growth of electronic commerce and then tell the prospect that 
it is important to find a way to come up with the needed funds. Follow this 
by a review of the budget.
Comment: Consumers are saying that a seal really won’t make a difference.
Response: Then the studies done by various consumer groups are wrong. Return to
studies such as the Yankolovich study and review the actual facts.
Comment: If the AICPA doesn’t advertise this program to the consumer, it will never
take off.
Response: The AICPA is targeting both the developer and consumer groups. Then,
try to refocus the topic to the real problem, that of the CPA not wanting to 
sell the service
Comment: What about all the other competition out there?
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Response: Yes, there is competition, but no other program is as full-featured as
WebTrust—covering ALL aspects of consumer concerns: business 
disclosures, transaction integrity, and information protection. Other pro­
grams cover a single principle or part of a principle. None has the inde­
pendence or objectivity of a CPA. (See the competitive grid presented in 
Appendix F which reflects the various seal programs in existence at the 
time this guide goes to press. It is interesting to note that competitors’ pro­
grams offer only some of the features that WebTrust provides.)
Comment: This program is for larger companies with Internet sites.
Response: Smaller companies have a lot of credibility to gain from the consumer.
Again, refocus the objection to the fact that consumers are looking for a 
measure of security on the Internet that WebTrust offers.
Comment: There are so few seals on the web, we don’t want to be first.
Response: You’re right, there are not a lot of WebTrust seals on the Internet yet, be­
cause the program is so new. This gives you an opportunity to be a leader 
and set the standard for your competition.
The tactic the accountant needs to take is one of listening to the objection from the client 
and then refocusing the discussion back to the benefits of WebTrust and eCommerce. 
Consider the following benefits:
• Reduced sales costs
• Increased sales at the eCommerce site
• Increased consumer confidence
• Larger global customer base
• Perceived as a leader
Understand that WebTrust is not about accounting. Rather, WebTrust is about consumer 
confidence on the World Wide Web. The last person to market a WebTrust engagement 
to is the controller or CFO whose budget is exhausted and just got the audit bill from 
your firm WebTrust and its concepts are better understood by the sales and marketing de­
partments whose job it is to reach the consumer and build confidence. This situation 
poses two problems:
• Accountants often don’t have any contact with the sales or marketing departments 
of their clients because historically they have worked with the accounting depart­
ment.
• Sales and marketing people get “pitched” to on a regular basis. A one-time sales pitch 
on the part of the accountant is not likely to get you a new engagement. On the aver­
age, it will take 3-5 sales calls to the same prospect to win an engagement.
Accountant’s attitudes must change to realize that it will take effort on our part to 
launch this service. Neither the AICPA nor state organizations have the resources re­
quired to put forth a marketing campaign like Microsoft or IBM Accountants, however, 
have a national “sales force” of over 300,000 members. We also have materials provided
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by the AICPA to help market this vital service. And, who knows, as accountants become 
better at selling WebTrust engagements, they may find it easier to sell other services as 
well.
Favorite Websites
See Appendix D for selected Websites that might be helpful in your WebTrust engage­
ments.
WebTrust Presentation on Microsoft Power Point
Included with this book as Appendix E is a copy of information to consider if you want to 
develop a Microsoft Power Point presentation for WebTrust. The information includes a 
review of the explosive growth of eCommerce and an introduction to the WebTrust Prin­
ciples and Criteria. Feel free to adapt the information to meet the particular needs of 
your firm and the audience. Be sure to look at the notes which provide additional infor­
mation or discussion points to consider.
Seal Programs
Various competitors offer seal programs that address some of the features that the 
WebTrust Seal Program includes. See Appendix F, which includes a copy of the Seal Pro­
gram Comparison grid, indicating the competitive and technical differences between 
WebTrust and other seal programs.
Conclusion
eCommerce represents one of the most exciting opportunities and adventures for both 
clients and accountants. As our clients look for newer more efficient ways to reach their 
customers, accountants should be leading the way with electronic commerce. Forrester 
Research stated: “The rapid growth of inter-company electronic commerce will cause 
businesses to adopt dynamic trading processes—July 1997.”
As information and accounting professionals, we should be leading the way in educating 
our clients as to the benefits of electronic commerce. In many cases, we will need to assist 
them in taking advantage of the opportunities eCommerce provides. Yes, there will be 
risks, but there will also be opportunity and reward. Consider these points taken from 
great leaders in our history:
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Opportunity is missed by most people because it is dressed in overalls and 
looks like work. —Thomas A. Edison
Security is mostly a superstition. It does not exist in nature...life is 
either a daring adventure or nothing. —Helen Keller
Nothing is particularly hard, if you divide it into small jobs. —Henry Ford
He who waits for a roast duck to fly into his mouth must wait a very, very long 
time. —Chinese Proverb
It is my sincere wish that we all look ahead with great ex­
citement to the opportunities and challenges offered by 
electronic commerce and WebTrust. The wave of technol­
ogy is before our clients and us. Now it our choice—to 
either ride the wave of technology into the 21st century or 







Common Internet File Formats
Internet Dictionary
Address
See either IP Address or Email Address.
Address Mask
The address mask is used to identify the parts of an IP address that correspond to the differ­
ent sections (separated by dots). It’s also known as the “subnet mask” because the network 
portion of an address can be determined by the encoding inherent in an IP address.
Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET)
A pioneering long-haul network funded by what’s now-called DARPA (formerly known as 
ARPA). It was the foundation on which the Internet was built.
Agent
The part of a system that performs information preparation and exchange on behalf of an 
application.
Alias
A type of nickname (usually short and easy to remember) that refers to a type of network re­
source. Aliases are used so you won’t have to remember the long and difficult names typical 
of network resources.
Anonymous FTP
By using the word “anonymous” as your user ID and your email address as the password when 
you login to an FTP site, you can bypass local security checks and gain limited access to pub­
lic files on the remote computer. This type of access is available on most FTP sites, but not all.
Applet
A small Java program that can be embedded in an HTML page. Applets differ from full- 
fledged Java applications in that they are not allowed to access certain resources on the local 
computer, such as files and serial devices (modems, printers, etc.), and are prohibited from 
communicating with most other computers across a network. The current rule is that an ap­
plet can only make an Internet connection to the computer from which the applet was sent.




Sometimes known as a client or an “app” it’s a program that performs a specific function.
FTP, Mail, Gopher, Mosaic, and Telnet clients are the most common examples of Internet 
applications.
Archie
You’ll usually hear this term referred to in the phrase archie search. Archie is a way of auto­
matically gathering, indexing, and sometimes even retrieving files on the Internet. Most good 
archie clients are able to FTP files once you’ve found the information you’re looking for.
Archive
A collection of files stored on an Internet machine. FTP sites are known as archives.
ARPANET
See Advanced Research Projects Agency Network.
Asynchronous Transfer Mode
A transfer method that dynamically allocates bandwidth using a fixed-size packet, or cell. Also 
known as fast packet.
ATM
See Asynchronous Transfer Mode.
Authentication
Any process that ensures that users are who they say they are. When you type your name and 
password, you are authenticated and allowed access.
Bandwidth
This refers to the difference (measured in Hz) between the highest and lowest frequencies of 
a transmission. Most people loosely refer to bandwidth as the amount of data that can be 
transferred over a network connection.
BBS
See Bulletin Board System.
Berkeley Internet Name Domain
An early version of a DNS server developed by the University of California at Berkeley. Most 
Internet hosts run a version of BIND.
Bitnet
A computer network devoted to academic use that provides email and file transfer services us­
ing a store-and-forward protocol. It is based on the IBM Network Job Entry protocols. A more 
recent version of Bitnet (known as Bitnet-II) encapsulates the Bitnet protocol within IP 
packets.
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Bounce
If you send email and it fails to arrive at its intended recipient for any reason (incorrect user 
name, network failure, etc.), the message “bounces” and returns to you. The subject line in a 
bounced message usually says something like: Undeliverable Mail or Message Undeliverable.
BTW
Acronym meaning By The Way. Seen mostly in IRC sessions.
Bulletin Board System
A computer that typically provides email services, file archives, and announcements of inter­
est to the bulletin board system’s operator (known as a sysop). BBS’s started out as hobbies 
for computer enthusiasts, and were mostly accessible by modem. Recently, however, more 
and more BBS’s are being connected to the Internet.
CCIRN
See Coordinating Committee for Intercontinental Research Networks.
CCITR
See Comite Consultatif International de Telegraphique et Telephonique.
CERT
See Computer Emergency Response Team.
CGI
(Common Gateway Interface)—A set of rules that describe how a Web Server communicates 
with another piece of software on the same machine, and how the other piece of software 
(the “CGI program”) talks to the web server. Any piece of software can be a CGI program if it 
handles input and output according to the CGI standard.
Usually a CGI program is a small program that takes data from a web server and does some­
thing with it, like putting the content of a form into an email message, or turning the data 
into a database query.




The most common name of a directory on a web server in which CGI programs are stored. 
The “bin” part of “cgi-bin” is a shorthand version of “binary,” because once upon a time, most 
programs were referred to as “binaries.” In real life, most programs found in cgi-bin directo­





Challenge-Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP)
An authentication method that can be used when connecting to an Internet Service Provider. 
CHAP allows you to login to your provider automatically, without the need for a terminal 
screen. It is more secure than the Password Authentication Protocol (another widely used au­
thentication method), because it does not send passwords in text format.
CHAP
See Challenge-Handshake Authentication Protocol.
Chat
Another term for IRC. Also, an acronym meaning Conversational Hypertext Access 
Technology.
CIX
An acronym meaning Commercial Internet Exchange.
Client
In Internet terms, it is an application that performs a specific function, such as Telnet or FTP. 
It’s the front-end to an Internet process. In more general terms, a client is the computer sys­
tem or process that requests a service of another computer system or process. The much 
talked about client-server architecture refers to a workstation requesting the contents of a file 
from a server.
Comite Consultatif International de Telegraphique et Telephonique (CCITT)
French for International Telephone and Telegraph Advisory Council—an organization that 
plays a major role in the United National International Telecommunications Union (ITU). 
The CCITT is responsible for making technical recommendations about communications sys­
tems worldwide. Every four years, CCITT updates the standards, most recently in 1996.
Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT)
The CERT was formed by DARPA in November 1988 in response to the Internet worm inci­
dent. CERT exists to facilitate Internet-wide response to computer security events involving 
Internet hosts and to conduct research targeted at improving the security of existing systems. 
They maintain an archive of security-related issues on their FTP server at ftp.cert.org, their 
email address is cert(5)cert.org, and their 24-hour telephone Hotline for reporting Internet 
security issues is (412) 268-7090.
Cookie
The most common meaning of “Cookie” on the Internet refers to a piece of information sent 
by a Web Server to a Web Browser that the Browser software is expected to save and to send 
back to the Server whenever the browser makes additional requests from the Server.
Depending on the type of Cookie used, and the Browser’s settings, the Browser may accept or 
not accept the Cookie, and may save the Cookie for either a short time or a long time.
Cookies might contain information such as login or registration information, online “shop­
ping cart” information, user preferences, etc.
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When a Server receives a request from a Browser that includes a Cookie, the Server is able to 
use the information stored in the Cookie. For example, the Server might customize what is 
sent back to the user, or keep a log of particular user’s requests.
Cookies are usually set to expire after a predetermined amount of time and are usually saved 
in memory until the Browser software is closed down, at which time they may be saved to disk 
if their “expire time” has not been reached.
Cookies do not read your hard drive and send your life story to the CIA, but they can be used 
to gather more information about a user than would be possible without them.
Coordinating Committee for Intercontinental Research Networks (CCIRN)
A committee that provides a forum for North American and European network research or­
ganizations to cooperate and plan.
Corporation for Research and Educational Networking (CREN)
An organization formed in October 1989, when Bitnet and CSNET were combined. CSNET is 
no longer around, but CREN still operates Bitnet.
Cracker
Substantially different from hackers, crackers are users who try to gain illegal access to com­
puters. They are usually malicious in their intentions.
Cyberspace
The world of computers and the society that gathers around them, as referred to by William 
Gibson in his fantasy novel Neuromancer. It now loosely refers to the online world and even 
more loosely to the Internet.
Data Encryption Key (DEK)
Much like an actual key used for locking and re-opening doors, DEKs are used for the encryp­
tion and decoding of message text, sometimes in the form of a digital signature.
Data Encryption Standard (DES)
A standardized encryption method widely used on the Internet.
Datagram
A block of data that is “smart” enough (actually, which carries enough information) to travel 
from one Internet site to another without having to rely on earlier exchanges between the 
source and destination computers (not to be confused with a Candygram).
DDN
See Defense Data Network.
DECnet
The proprietary network protocol designed by Digital Equipment Corporation.
Dedicated Line
A communications line that is used solely for computer connections. If you buy an additional 
phone line for your modem, that’s a dedicated line. There are other types of dedicated lines 
(such as T3s and T1s) that are used for larger network entities.
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Defense Data Network (DDN)
A global communications network that serves the U.S. Department of Defense. It is made up 
of a network called MILNET, other portions of the Internet, and classified networks that are 
not part of the Internet. The DDN is used to connect military installations and is managed by 
the Defense Information Systems Agency. It was originally developed by DARPA.
Dialup
A widely used method of accessing the Internet. A dialup connection uses regular phone 
lines to connect one computer to another via modem.
Distributed Computing Environment (DCE)
An architecture based on standard programming interfaces, conventions, and server func­
tionalities used for distributing applications transparently across networks. The DCE is con­
trolled and promoted by the Open Software Foundation (OSF), a consortium of vendors in­
cluding DEC, IBM, and Hewlett Packard.
DNS
See Domain Name Service.
Domain
A “logical” region of the Internet. People sometimes refer to them loosely as “sites.” Gener­
ally, a domain corresponds to an IP address or an area on a host.
Domain Name Service (DNS)
The DNS is a static, hierarchical name service used with TCP/IP hosts, and is housed on a 
number of servers on the Internet. Basically, it maintains a database for figuring out and find­
ing (or resolving) host names and IP addresses on the Internet. This allows users to specify 
remote computers by host names rather than numerical IP addresses (if you’ve used UNIX, 
you may have heard the DNS referred to as the BSD UNIX BIND service). For example, go to 
a DOS prompt in Windows 95, the % prompt in UNIX, or use a ping client for Windows 3.1 
or Mac, and type ping www.winfiles.com. This will check the DNS server you have configured, 
look up the numerical IP address for www.winfiles.com, and then ping that server’s IP ad­
dress. The advantage of the DNS is that you don’t have to remember numerical IP addresses 
for all the Internet sites you want to access.
Dot Address (or Dotted Decimal Notation)
The common notation for IP addresses of the form 1.2.3.4, where each number represents 
one byte in the four-byte IP address.
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF)
A foundation that addresses social and legal issues arising from the impact of computers on 
society.
Electronic Mail (Email)
A method by which computer users can exchange messages with each other over a network. 
Email is probably the most widely used communications tool on the Internet. There are many 
quirky conventions to Email, but most entail a To:, From:, and Subject: line. One of the ad­
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vantages of email is its ability to be forwarded and replied to easily. If an email is badly re­




Your email address is made up of several parts. By convention, addresses use lowercase letters 
with no spaces. The first part of the address, the username, identifies a unique user on a 
server. The @ (pronounced at) separates the username from the host name. The host name 
uniquely identifies the server computer and is the last part of the Internet email address. 
Large servers, such as those used at universities or large companies sometimes contain multi­
ple parts, called subdomains. Subdomains and the host name are separated by a period (but 
it’s pronounced dot). The three-letter suffix in the host name identifies the kind of organiza­
tion operating the server (some locations use a two-letter geographical suffix). The most com­
mon suffixes are: .com (commercial), .edu (educational), .gov (government), .mil (military), 
.net (networking), and .org (non-commercial). More suffixes are under consideration. Ad­
dresses outside of the U.S. sometimes use a two-letter suffix that identifies the country in 
which the server is located. Some examples are: .jp (Japan), .nl (The Netherlands), .uk 
(United Kingdom), .ca (Canada), and .tw (Taiwan).
Encryption
The basis of network security. Encryption encodes network packets to prevent anyone except 
the intended recipient from accessing the data.
Ethernet
A standard and probably the most popular connection type for Local Area Networks (LANs). 
It was first developed by Xerox, and later refined by Digital, Intel, and Xerox. In an Ethernet 
configuration, computers are connected by coaxial or twisted-pair cable where they contend 
for network access using a Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Detection 
(CSMA/CD) paradigm. Ethernet can transfer information at up to 10 megabit-per-second 
(Mb/s).
FAQ
Acronym for Frequently Asked Questions. FAQs are widely available on the Internet and usu­
ally take the form of large, instructional text files. They are written on a wide variety of topics, 
and are usually the most up-to-date source for specialized information.
Federal Networking Council (FNC)
A collection of federal agencies that have heavy interests in federal networks using TCP/IP 
and the Internet. Representatives from DOD, DOE, DARPA, NSF, NASA, and HHS are the 
major members of the FNC.
File Transfer Protocol (FTP)
The most widely used way of downloading and uploading (getting and putting) files across an 
Internet connection. The File Transfer Protocol is a standardized way to connect computers 
so that files can be shared between them easily. There is a set of commands in FTP for mak­
ing and changing directories, transferring, copying, moving, and deleting files. Formerly, all
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FTP connections were text based, but graphical applications are now available that make FTP 
commands as easy as dragging and dropping. Numerous FTP clients exist for a number of 
platforms.
Finger
A UNIX command that shows information about a user or group of users on the Internet. 
When executed, the Finger command usually returns the user’s real name, whether or not 
they have unread mail, and the time and date of their last login. Finger also displays two files 
(if they exist) located in the home directory of the user you fingered. These two files (the 
.PLAN and the .PROJECT files.) are simply ASCII text files that can be entered by the user to 
display any information upon being fingered.
Flame
A negative response to an email message or newsgroup posting. If you post an article or send 
an email to an audience that deems your message inappropriate, expect to get flamed. The 
most common recipients of flames are users who post commercial messages in public forums, 
those who post adult material in non-adult areas of the Internet, and users who post or send 
racial or gender-biased comments. The worst sort of flame is known as a mail-bomb, which oc­
curs when the user being flamed opens his or her email and receives a flood of letters with 
unusually long file attachments that make his or her computer crash.
Follow-up
A reply to an email or newsgroup posting that continues the conversation or idea, known as a 
thread.
Freenet
A network system made up of community-based bulletin board systems with email, informa­
tion services, interactive communications, and conferencing. They are usually funded and op­
erated by individuals or organizations much like public television. Freenet providers are part 
of the National Public Telecomputing Network (NPTN), a Cleveland-based organization that 
works to make computer networking services as freely available as public libraries.
FTP
See File Transfer Protocol.
Gateway
A kind of “go-between” device or program that passes information between networks that 
normally couldn’t communicate. What used to be called a gateway is now called a router. Not 
to be confused with a protocol converter.
Gopher
An information search and retrieval tool used widely for research. Gopher information is 
stored hierarchically on computers across the Internet. It uses a simple protocol that allows a 
client to access information from a multitude of numerous Gopher servers at one time, creat­
ing what’s known as gopher space. The most common search tools in gopher are Veronica 
and Jughead. Gopher clients exist for most platforms.
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Hacker
A computer user who works to understand the ins and outs of computers, networks, and the 
Internet in general. Hackers are generally benign, and are not to be confused with the more 
malicious crackers.
Hit
As used in reference to the World Wide Web, “hit” means a single request from a web browser 
for a single item from a web server; thus, for a web browser to display a page that contains 3 
graphics, 4 “hits” would occur at the server: 1 for the HTML page, and one for each of the 3 
graphics.
“Hits” are often used as a very rough measure of load on a server, e.g. “Our server has been 
getting 300,000 hits per month.” Because each “hit” can represent anything from a request 
for a tiny document (or even a request for a missing document) all the way to a request that 
requires some significant extra processing (such as a complex search request), the actual 
load on a machine from 1 hit is almost impossible to define.
Host
A computer that is attached to a network or the Internet. Hosts allow users on client ma­
chines to connect and share files or transfer information. Individual users communicate with 
hosts by using client application programs.
Host Address
The address of a host computer on the Internet.
Hostname
The name given a host computer connected to the Internet.
HTML
See HyperText Markup Language.
Hypermedia
The combination of hypertext and multimedia in an online document.
Hypertext
A type of text that allows embedded links to other documents. Clicking on or selecting a hy­
pertext link displays another document or section of a document. Most World Wide Web doc­
uments contain hypertext.
Hypertext Markup Language (HTML)
The standard way to mark text documents for publishing on the World Wide Web. HTML is 
marked-up using tags surrounded by brackets. To see what tagged HTML text looks like, se­
lect the View Source feature from the menus in the program you are using to view this docu­
ment now, and you’ll see a display of the HTML text used to create this page.
IMHO
Acronym for In My Humble Opinion. Generally seen in IRC, email, or Usenet postings.
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Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN)
A relatively new technology which combines voice and digital network services in a single 
medium. ISDN makes it possible for communications carriers to offer their customers digital 
data services as well as voice connections through a single line. CCITT defines the standards 
relating to ISDN.
International Organization for Standardization (ISO)
An organization of 89 member countries (founded in 1946) responsible for setting world 
standards in many electronics areas. Members of the ISO are the national standards organiza­
tions of the member countries.
Internet
A large, uncontrolled, unadministered, anarchic cyber-state that will soon take over the 
world! Basically, it’s just everyone’s computers hooked together. It’s not a corporation, orga­
nization, or entity in itself. When you connect to the Internet, you actually become part of it. 
Always capitalized, the word Internet can also be referred to colloquially as the “Net.”
Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)
The central registry for various Internet protocol parameters, such as port, protocol and en­
terprise numbers, and options, codes, and types. The currently assigned values are listed in 
the Assigned Numbers document. If you’d like more information or want to request a num­
ber assignment, you can email IANA at iana@isi.edu.
Internet Protocol (IP)
An industry standard, connectionless, best-effort packet switching protocol used as the net­
work layer in the TCP/IP Protocol Suite.
Internet Protocol Address (IP Address)
The 32-bit address defined by the Internet Protocol. Every resource on the Internet has a 
unique numerical IP address, represented in dotted decimal notation. IP addresses are the 
closest thing the Internet has to phone numbers. When you “call” that number (using any 
number of connection methods such as FTP, HTTP, Gopher, etc.) you get connected to the 
computer to which that IP address is assigned.
Internet Service Provider (ISP)
An ISP is a company that maintains a network that is linked to the Internet via a dedicated 
communication line, usually a high-speed link known as a T1. An ISP offers use of its dedi­
cated communication lines to companies or individuals (like me) who can’t afford $1,300 a 
month for a direct connection. Using a modem, you can dial up to a service provider whose 
computers will connect you to the Internet, typically for a fee.
Internet Society (ISOC)
A non-profit, professional organization that supports the technical evolution of the Internet 
and stimulates the interest of members of the scientific and academic communities, industry, 
and the public regarding technology and the applications of the Internet. The ISOC also pro­
motes the development of new applications for the Internet by publishing a quarterly 
newsletter, the Internet Society News, and by holding an annual conference, called INET.
88
Appendix A: Internet Dictionary and Common Internet File Formats
InterNIC
Meaning Internet information Center, InterNIC is the combined name for the providers of 
registration, information, and database services to the Internet. InterNIC is who you contact 




See Internet Protocol Address.
IRC
The world-wide party line of the ’90s. IRC allows multiple users to converse in real time on 
different channels. Channels (which have a # sign preceding their name) vary in traffic and 
content. Channel operators (or Ops) moderate the conversation, and have the ability to 
“kick” people from channels, or even ban them if their actions warrant it. IRC clients are 
available for nearly all platforms.
ISDN
See Integrated Services Digital Network.
ISO




Java is a network-oriented programming language invented by Sun Microsystems that is 
specifically designed for writing programs that can be safely downloaded to your computer 
through the Internet and immediately run without fear of viruses or other harm to your com­
puter or files. Using small Java programs (called “ Applets"), Web pages can include functions 
such as animations, calculators, and other fancy tricks.
We can expect to see a huge variety of features added to the Web using Java, because you can 
write a Java program to do almost anything a regular computer program can do, and then in­
clude that Java program in a Web page.
See Applet.
LAN
Acronym for Local Area Network. LANs are now commonplace in most businesses, allowing 
users to send email and share resources such as files, printers, modems, etc. Currently, most 
larger companies are connecting their LANs to the Internet, allowing users to connect to re­




A dedicated full-time connection used to link a user or network to an Internet Service 
Provider or another network.
Listserv
An automated mailing list distribution system. Listservs exist for a multitude of professional, 
educational, and special interest groups. Usually, you have to send an email to a Listser/er 
with the subject SUBSCRIBE listname or something to that effect. You are then subscribed to 
that mailing list and (depending on the service) will receive regular mail from a single source 
or from all members who send email to the Listserver. Listserv was originally designed for the 
Bitnet/EARN network.
Lurking
Non-active participation on the part of a subscriber to a mailing list, a Usenet newsgroup, an 
IRC channel, a video connection, or any other Internet communication device. If you’re 
“lurking,” you’re generallyjust listening to the discussion. It’s usually best to lurk if you’re a 
beginner or if you are new to a communication group. This allows you to get up to speed on 
the history or acceptable behavior of the group.
Mailing List
A list of email addresses used to forward messages to groups of people. When you subscribe 
to a mailing list, you receive all mail sent to that list (see also Listserv).
Mail Reflector
A program that distributes files or information in response to requests sent via email. Many 
Listservs have mail reflectors. You can request documents of a reflector by sending a message 
with the subject SEND document name or a similar command. Mail reflectors are also being 
used to provide FTP-like services for users with limited Internet access. MIME Encoding 
See Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions Encoding.
Mirror Site
Because of the popularity of some FTP and Web sites, mirror sites came into existence. They 
are areas on a computer that “mirror” or contain an exact replica of the directory structure of 
another computer. If you have trouble getting connected to an FTP site, for example, be­
cause of the high amount of traffic, you can usually connect to a mirror site that contains the 
same information on a different computer. Mirror sites are usually updated once a day.
Moderator
The person who manages moderated mailing lists, newsgroups, or online discussion forums 
for services such as AOL, CompuServe, or the Microsoft Network.
Mosaic
A graphical browser for the World Wide Web that supports hypermedia. The NCSA (National 
SuperComputer Association) invented the Mosaic browser, which quickly became the indus­
try standard. Netscape Communications Corporation later invented the Netscape Navigator, 
which has redefined the content on the Web. Other major companies entered the browser
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market with little success, until Microsoft launched their Internet Explorer, which now con­
tends with Navigator as the browser of choice. The term Mosaic is sometimes used incorrectly 
as a synonym for the World Wide Web.
MUD
Acronym for Multi-User Dungeon or Domain. MUDs are role-playing games that take place 
on a computer. Users can Telnet to a MUD host, and create a character. MUDs can be action, 
adventure, or fantasy games, and allow you to save your character for future play. Some 
MUDs have thousands of registered characters, and most foster a community or culture of 
their own. These are highly addictive areas of the Internet, and users can spend many hours 
enthralled in this type of activity.
Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions Encoding (MIME Encoding)
MIME is a standardized method for organizing divergent file formats. The method organizes 
file formats according to the file’s MIME type. When Internet (usually email) software re­
trieves a file from a server, the server provides the MIME type of the file, and the file is de­
coded correctly when transferred to your machine.
Netiquette
The combination of the words Net and etiquette, this refers to the proper behavior on a net­
work, and more generally the Internet. The key element in Netiquette is remembering that 
actual people are on the other end of a computer connection, and offensive comments or ac­
tions are just as offensive even if you can’t see your recipient.
Network File System (NFS)
A protocol developed by Sun Microsystems. NFS allows a computer to access and use files 
over a network as if they were local. This protocol has been incorporated into the products of 
more than 200 companies and is now a de facto Internet standard.
Network News Transfer Protocol (NNTP)
An industry standard protocol for the distribution, inquiry, retrieval, and posting of news 
articles.
NFS
See Network File System.
NNTP
See Network News Transfer Protocol.
Open Systems Interconnection (OSI)
A suite of protocols, designed by ISO committees to be the international standard computer 
network architecture.
OSI
See Open System Interconnection.
Packet
The common term for the standard unit of data sent across a network.
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Packet Internet Gopher (PING)
The simplest way to test or time the response of an Internet connection. A PING sends a re­
quest to an Internet host and waits for a reply called (yep, you guessed it), a PONG. When 
you PING an address, you get a response telling you the number of seconds it took to make 
the connection. PING clients exist for a number of platforms, or you can use a UNIX or Win­
dows 95 prompt to issue a PING command directly.
PAP
See Password Authentication Protocol.
Password Authentication Protocol (PAP)
One of the many authentication methods that can be used when connecting to an ISP. PAP 
allows you to login automatically, without having to use a terminal window to type in your 
username and password. One warning about PAP: passwords are sent over the connection in 
text format, which means there is no protection if someone is “listening-in” on your 
connection.
Plug-in
A piece of software (usually small) that adds features to a larger piece of software. Common 
examples are plug-ins for the Netscape® browser and web server. Adobe Photoshop® also uses 
plug-ins. The idea behind plug-in’s is that a small piece of software is loaded into memory by 
the larger program, adding a new feature, and that users need only install the few plug-ins 
that they need, out of a much larger pool of possibilities. Plug-ins are usually created by peo­
ple other than the publishers of the software the plug-in works with.
Point of Presence (POP)
An installation of telecommunications equipment, usually digital leased lines and multi- 
protocol routers.
Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP)
A protocol that provides a method for transmitting packets over serial point-to-point links. 
PPP is one of the most popular methods for dialup connections to the Internet, because it al­
lows you to use other standard protocols (such as IPX, TCP/IP, and Netbeui) over a standard 
telephone connection, but it can also be used for LAN connections.
POP
See either Point of Presence or Post Office Protocol.
Posting
The sending of an article to a Usenet newsgroup or the placing of a message on a BBS.
Post Office Protocol (POP)
A protocol designed to allow single users to read mail from a server. There are three versions: 
POP, POP2, and POP3. When email is sent to you, it is stored on the server until accessed by 
you. Once you are authenticated, the POP is used to transmit the stored mail from the server 
to your local mailbox on your client machine.
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Simply, the “language” spoken between computers to help them exchange information.
More technically, it’s a formal description of message formats and the rules that two comput­
ers must follow to exchange those messages. Protocols can describe low-level details of 
machine-to-machine interfaces (like the order in which bits and bytes are sent across a wire) 
or high-level exchanges between allocation programs (the way in which two programs trans­
fer a file across the Internet).
Read the Flippin’ Manual (RTFM)
An acronym used to respond to a simple or commonly asked question.
Request for Comments (RFC)
A document series, begun in 1969, which describes the Internet suite of protocols and related 
experiments. Not all (actually, very few) RFCs describe Internet standards, but all Internet 
standards are written up as RFCs.
RFC
See Request for Comments.
Router
A device that forwards traffic between networks. Forwarding decisions are made based on net­
work layer information and routing tables, often constructed by routing protocols.
Serial Line Internet Protocol (SLIP)
Similar to PPP, SLIP is another standard protocol used to run TCP/IP over serial lines, such 
as telephone circuits or RS-232 cables. Unlike PPP, however, SLIP does not work on LAN con­
nections. SLIP used to be the most popular way for dialup users to access the Internet, but 
PPP quickly overcame SLIP because of its ease of use and integration into many client operat­
ing systems.
Server
Simply, a computer that provides resources, such as files or other information. Common In­
ternet servers include file servers and name servers Domain Name Service.
Service Provider
See Internet Service Provider.
SIG
Acronym for Special Interest Group. SIGs sponsor a variety of Listservs, IRC channels, and 
Internet sites. Also a nickname for a Signature.
Signature
An ASCII text file that can be automatically attached to the bottom of a piece of email or 
newsgroup posting that identifies the sender. Many signatures (or sigs) use symbols and char­
acters to create images or words to make the sig more interesting.
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Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP)
A protocol used to transfer email. SMTP transfers mail from server to server, and the end 
user must use POP (see also Post Office Protocol) to transfer the messages to their machine.
Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)
Developed to manage nodes on an IP network, SNMP is an Internet standard protocol. It can 
be used to manage wiring hubs, video toasters, CD ROM jukeboxes, and many other devices.
SLIP
See Serial Line Internet Protocol.
Smiley
The use of punctuation marks and other symbols or characters to portray moods when typ­
ing, especially in email messages and IRC. Here’s an example of a simple smiley: :). If you 
don’t see it, tilt your head to the left and look at it. The colon makes the eyes and the paren­
thesis makes the smiley mouth. The smile means happiness (like if someone says something 
funny) or it often denotes sarcasm. Other combinations of characters can express many other 
emotions. You may also hear them referred to as emoticons.
SQL
(Structured Query Language)—A specialized programming language for sending queries to 
databases. Most industrial-strength and many smaller database applications can be addressed 
using SQL. Each specific application will have its own version of SQL implementing features 
unique to that application, but all SQL-capable databases support a common subset of SQL.
SRI
A research institute based in California that runs the Network Information Center (NISC).
SSL
(Secure Sockets Layer)—A protocol designed by Netscape Communications to enable en­
crypted authenticated communications across the Internet. SSL used mostly (but not exclu­
sively) in communications between web browsers and web servers. URLs that begin with “http” 
indicate that an SSL connection will be used. SSL provides 3 important things: Privacy, Au­
thentication, and Message Integrity. In an SSL connection each side of the connection must 
have a Security Certificate, which each side’s software sends to the other. Each side then en­
crypts what it sends using information from both its own and the other side’s Certificate, en­
suring that only the intended recipient can de-crypt it and that the other side can be sure the 





One of AT&T’s terms used to denote the type of connection of a host to the Internet. A T1 
transmits a DS-1 formatted digital signal at 1.544 megabits per second.
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T3
One of AT&T’s terms used to denote the type of connection of a host to the Internet. A T3 
transmits a DS-3 formatted digital signal at 44.746 megabits per second—about 40 times the 
speed of a T1.
TCP/IP
See Transmission Control Protocol/Intemet Protocol.
TCP/IP Stack
To properly use the TCP/IP protocol, PCs require a TCP/IP stack. This consists of TCP/IP 
software, sockets software (such as WINSOCK.DLL for Windows machines), and hardware 
driver software (known as packet drivers). Windows 95 comes with Microsoft’s own built-in 
TCP/IP stack, including version 1.1 of Microsoft’s WINSOCK.DLL and packet drivers.
Telnet
The Internet standard protocol to connect to remote terminals. Telnet clients are available 
for most platforms. When you Telnet to a UNIX site, for example, you can issue commands at 
the prompt as if the machine were local.
TN3270
A slight variation of Telnet used to connect the user to an IBM mainframe. TN3270 clients 
exist for most platforms.
Token Ring
A type of LAN in which networked computers are wired into a ring. Each computer (or 
node) is in constant contact with the next node in the ring. A control message, called a 
token, is passed from one node to another, allowing the node with the token to send a mes­
sage out to the network. If the ring is “broken” by one computer losing contact, the network 
can no longer communicate. The IEEE 802.5 token ring standard is the most common.
Topology
The layout of all the computers on a network and the links that join them.
Transmission Control Protocol/Intemet Protocol (TCP/IP)
TCP/IP is the standard communications protocol required for Internet computers. To com­
municate using TCP/IP, PCs need a set of software components called a TCP/IP stack. Mac­
intosh computers typically use a proprietary software package called MacTCP. Most UNIX sys­
tems are built with TCP/IP capabilities.
Universal Resource Locator (URL)
More commonly referred to as the URL, the Universal Resource Locator refers to the entire 
address that is recognized “universally” as the address for an Internet resource. Each resource 
on the Internet has a unique URL. URLs begin with letters that identify the resource type, 
such as http, ftp, gopher, etc. These types are followed by a colon and two slashes. Next, the 
computer’s name is listed, followed by the directory and filename of the remote resource. For 




Originally, UUCP was a program that allowed UNIX systems to transfer files over phone lines. 
Currently, the term is used to describe the protocol that passes news and email across the 
Internet.
Usenet
Usenet groups are more commonly known as newsgroups. There are thousands of groups 
hosted on hundreds of servers around the world, dealing with various topics. Newsreader soft­
ware is required to properly download and view articles in the groups, but you can usually 




A search engine (not unlike Archie) that is built into Gopher. It allows searches of all gopher 
sites for files, directories, and other resources.
W3
See World Wide Web.
WAIS
See Wide Area Information Service.
White Pages
Databases containing email addresses, telephone numbers, and postal addresses of Internet 
users. You can search the Internet White Pages to find information about particular users.
WHOIS
An Internet program (related to Finger and the White Pages) that lets you enter an Internet 
entity (such as domains, networks, and hosts) and display information such as a person’s 
company name, address, phone number and email address.
Wide Area Information Service (WAIS)
A distributed information service and search engine that allows natural language input and 
indexed searching. Many Web search utilities use a WAIS engine.
Winsocks
Stands for Windows Sockets. Winsocks is a set of specifications or standards for programmers 
creating TCP/IP applications for use with Windows.
World Wide Web (WWW or W3)
The Web is a collection of online documents housed on Internet servers around the world.
The concept of the Web was created by researchers at CERN in Switzerland. Web documents 
are written or coded in HTML. To access these documents, you have to use a Web browser. 
When these browsers access (or hit) a page, the server uses the HyperText Transfer Protocol 
(HTTP) to send the document to your computer.
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Worm
A computer program that replicates itself and is self-propagating. Whereas viruses are de­
signed to cause problems on a local system and are passed through boot sectors of disks and 
through files, worms are designed to thrive in network environments. Network worms were 
first defined by Shoch & Hupp of Xerox in ACM Communications (March 1982). The most 
famous (or infamous) worm was the Internet Worm of November 1988. It successfully propa­
gated itself on over 6,000 systems across the Internet.
WWW
See World Wide Web.
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Common Internet File Formats
Because much of your time will be spent working with files and other forms of electronic 
data, the following table has been provided to help take away some of the mystery of file 
formats and their meaning.
File Suffix Format Description Type
.aiff Semi-common sound format Binary
.au Most common sound format on the web Binary
.bin Mac binary II encoded file Binary
.doc May be a DOS/Windows program files or self-extracting archive Binary
.exe May be a DOS/Windows program files or self-extracting archive Binary
.gif Graphical Interchange Format—most common graphics format on the web, 
but not the most economical in terms of space.
N/A
.gz The Gnu version of zip. This is a compression algorithm for Unix Binary
.hqx BinHex 4.0—encryption program for Macintosh files Binary
.html or .htm Hypertext markup language—the format used on most web-based documents Text
.image Macintosh Disk Image file Binary
.jpg, .jpeg or .jfif Common graphic format. Very economical in terms of space requirements. Binary
.mov, .qt, 
.movie or .moov
Apple’s QuickTime Movie formats Binary
.mpg or .mpeg The standard movie platform on the Internet Binary
.pdf Adobe Acrobat Portable document format. Documents in this format can be 
used on any platform.
Binary
.ps Postscript files used for printing. Not readable. Text
.sea Macintosh self-extracting archive file Binary
.sit Stuffit Archive compression file Binary
.tar Unix tar program takes separate files and combines them into one file Binary
.tiff or .tif Very large and very high quality image format Binary
.txt You guessed it—plain ol’ text file Text
.uu or .uue Encoded file usually done on a Unix machine. Popular with some older 
email packages.
Binary
.wav Windows wage format sound file Binary
.z Unix compressed file Binary
.zip Pkzip—a common DOS/Windows compression format Binary
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Summary of State-by-State Temporary Practice Rules
The following table has been extracted from the AICPA/NASBA Digest of State Laws and 
State Board Regulations—1998. Practitioners performing an engagement, or portion of 
an engagement, in a state other than where he or she is licensed should consider how the 
following information impacts their engagement and consider contacting the state board 
of accountancy prior to the beginning of the engagement.
State Temporary Practice
Alabama The Board may issue an annual temporary permit to an out-of-state CPA to fulfill specific 
engagements contracted for outside Alabama.
Alaska General permits for nonresident firms can be obtained on a temporary basis.
Arizona The jurisdiction does not provide for temporary practice.
Arkansas An out-of-state accountant may practice temporarily and periodically in Arkansas if he/she 
is conducting a regular practice outside of the State.
California Any person who is the holder of a valid and unrevoked license as a certified public accoun­
tant under the provisions of Section 5087 may, after application for a license and after pro­
viding evidence of qualifying continuing education, engage in the practice of public accoun­
tancy in this State as a certified public accountant, until such time as his or her application 
for a license may be granted or rejected.
Colorado Temporary practice by an out-of state accountant is permitted on professional business in­
cident to regular out-of-state business.
Connecticut No mention in Digest
Florida A temporary license is required for out-of-state practitioners to fulfill specific engagements 
when they must come into the state to complete the engagement. Temporary licenses are 
not valid for more than ninety (90) days and will not be granted to practitioners who are res­
idents. To obtain a temporary permit, an application must be completed, a fee paid, and a 
copy of one audited, one reviewed, and one compiled financial statement must be submit­
ted with the first temporary permit requested each calendar year.
Georgia Temporary permits are issued to those individuals or firms not residing in Georgia but hold­
ing valid permits to practice in another jurisdiction that was issued after the recipient passed 
an examination equivalent to that required by the Georgia Board. An applicant must meet 
equivalent educational and experience requirements in effect in Georgia. Ten (10) years of 
public accounting experience may be accepted in lieu of examination requirement. A recip­
rocal certificate may be issued to an applicant provided that the state of original issuance 
grants a similar privilege to Georgia CPAs.




Hawaii A temporary permit may be issued for a period of three (3) months to out-of-state accoun­
tants to fulfill specific engagements that are incidental to their practice out of state. Applica­
tion must be filed no later than sixty (60) days prior to the engagement. Verification of a cur­
rent, valid license is required.
Idaho A CPA or LPA of another state or country holding a valid and unrevoked license may tem­
porarily practice for a period not exceeding thirty (30) days in a calendar year. Individuals 
must make advance written notification to the Board.
Illinois Temporary practice by a CPA licensed by another jurisdiction is permitted for professional 
business incident to regular practice in another jurisdiction.
Indiana Temporary practice by an out-of-state accountant is permitted on business incident to 
his/her regular practice out of state, provided that such practice is conducted in conformity 
with the Board’s rules.
Iowa Temporary practice is permitted if it is temporary in nature and is incident to a regular prac­
tice outside of Iowa.
Kansas Kansas no longer issues temporary permits to practice. All out-of-state CPAs wishing to 
practice in Kansas, on business not incidental to their practice in another state, must now 
obtain a Kansas CPA certificate by reciprocity and then a permit to practice. The Board de­
fines what it considers to be incidental to one’s regular practice. Permits are required prior 
to commencing business in Kansas.
Kentucky Kentucky does not have a temporary practice rule. CPAs of other states are expected to be­
come licenses unless the work in Kentucky is incidental to their practice. “Incidental” is de­
fined as “an engagement that was initiated with a client located outside of the Common­
wealth and has extended into the commonwealth due to common ownership or existence of 
a subsidiary, assets, or other operations located within the Commonwealth.”
Louisiana A temporary permit may be issued to a licensed CPA of another state for a period of ninety 
(90) days for a specified single engagement. The permit is not renewable.
A temporary permit for Practice Monitoring Engagements may be issued to a licensed CPA 
of another state for a period of one (1) year and may be renewed annually. The permit may 
only be used to perform quality/peer reviews and is not a license to practice or authorization 
to engage in the practice of public accounting in Louisiana.
Maine There is not provision for the issuance of temporary permits to practice.
Maryland Individuals must secure limited licenses, and corporations or partnerships must secure lim­
ited permits. An application must be filed and a fee paid. A limited license/permit shall be 
good for no more than one (1) year and is for practice on a specified job. An explicit set of 
requirements must be met to secure a limited license/permit.
Massachusetts The Board has no provisions for granting temporary permits to practice.
Michigan An applicant may obtain a temporary permit if certified properly outside the State for a one 
(1)-year period to work directly under the supervision of a licensed individual.
Minnesota CPAs who are licensed and in good standing in other states, and who come into Minnesota 
for engagements that will last more than thirty (30) days in any twelve (12)-month period, 
must apply for a temporary license. The license expires at the end of twelve (12) calendar 
months from the date it was granted.
Mississippi A CPA from another state may practice in Mississippi on a temporary basis if such practice 
is incident to the practitioner’s regular practice out of state. “Temporary” is defined as less 
than ten (10) days during a year and “regular out-of-state practice” as not including en­
gagements with a Mississippi-domiciled entity.
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State Temporary Practice
Missouri Out-of-state CPAs who have a Missouri client must be licensed. Such out-of-state accoun­
tants may practice temporarily in Missouri on professional business incident to their regular 
practice for clients outside Missouri. The phrase “temporarily practicing in this state on pro­
fessional business incident to regular practice outside this state,” as used in section 
326.012(1) RSMo, means that practice that is a continuation or extension of an engagement 
for a client located outside Missouri, which engagement began outside Missouri and ex­
tends into Missouri through common ownership, existence of a subsidiary, assets, or other 
operations located within Missouri.
Montana Not allowed.
Nebraska No mention in Digest.
Nevada An out-of-state accounting firm may temporarily practice in Nevada by obtaining a tempo­
rary permit that is issued for the period of a specific engagement (not to exceed six [6] 
months). Permits are issued to the firm. The proprietor, partner, or shareholder responsible 
for the engagement must meet all current Nevada requirements for licensing.
New Hampshire A CPA of another state may practice in New Hampshire after acquiring a foreign accoun­
tant practice permit. This is required for all engagements however incidental.
New Jersey The Board does not permit temporary practice. The Board does permit occasional audits in 
the state by licensees other states as long as a licensee of another state does not open a 
practice in new Jersey, the out-of-state licensee may conduct business in New Jersey and 
issue the audit report from his/her home state.
New Mexico An out-of-state accountant may temporarily practice in New Mexico on professional busi­
ness upon filing the proper application for reciprocity with the Board office. However, tem­
porary authority to practice shall not prevent the Board from refusing, after complying with 
the provisions of the Uniform Licensing Act, to issue a certificate or permit if the applicant 
otherwise fails to qualify for a certificate under the New Mexico Public Accountancy Act.
New York An out-of-state accountant may perform services in New York that are incidental to such 
person’s practice outside of the State.
North Carolina A CPA without a North Carolina certificate wishing to perform an engagement in North Car­
olina must apply for a reciprocal certificate. A CPA can request a temporary certificate for 
an engagement prior to the issuance of the reciprocal certificate. All CPAs who will be as­
signed to an engagement must also have reciprocal certificates.
North Dakota No provisions are made for temporary practice.
Ohio Temporary practice in Ohio is generally prohibited. Please contact the Board for details.
Oklahoma An accountant of another state or foreign country may temporarily practice in Oklahoma or 
engage in professional business, provided such temporary practice must be a continuance 
of an engagement for a client located outside Oklahoma that extends into Oklahoma 
through common ownership, existence of a subsidiary, assets, or other operations located 
within Oklahoma. No permit or registration is required for temporary practice.
Oregon An out-of-state accountant may temporarily practice in Oregon on professional business, in­
cident to his/her regular practice, without obtaining permission from the Oregon Board. Also, 
reciprocity applicants who request permission in writing may be allowed to practice ac­
counting in Oregon until their Oregon license is granted or denied. Otherwise, no other cir­
cumstance allows any practice of accounting in Oregon without first obtaining an Oregon 
license.
Pennsylvania An out-of-state accountant who is engaged in public practice in Pennsylvania on profes­
sional business incident to his/her regular practice outside of Pennsylvania, provided such 
temporary practice is conducted in conformity with Board rules. He/she must apply to the 




Puerto Rico The Board does not give special permits to out-of-jurisdiction CPAs to work in Puerto Rico. 
An extra-territorial accountant may temporarily practice in Puerto Rico on professional busi­
ness incident to his/her regular practice outside Puerto Rico.
Rhode Island A certified public accountant who holds a permit to practice issued by another state and who 
practices in Rhode Island must apply for a permit to practice in Rhode Island. From the date 
of filing the completed application with the Board, the applicant shall be deemed qualified to 
practice and may practice public accounting in Rhode Island until the Board has acted upon 
the application. Such application shall constitute the appointment of the Secretary of State 
as an agent for service of process in any action or proceeding arising out of any transaction 
or operation connected with, or incidental to, the practice of public accounting in Rhode Is­
land by such applicant.
South Carolina Temporary practice by a licensed accountant of another state is permitted on business in­
cident to such person’s regular practice outside the State, provided that the applicant reg­
isters with the Board and complies with its regulations. Registration is not required if ser­
vices within the State do not exceed a total of ten (10) days in a calendar year.
South Dakota There is no provision for the issuance of temporary permits to practice. Any individual or firm 
intending to practice public accountancy in South Dakota, even for one engagement, must 
apply for a permit to practice. The permit must be renewed or maintained during the fiscal 
year in which the individual or firm is practicing in the state.
Tennessee There is no provision for temporary practice in this jurisdiction. Individuals must notify the 
Board office regarding their intent to practice if they are from a “substantially equivalent” 
state. Otherwise, applicants must apply for reciprocity.
Texas For a fee of $100, a licensed accountant from another state or territory may practice tem­
porarily in Texas on professional business incident to his/her regular practice.
Utah An out-of-state accountant may practice temporarily in Utah if the practice is incidental to 
his/her regular out-of-state practice, provided that such practice is conducted in conformity 
with Utah laws and rules.
Vermont An out-of-state accountant may temporarily or periodically practice in Vermont if he/she is 
conducting a regular practice outside of Vermont, provided the temporary practice is con­
ducted in conformity with the regulations and rule of professional conduct promulgated by 
the Board.
All nonresident firms licensed or registered in another state or country that desires to prac­
tice temporarily in Vermont must register with the Board and pay the required fee. The 
Board shall adopt rules prescribing the procedure to be followed in carrying out the regis­
trations. Registrations under this section shall expire three (3) months after issuance.
Virginia Virginia makes no provision for the issuance of temporary permits to practice.
Virgin Islands An out-of-state accountant may temporarily practice in the U.S. Virgin Islands on profes­
sional business incident to his/her regular practice.
Washington The Board does not issue temporary practice permits to out-of-state CPAs or CPA firms. A 
CPA from another state may temporarily practice in Washington provided the business is 
incidental (less that 10% of the firm’s total business for the year) to the CPA’s regular out- 
of-state practice, and the CPA holds a valid license to practice public accounting issued by 
the other state.
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State Temporary Practice
West Virginia A person holding a certificate or registration issued by the accountancy board of another ju­
risdiction may temporarily practice in this state on professional business incident to his/her 
regular practice provided hat he/she shall in the practice be governed by this rule and pay 
a fee. An application for a nonresident or temporary license must be completed, accompa­
nied by a certifying/verifying letter from the applicant’s resident board, a copy of the appli­
cant’s current license to practice in his/her resident state, and the required fee. This tem­
porary or nonresident permit/license may be renewed.
Wisconsin A CPA of another state may temporarily practice in Wisconsin on professional business in­
cident to an engagement with a client of his/her regular practice in the state in which he/she 
is domiciled, provided that such CPA has neither residence nor office in Wisconsin, and that 
the client is not located exclusively in Wisconsin.





This appendix includes forms for the WebTrust engagement. Please note that they are di­
vided into several categories, as indicated.
General
• WebTrust Engagement File Index
• Client Self-Assessment Document
• Engagement Letter
• Request of Arbitration Representation Letter
• Management Representation Letter
• EID Number and Documentation from the AICPA
• Supervision, Review, and Approval Form
• Engagement Termination Letter
• Mailing House Request Letter
Engagement Planning and Execution
• Engagement Acceptance Worksheet
• Summary WebTrust Work Program Worksheet
• WebTrust Work Program
• Client Information Worksheet
• General Control Environment Worksheet
• Analytical Procedures
• Transaction Walk-Through Worksheet
• Self-Monitoring Worksheet
Business Practices and Information Privacy Criteria
• Business Practices and Information Privacy Practices Disclosure Worksheet
• Privacy Disclosures and Policies Worksheet
• Dispute Resolution Disclosures
• Legal and Regulatory Issues
• Test of Transactions
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Transaction Integrity
• Transaction Integrity Controls Worksheet
• Order Entry Process Worksheet
• Credit Card System Evaluation Worksheet
• Test of Transactions
Information Protection
• Information Protection Controls Worksheet
• Information Protection Controls System Architecture
• Site Security
• Firewall Control Evaluation
• Disaster Recovery and Physical Access
• Information Protection Controls Tests of Transactions
Change Management and Accountant Notification
• CPA Notification of Change
Other Matters
• Other Matters Worksheet
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Client Self-Assessment Document (obtain from WebTrust Principles 
and Criteria for Business-to-Consumer eCommerce, version 2, Ap­
pendix B at the AICPA website at: www.aicpa.org/webtrust/index.htm)
(The self-assessment document for ISP in eCommerce is coming soon.)
Engagement Letter
Request of Arbitration Representation Letter
Management Representation Letter
EID number and documentation from AICPA (also see Appendix H 
for enrollment information)
Supervision, Review, and Approval Form
Engagement Termination Letter
Mailing House Request Letter
Engagement Planning and Execution
Engagement Acceptance worksheet
Summary WebTrust Work Program Worksheet
WebTrust Work Program
Client Information Worksheet




Business Practices and Information Privacy Criteria
Business Practices and Information Privacy Practices Worksheet
Privacy Disclosures & Policies Worksheet
Dispute Resolution Disclosures
Legal and Other Regulatory Issues
WebTrust Practitioners’ Guide






Transaction Integrity Controls Worksheet
Order-Entry Process Worksheet
Credit Card Evaluation Worksheet
Test of Transactions
Information Protection
Information Protection Controls Worksheet
Information Controls System Architecture Worksheet
Site Security Worksheet
Firewall Control Evaluation Worksheet
Disaster Recovery & Physical Access Worksheet
Test of Transactions
Change Management and Accountant Notification
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Client Self-Assessment Document
Note: The self-assessment document for WebTrust-ISP in eCommerce is coming soon and 
will be available at the AICPA website at www.aicpa.org/webtrust/index.htm .
WEBTRUST SM/™ SELF-ASSESSMENT 
QUESTIONNAIRE (VERSION 2.0)
This questionnaire is for use by e-commerce service providers in documenting their e- 
commerce business practices disclosures and related controls and in documenting a basis for 
their assertion or representation that “on its Web site at www. during the period 
, 1999 through, 2000 the entity—
• Disclosed its business and information privacy practices for e-commerce transactions 
and executed transactions in accordance with its disclosed practices.
• Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that customers’ 
transactions processed using e-commerce over the web were completed and billed as 
agreed.
• Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that private customer 
information obtained as a result of e-commerce was protected from uses not related to its 
business.












A. E-commerce Activities to Be Covered
1. Describe the entity's e-commerce activities that are asserted and 
represented to meet the WebTrust Principles and Criteria.
a) What goods and services are being sold or provided?
b) Who is the typical customer?
c) What is the typical form of payment?
2. What is the Web site URL?
3. Who is responsible for controlling these activities and what is their 
reporting relationship to the entity's management?
4. How long has the entity been selling such goods and services through this 
form of e-commerce?
5. If the e-commerce activities have changed in the last ninety days, 
describe the nature of such changes and when each change occurred.
B. Information Systems Used to Support E-commerce Activities
1. List the Web Site or other customer interface systems and provide the 
following information about each.
a) Provide a description.
b) Indicate who, in this entity, is responsible.
c) Describe any portion of these systems that is outsourced to third 
parties.
d) Describe the frequency and nature of changes to Web site and 
customer interface systems.
2. List the telecommunications and network systems, including the 
following information.
a) Give a description.
b) Indicate, who, in this entity, is responsible.
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c) Describe any portion of these systems that is outsourced to third 
parties.
d) Describe the frequency and nature of changes to telecommunications 
and network systems.
3. List the other supporting systems and technology, including the following 
information.
a) Provide a description.
b) Indicate who, in this entity, is responsible.
c) Describe any portion of these systems that is outsourced to third 
parties.
d) Describe the frequency and nature of changes to such systems and 
technology.
C. Web Site Server Technology
1. Describe the e-commerce server platform(s) in use (description and 
version).
2. How many e-commerce servers are in use at the primary site? How many 
are at an alternate or backup site?
3. Is SSL used for some, or all, Internet transactions? If so, describe the 
kinds of transactions for which SSL is used and the kind of server digital 
certificate being used.
4. Identify the technical staff (and/or whether the site is hosted by an ISP 
and the technical staff of the ISP) who are capable of performing the 
following technical tasks.
a) Generate a Certificate Signing Request (CSR) using the Web server 
software?
b) Install a Digital Certificate (also known as a Digital ID) on the Web 
server software?
c) Configure certain pages on your web server to be secure using 
(SSL)?
d) Install a Java Applet on the appropriate Web page?
5. Identify the Webserver package used.
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If the site is running on Netscape 2.0 +, Microsoft IIS 2.0+, C2Net 
Apache Stronghold, Oracle Server, O’Reilly, WebSite Pro 2.0+, 
Primehost 2.033+, Advanced Business Link Server, Oracle Server, 
JavaSoft Server, Open Market Server 2.1+, there should be no technical 
difficulties using the WebTrust service. If another Webserver software 
package is being used, VeriSign should be contacted to ensure 
compatibility. A complete WebTrust test package may be obtained by 
contacting VeriSign directly. Identify the version of Netscape that your 
customer base is most likely to be using. Users using Netscape 4.05 will 
see the message “The Certificate Authority used to sign this certificate 
has expired. Do you wish to proceed?” If the user agrees, the session 
proceeds as normal. This is a general problem affecting virtually all 
commerce sites using VeriSign Digital Certificates, not only WebTrust 
sites.
D. Control Environment
1. Describe the factors in the entity's organization that contribute to a 
control environment that is generally conducive to reliable business 
practice disclosures on its Web site and effective controls over e- 
commerce transaction integrity and the protection of related private 
customer information. Such factors might include, but are not limited to 
the following:
a) Management's "tone at the top"
b) Hiring, development, and retention of competent personnel
c) Emphasizing the importance and responsibilities for sound business 
practices and effective control
d) Supervising business activities and control procedures
e) Employing a suitable internal auditing function that periodically 
audits matters related to the entity's e-commerce activities
f) Other factors
II Business and Information Privacy Practices
Principle - The entity discloses its business and information privacy practices 
for e-commerce transactions and executes transactions in accordance with 
its disclosed practices.
A. Description of Business Practices.
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1. Describe the entity’s business practices and how such practices are 
disclosed to customers for each of the following.
a) Descriptive information about the nature of the goods that will be 
shipped or the services that will be provided, including the following:
(1) Condition of goods (meaning, whether they are new, used, or 
reconditioned).
(2) Description of services (or service contract).
(3) Sources of information (meaning, where it was obtained and how it 
was compiled).
(4) Other relevant descriptive information.
b) The terms and conditions by which e-commerce transactions are 
conducted
(1) Time frame for completion of transactions (transactions means 
fulfillment of orders where goods are being sold and delivery of 
service where a service is being provided).
(2) Time frame and process for informing customers of exceptions to 
normal processing of orders or services requests (e.g., backorders or 
other order exceptions) and available customer options.
(3) Normal method of delivery, including customer options, where 
applicable.
(4) Payment terms, including customer options, if any.
(5) Electronic settlement practices and related charges to customers.
(6) How the customer may cancel recurring charges, if any.
(7) Product return policies and/or limited liability, where applicable.
(8) Other relevant terms and conditions, if any.
c) Where on its Web site (and/or in information provided with the 
product) customers can obtain warranty, service, and support related 
to the goods and services purchased on the Web site.
d) Information to enable customers to file claims, ask questions and 
register complaints, including but not limited to the following:
(1) Street address (not a post office box or e-mail address).
(2) Telephone number (a number to reach an employee on a reasonably
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timely basis and not only a voice mail system or message machine).
(3) Days and hours of operation.
(4) If there are several offices or branches, the same information for the 
principal office.
(5) Other relevant information for customers,
e) The entity discloses on its Web site its information privacy practices. 
These practices include but are not limited to, the following 
disclosures:
(1) The specific kinds and sources of information being collected and
maintained.
(2) The use of that information.
(3) Possible third-party distribution of that information.
(4) Choices regarding how individually identifiable information collected 
from an individual online may be used and/or distributed.
(5) The consequences, if any, of an individual's refusal to provide 
information.
(6) How erroneous or incomplete individually identifiable information 
collected can be reviewed and, if necessary, corrected or removed.
(7) How to resolve complaints related to accuracy, completeness, and 
distribution of private customer information and the consequences for 
failure to resolve such complaints.
(8) The address and contact information for any government bodies that 
receive consumer complaints on privacy matters.
f) The disclosure of the dispute resolution process that should have at a 
minimum the following attributes:
(1) Management's commitment to use a specified third party dispute
resolution service in the event the customer is not satisfied with the 
entity's proposed resolution of such a complaint.
(2) A commitment from such a service to handle such unresolved 
complaints.
(3) Procedures to be followed in resolving such complaints, first with the 
entity.
(4) What use or other action will be taken with respect to the private 
information, which is the subject of the complaint, until the complaint
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is satisfactorily resolved.
g) If the Web site uses cookies, disclose how cookies are used and the 
consequences, if any of an individual's refusal to accept a cookie.
2. Describe who is responsible for controlling these activities.
3. Has the entity changed its business practices or the related disclosures in 
the last ninety days? If so, describe the nature of such changes and when 
each change occurred.
B. Where there are local, national, or other laws or requirements affecting business terms 
and conditions (for example, consumer protection rights and "lemon laws”)?
1. Describe the entity's policies and procedures to provide reasonable 
assurance that it complies with such laws and requirements.
2. Where required by such laws and requirements, describe how appropriate 
disclosures provided to the customer.
C. Describe the entity’s process for monitoring customer claims and complaints and for 
identifying patterns of claims and complaints that are not being satisfactorily addressed.
D. Describe the processes management uses to monitor the continuing effectiveness of its 
disclosure of business practices to provide reasonable assurance that—
1. The e-commerce transactions it executes are in accordance with its 
disclosed business practices.
2. Its business practice disclosures on its Web site remain current and 
continue to meet the WebTrust Criteria.
3. Reports of noncompliance are promptly addressed and corrective 
measures taken.
E. Describe how the foregoing disclosures are presented on the Web site.
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III Transaction Integrity Controls
Principle - The entity maintains effective controls to provide reasonable 
assurance that customers’ orders placed using e-commerce are 
completed and billed as agreed.
A. Steps taken to ensure the integrity of e-commerce transactions
1. Describe the controls maintained by the entity to ensure the integrity of e- 
commerce transactions by explaining the following:
a) How the entity provides reasonable assurance that—
(1) Each request for transaction is checked for accuracy and 
completeness.
(2) Positive acknowledgement is received from the customer before the 
transaction is processed.
b) How the entity provides reasonable assurance that—
(1) The correct goods are shipped in the correct quantities in the time 
frame agreed.
(2) Services and information are provided to the customer as agreed to in 
the transaction.
(3) Transaction exceptions (for example, back orders and other 
exceptions) are promptly communicated to the customer.
c) How the entity provides reasonable assurance that—
(1) Sales prices and all other costs/fees are displayed for the customer
before requesting acknowledgment of the transaction.
(2) Transactions are billed and electronically settled as agreed.
(3) Billing or settlement errors are promptly corrected.
d) How the entity maintains controls that allow for subsequent follow-up 
of transactions.
2. Describe who is responsible for controlling these activities.
3. Has the entity changed its controls over transaction integrity in the last 90 
days? If controls over transaction integrity have changed, describe the 
nature of such changes and when each change occurred
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B. Describe the processes management uses to monitor the continuing effectiveness of its 
controls over transaction integrity to provide reasonable assurance that—
1. Its transaction integrity controls remain effective.
a) Its transaction integrity controls continue to meet the WebTrust 
Criteria.
b) Reports of noncompliance are promptly addressed and corrective 
measures taken.
IV Information Protection Controls
Principle - The entity maintains effective controls to provide reasonable 
assurance that private customer information obtained as a result of e- 
commerce is protected from uses not related to the entity's business.
In this context, private customer information includes personal 
identification information to the customer or his or her family (name, 
address, telephone number, social security/insurance or other government 
identification numbers, employer, credit card numbers, etc.), personal or 
family financial information, personal or family medical information, 
employment history, history of purchases or other transactions, credit 
records or similar information.
A. Description of the controls over the collection of data
1. Describe the policies and controls which provide customers with a choice 
to whether individually identifiable information collected from them 
online may be used for purposes other than completing the transaction in 
progress (an internal secondary use or external third party use).
2. Describe the controls allowing the opportunity to opt out of any particular 
internal secondary or external third party usage of that information except 
those required by law or regulatory agency
B. Description of steps taken to ensure the protection of private customer information.
1. Describe the controls maintained by the entity to protect transmissions of 
private customer information over the Internet from unintended 
recipients.
2. Describe the controls maintained by the entity to protect private customer 
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information obtained as a result of e-commerce and retained in its system 
from outsiders, as follows.
a) How systems that retain private customer information obtained as a 
result of e-commerce are protected from unauthorized outside access.
b) How the entity ensures that customers entering through the Web page 
cannot access other customers' private information (meaning, they can 
only perform inquiries, execute transactions, and obtain information 
about their own transactions).
c) How private customer information obtained as a result of e-commerce 
is protected from intentional disclosure to parties not related to the 
entity's business unless one of the following occurs.
(1) Customers are clearly notified prior to their providing such 
information.
(2) Customer permission is obtained after the customer has provided such 
information.
d) How the entity ensures that private customer information obtained as 
a result of e-commerce is used by employees only in ways associated 
with the entity's business.
3. Describe the controls maintained by the entity to protect against its 
unauthorized access to customer's computers and its unauthorized 
modification of customer's computer files, as follows.
a) Describe how the entity ensures that customer permission is obtained 
before storing, altering or copying information in the customer's 
computer (including the use of "cookies" stored on the customer's 
computer system) or that the customer is notified with an option to 
prevent such activities.
b) Describe how the entity ensures that transmission of malicious 
computer code (for example, viruses) to customers is prevented.
4. Who is responsible for controlling these activities?
5. Has the entity changed its controls over information protection in the last 
ninety days? If so, describe the nature of such changes and when each 
change occurred.
6. Describe the controls the entity maintains to ensure that individually 
identifiable information collected, created or maintained by it is accurate 
and complete for its intended use.
118
Appendix C: Sample Forms
7. Describe the controls the entity maintains to determine the integrity and 
security policies of third party service providers to whom information is 
transferred as part of an outsource arrangement (if any).
C. Describe the processes management uses to monitor the continuing effectiveness of its 
controls over information protection to provide reasonable assurance that—
1. Its information protection controls remain effective.
2. Its information protection controls continue to meet the WebTrust 
Criteria.
3. Reports of noncompliance are promptly addressed and corrective 
measures taken.
V Change Management and CPA/CA Notification
A. Description of the Change Management Process
1. Describe the entity's controls over changes to its electronic business 
practices, its transaction integrity controls, its information protection 
controls, and its e-commerce systems and supporting technology, which 
are designed to provide reasonable assurance that—
a) All such changes are approved by management.
b) Changes in business practices are reflected in modified disclosures of 
such practices.
c) Changes in the manner in which e-commerce transactions are 
executed are reflected in modified business practice disclosures.
d) Modified business practice disclosures continue to conform to the 
WebTrust Criteria.
e) Controls over transaction integrity and information protection 
continue to function effectively and to conform to the WebTrust 
Criteria.
B. Description of the Process to be Used to Notify CPA or CA of Changes
1. Describe the entity's policies and procedures to notify the CPA or CA in 
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advance of making changes to the following:
a) E-commerce activities
b) E-commerce systems and supporting technology
c) Business practices and disclosures of business practices
♦
d) Controls over transaction integrity
e) Controls over information protection
f) Monitoring procedures over the foregoing
g) Control environment
2. Who is responsible for notifying the CPA or CA of such changes?
3. Has the entity changed those controls, procedures, or responsibilities 
designed to provide reasonable assurance that the CPA or CA is notified 
of all relevant changes in the last three months? If so, describe such 
changes and when each was made.
VI Other Matters
A. Describe below any other matters that would be relevant to the CPA or CA in 
evaluating the Web site’s conformity with the WebTrust Criteria. Examples might 
include the following:
1. Significant changes in the entity's business or its organizational structure
2. Significant problems in meeting demand for its goods and services, 
meeting its customer commitments or continuing its historical level of 
customer satisfaction (for example., as might be evidenced by unusual 
levels of customer complaints).
3. Significant processing or controls problems with the entity's e-commerce 
systems or supporting infrastructure.
4. Instances of fraud and breaches of transaction integrity, security and 
information protection controls involving the following:
a) Employees with e-commerce responsibilities
b) Contractors and others who provide services to the entity related to its 
e-commerce activities
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c) Unauthorized third parties
d) Systems and supporting infrastructure used for executing e-commerce 
transactions.
5. Significant changes in management and other key personnel with e- 
commerce responsibilities.
6. Significant changes in legal or regulatory requirements affecting the 
entities business or the operation of its Website





To the Board of Directors
[Company]
[Address]
[City, State Zip Code]
This letter is to confirm our understanding of the terms and objectives of the engage­
ment and the nature and limitations of the services we will provide.
We will perform the following services:
We will examine the Web site of ABC Company as and for the period, 20XX through 
, 20XX, in accordance with standards established by the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants (“AICPA”). The Purpose of this examination is to examine ABC Company’s 
Web site and determine whether ABC Company’s management’s assertions related thereto are 
fairly stated, in all material respects, based on the AICPA/CICA WebTrust Principles and Crite­
ria. This assurance service will consist of inquiries of company personnel and review of com­
pany policies and procedures as they relate to electronic commerce. Our procedures will in­
clude obtaining an understanding of the company’s internal controls and testing these controls 
to the extent we feel necessary. This engagement cannot be relied upon to disclose errors or il­
legal acts, including fraud or defalcations, that may exist. In addition, this engagement will result 
in no warranty or assurances regarding the goods or services you provide. Any conclusions, 
based on our findings, to future periods is subject to the risk that (1) changes made to the sys­
tem or controls, (2) changes in processing requirements, or (3) changes required because of 
the passage of time [such as to accommodate dates in the year 2000], may alter the validity of 
such conclusions.
Our engagement is to provide assurance on the company’s electronic commerce business pro­
cesses. However, we will inform you of any material errors, fraud, or illegal acts that come to 
our attention during the course of our work.
This engagement will result in the issuance of our report that management’s assertions are 
fairly stated, in all material respects, based on the WebTrust Principles and Criteria. If the report 
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issued is unqualified, you will be awarded the right to obtain the WebTrust seal for your Web 
site following your application for and receipt of a Special Class 3 Certificate from the certifica­
tion authority designated by the AICPA pursuant to a subscriber agreement. You must comply 
with all the terms of this subscriber agreement. Also, you agree to provide a consumer recourse 
program as outlined in the current WebTrust Principles and Criteria for eCommerce transac­
tions occurring at your site.
The WebTrust seal is a symbolic representation to viewers of your Web site that your Web site 
has met the WebTrust Principles and Criteria and has received an unqualified report. This seal 
is intended solely for the use by the management of ABC Company on the Web site for which 
the assurance service was performed and may only be displayed on appropriate pages of your 
Web site as we instruct. This seal may not be copied, reproduced, or distributed. If, for any rea­
son, we are not able successfully to complete our procedures or the criteria are not met, the 
seal will not be delivered.
In addition to the WebTrust seal and the certification mark included therein, the AICPA/CICA 
own rights in various trademarks and service marks used in connection with the WebTrust Pro­
gram, such as WEBTRUST and CPA WEBTRUST. This engagement will not give you any right 
to use these additional marks or to make any use of the certification mark or WebTrust seal 
other than as permitted on your Web site.
The WebTrust seal will be displayed on your Web site using a digital certificate provided by a 
certification authority. The seal will hypertext (“hot”) link to our unqualified report and the follow­
ing other information concerning the WebTrust Program: the WebTrust Principles and Criteria 
at <http://www.aicpa.org/webtrust/princrit.htm>, Management’s disclosures of business prac­
tices for electronic commerce; and Management’s assertions.
The digital certificate and WebTrust seal delivered by the certification authority will be valid for 
one year, after which you will need to obtain a new digital certificate. However, your right to dis­
play the WebTrust seal will depend on your continued compliance with the WebTrust Principles 
and Criteria as confirmed by periodic testing resulting in the issuance of new unqualified ac­
countant’s reports. For your Web site, periodic testing and issuance of new unqualified reports 
will be required every(___ ) months (based on the nature and complexity of your Web
site. [NOTE: in NO event may the periodic testing period exceed three (3) months].
You will notify us in advance in the event that you make changes to your electronic commerce 
activities, including: changes to your electronic commerce controls, practices and disclosures or 
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the manner in which you comply with the WebTrust Principles and Criteria; changes in the na­
ture of the products, information, or services you offer through electronic commerce (e.g., new 
product lines, etc.), or changes in the system used to support your electronic commerce. In 
such event, we shall have the right to perform additional procedures, at your expense, to deter­
mine whether your Web site continues to meet the WebTrust Principles and Criteria and to is­
sue an updated Unqualified Report; if we are unable to perform such additional procedures (for 
whatever reason), we shall have the option of declaring for this purpose that your Web site no 
longer meets the WebTrust Principles and Criteria. Your failure to notify us in advance of 
changes in your electronic commerce activities may result in the revocation of your unqualified 
accountant’s report and your continued right to use the WebTrust seal.
In the event that changes such as those noted above have been made without communication 
to us, or an examination of the Web site has not been made within(___ ) months of the
issuance of the previous unqualified accountant’s report, or we become aware of false or mis­
leading information contained within the Web site, which has not been corrected by manage­
ment, we may unilaterally revoke our accountant’s report and your continued right to use the 
WebTrust seal. You agree that, upon expiration of our unqualified report and/or the Subscriber 
Agreement or if the AICPA or we advise you that we have reason to believe your Web site no 
longer meets the WebTrust Principles and Criteria, you shall immediately remove the WebTrust 
seal from your Web site. You acknowledge that your failure to remove the WebTrust seal from 
your Web site upon request from us or the AICPA will irreparably harm the AICPA and give it 
the right to seek an immediate court order requiring you to remove the seal from your site.
We plan to begin your WebTrust engagement on, 20XX, and to complete our work on 
, 20XX. As discussed above, we will begin to update our testing procedures to ensure 
continued compliance with the WebTrust Principles and Criteria(___ ) months from the
issuance of our initial accountant’s report.
We will respect the confidentiality of the information you provide in connection with this engage­
ment; however, by agreeing to this engagement, you also consent to a review of the documents 
and work papers generated or accumulated in connection with this engagement for quality con­
trol purposes by individuals or firms designated by Firm or the owner or licensees of the Certifi­
cation Mark and Related Marks.
At the conclusion of this engagement and prior to the issuance of our report, ABC management 
must provide us with a representation letter describing its responsibility for disclosing its busi­
ness practices for electronic commerce transactions, for executing its electronic commerce 
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transactions in accordance with its disclosed business practices, for maintaining adequate inter­
nal control structures as they relate to your Web site and for ensuring that it follows the 
WebTrust Principles and Criteria. This letter will also attest to the completeness and truthful­
ness of the representations and disclosures made to us during the course of our work.
Our report is presently expected to read as follows:
Independent Accountants’ Report
To the Management of ABC Company, Inc.:
We have examined the assertion by the management of ABC Company, Inc. (ABC) that:
“on its Web site for electronic commerce at <www.abc.com> during the period August 1, 2001 
through October 31, 2001, ABC:
• disclosed its business and privacy practices for electronic commerce transac­
tions and executed transactions in accordance with its disclosed business and 
privacy practices,
• maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that customers’ 
orders placed using electronic commerce were completed and billed as 
agreed, and
• maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that private cus­
tomer information was protected from uses not related to ABC’s business
in conformity with the AICPA/CICA WebTrust Principles and Criteria [hot link].”
ABC’s management is responsible for its assertion [hot link to management’s assertion]. Our re­
sponsibility is to express an opinion on management’s assertion based on our examination.
Our examination was made in accordance with standards established by the American Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants. Those standards require that we plan and perform our exami­
nation to obtain reasonable assurance that management’s assertion is not materially misstated.
Our examination included (1) obtaining an understanding of ABC’s electronic commerce busi­
ness practices and its controls over the processing of electronic commerce transactions and 
the protection of related private customer information, (2) selectively testing transactions exe­
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cuted in accordance with disclosed business practices, (3) testing and evaluating the operat­
ing effectiveness of the controls, and (4) performing such other procedures as we considered 
necessary in the circumstances. We believe that our examination provides a reasonable basis 
for our opinion.
Because of inherent limitations in controls, errors or fraud may occur and not be detected. Also, 
projections of any evaluation of controls to future periods are subject to the risks that controls 
may become inadequate because of changes in conditions or that the degree of compliance 
with the policies or procedures may deteriorate.
In our opinion, ABC management’s assertion for the period August 1, 2001 through October 31, 
2001 is fairly stated, in all material respects, based on the AICPA/CICA WebTrust Principles 
and Criteria.
The CPA WebTrust seal of assurance on ABC’s Web site for electronic commerce constitutes a 
symbolic representation of the contents of this report and it is not intended, nor should it be con­
strued, to update this report or provide any additional assurance.
This report does not include any representation as to the quality of ABC’s goods or services nor 
their suitability for any customer’s intended purpose. Furthermore, any conclusions, based on 
our findings, to future periods is subject to the risk that (1) changes made to the system or con­
trols, (2) changes in processing requirements, or (3) changes required because of the passage 
of time [such as to accommodate dates in the year 2000], may alter the validity of such conclu­
sions.
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Request of Arbitration Representation
Arbitration Firm is Requested to Furnish Information
[Client Letterhead]
Date
Name/Address of Arbitration Organization
Our accountants, [name and address], are conducting a WebTrust examination as of 
[date] and for the [period] then ended. Please furnish directly to them the information requested 
below involving matters as to which you have been engaged and to which you have devoted at­
tention in the form of arbitration or mediation services.
Please prepare a description of all material pending or threatened arbitration claims, and 
assessments. Materiality for purposes of this letter includes items involving amounts exceeding 
$individually or in the aggregate. The description of each case should include the 
following information:
• nature of the arbitration case
• progress of the case to date
• how management of [name of client] is responding or intends to respond
Also, please identify any pending claims or assessments that have not had any case 
work performed.
Our accountants plan to have completed the WebTrust examination on [date]. And 
would appreciate receiving your reply by that date with a specified effective date no earlier than 
[date].
Should you require additional clarification on this matter, please contact our accountants 







[Date of Accountants’ Report]
To [accountant/accounting firm]:
In connection with your examination of the electronic commerce business processes of [name 
of client] as of [date] for the purpose of expressing reasonable assurance that the principles of 
WebTrust as published by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (CICA) are be­
ing followed, we confirm to the best of our knowledge and belief, the following representations 
made to you during your examination.
1. Specifically, we represent that—
a) The company’s business practices are followed consistently and as disclosed to 
the accountant.
b) There have been no changes in the company’s business practices during the 
period of review, or since the last review.
c) There are no violations or possible violations of laws or regulations whose ef­
fects should be considered as to their effect on the transaction of electronic 
commerce.
d) The company has complied with all contractual agreements that would have a 
material effect on the transaction of electronic commerce.
e) There have been no breeches to the security of the website.
f) Management subscribes to and follows WebTrust Principles.
g) We represent that the business practices disclosures for  are cur­
rent, accurate, and complete and have been on our website since July 1, 199X.
www.abc.com
h) We have disclosed to you all organizations to whom we sell our customer data 
base information
2. In addition we agree to:
Permit you to conduct subsequent examinations at such times as you may 
deem appropriate, but not to exceed three months from the date of this report
Maintain our electronic commerce controls, practices and disclosures
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• Notify you regarding changes affecting our electronic commerce activities, in­
cluding:
• Changes to our electronic commerce controls, practices, and disclosures or 
the manner in which they achieve the WebTrust Electronic Commerce Princi­
ples
• Changes in the nature of the products, information, or services we offer 
through electronic commerce
• Changes in the system(s) we use to support electronic commerce
3. We also agree to permit you to unilaterally remove the WebTrust Seal if:
• You find that changes, such as those above, have been made but not communi­
cated to you by us
• A subsequent examination has not been made within days for any reason
• During the course of performing the engagement you discover that changes we 
have made result in practices that no longer meet the WebTrust Principles
1. We have advised you of all actions taken at meetings of stockholders, board of direc­
tors, and committees of the board of directors (or other similar bodies, as applicable) 
that may affect our transacting business electronically.
2. We have responded fully to all inquiries made to us by you during your examination.
3. We understand that this engagement is not intended to examine our system(s) for 
the year 2000 problem and that you have provided no assurance on the system(s) in 
that regard.




EID Number and Documentations from the AICPA
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WebTrust Supervision, Review and Approval
Client:
Closing date_______________________________ URL_______________________________
This form should be completed as the last step before issuing a WebTrust report and seal. Any items 
answered "no" should be fully explained and attached as a part of this form.
Yes________No_______ N/A  
Detailed Review Performed by the staff in charge of fieldwork
I have reviewed all work papers prepared by the personnel in my charge
on this engagement. Each schedule is complete, properly headed,  
initialed, indexed, and cross-referenced
I have reviewed all other files (permanent, general) as necessary. All 
relevant information has been used or cross-referenced.
I have compared the work performed as evidenced by our work papers with 
the procedures indicated in the work program and find that our examination 
complies with the requirements of the work program.
I have compared the work papers with management's assertions for WebTrust 
and find satisfactory attest consideration has been given to all of the 
WebTrust Principles and Criteria.
I have reviewed the completed work program and am satisfied that our 
examination was done in accordance with AICPA/CICA attest 
standards, and that:
All conclusions are supported by evidence obtained.
There are no unresolved points in the work papers.
I have reviewed the dispute resolution and management's representation 
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WebTrust Supervision, Review and Approval (cont.)
Client:
Closing date:______________________________ URL:_______________________________
Partner Review Performed by the Engagement Partner
I have reviewed all work papers prepared by the personnel in my 
charge on this engagement that were not a part of the detailed 
review process.
I have also made a review of sufficient additional work papers to be 
satisfied with the adequacy of our examination and with the 
detailed review.
I have reviewed the completed work programs and am satisfied that 
our examination, as evidenced by the work papers reviewed by me, was 
conducted in accordance with attest standards and the engagement 
arrangements with the client. And that:
All conclusions are supported by evidence obtained.
There are no unresolved points in the work papers.
I have reviewed the dispute resolution and management's representation 
letters for consideration of all important representations.
A summary memorandum, if necessary, has been prepared to explain 
any unusual technical issues, examination complications, opinions 
of specialists, and resolution of disagreements on technical issues 
between the personnel assigned on this engagement.










As of [date], we will end our services as your accountants for the WebTrust engagement. We 
have not come to the decision easily, and after substantial discussions and deliberation with 
you and our firm’s management, it is deemed necessary to take this step because:
• [We lack the expertise to continue with this engagement]
• [There have been severe limitations in our ability to obtain the needed information 
for this examination]
• [Of a lack of payment for services we have performed]
• [Other]
You should take immediate steps to address the reasons for our decision to withdraw from the 
engagement. If corrective measures are taken, we will consider working on this engagement 
again.
Should you wish to engage a new accountant we will assist the accountant in addressing any 
open items, subject to your payment of any outstanding invoices. To assist in this process, 
please provide to us a letter authorizing us to communicate with the new accountant regarding 
this engagement.
We look forward to resolving this (these) issue(s) in a professional manner. Should you require 









[Mailing House & address]
Our accountants, [Name & Address], are conducting an examination of our website 
(www.abc.com) as of [date] and for the [period] then ended. Part of this examination is to verify 
to the accountants that customers from our site who have not given permission for their infor­
mation to be sold to third parties, such as your company, has not been sold or provided to you. 
Please furnish directly to them from the information below involving our sale to you of our cus­
tomer database. [Note: do not include a street address, because this would give an op­
portunity to the mailing house to add the customer to their data base if it is not already 
part of their information. Also be sure to include both types of customers—those who 
have given permission and those who have not given permission for their private infor­
mation to be distributed to other parties—in your sample.]
Customer Name Street City Zip Code Included in Sample (Y/N)
Our accountants expect to have their examination completed on [date], and would ap­
preciate receiving your reply by that date. If you anticipate any problems, please inform them no 







Instructions: Use this form to document acceptance and engagement consideration.
General Information:






Description of client business: 
(Include any specialized 
treatment to be required)
Key company personnel:
If company is a new client, disclose if this engagement is a WebTrust only engagement. Identify 
the other firm and consider any problems that may have been left unresolved with the prior 
accountants:
Document any communication with prior or other accounting firm:
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Acceptance criteria: Yes No
1 There are no issues with client personnel, management, 
or officers with regard to integrity.
2 There are no unresolved issues with regard to independence 
or conflicts of interest, which may impair our independence.
3 There are no collection problems with the 
prior accountant (or our firm if this a new engagement).
4 The proposed engagement team expertise and 
capabilities is not beyond the team's capabilities.
5 There are no unresolved issues with prior accountants.
6 Will this engagement require additional firm tools or 
other resources not currently available?
7 The staffing and timing required by this engagement 
is not beyond the capabilities of the firm.
8 The electronic commerce carried on by this client does 
not place any undue risk to the firm.
9 There are no concerns regarding the Website's disclosures 
that do not relate to the WebTrust Principles & Criteria.
1 0 This engagement does not appear to cause any undue 
risk or exposure to the firm.
Note: A "yes" response does not disqualify the prospective engagement from being accepted. 
However, additional steps will need to be considered before proceeding with the engagement.







Explain how client was acquired (referral, advertising etc.):
Has a thank you been sent to the referral source?_____________________________
Other: List any other items that should be considered in the acceptance of this client/engagement 
not previously listed:_____________________________________________________________
Conclusion:
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Summary WebTrust Work Program
Client: ____________________________________________________









Self-assessment document __________ __________
Delivered to client __________ __________
Discussed with client __________ __________
Planning __________ __________
Begin field work __________ __________
Complete field work __________ __________
Complete report and documentation __________ __________
Partner approval __________ __________
Deliver to client __________ __________
Approval: By Date




Summary WebTrust Work Program (cont.)
Client:









Business Practices & Information Privacy
Business and information privacy practices 
Privacy disclosures & policies 
Dispute resolution disclosures
Legal & other regulatory issues 
Test of transactions
Transaction Integrity
Transaction integrity controls 
Order entry process worksheet 
Credit card evaluation worksheet 
Test of transactions
Information Protection
Information protection controls 
System(s) architecture worksheet 
Site security worksheet
Firewall control evaluation worksheet 
Disaster recovery & physical access 
Test of transactions
Change Management & Accountant Notification
CPA notification of change process
Reference Date Hours Date Hours
 ^^H   
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Instructions: This checklist should be used for initial WebTrust engagements and the 
interim evaluations. After each procedure is completed it should be initialed by the in-charge 
accountant. If the procedure is deemed unnecessary, an "NA" should be placed on the 
appropriate line. Any additional steps or situations noted should be appended to this document.
Examination Objectives
The objectives in the general program are general in nature and not necessarily related to 
specific WebTrust assertions
General
The examination has been properly planned.
Information prepared by the client appears accurate.
Written representations have been obtained from management.
Reportable conditions, irregularities or illegal acts, and other 
matters related to the conduct of the examination have 
been communicated to the appropriate individuals or parties.
Staff assistants have been properly supervised.
Outside experts have had their credentials properly verified 
and have been properly supervised.
Work papers have been reviewed in accordance with firm policies.
Proper considerations have been given to independence, client 
acceptance and continuation, personnel assignment, 
consultation, and supervision.
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Perform the following planning steps before fieldwork begins:
If the entity is a new client:
Obtain assurance that the client meets firm standards, 
consider using Engagement Acceptance Form.
If this is a continuing client:
Determine whether there is any reason why there should be 
a reevaluation of continuance. (Consider items 
such as: changes in management, scope of the 
engagement, lack of firm expertise, etc.).
Determine whether there is any change in independence. 
Include a check for unpaid fees.
If specialists outside the firm will be engaged to perform portions 
of the engagement, obtain assurance in writing of their 
independence.
Ascertain or acquire the necessary knowledge concerning the 
client's industry and/or other technical skills required by the 
engagement.
As a practical consideration, the accountant may wish to 
request the following items before starting fieldwork:
Organization charts
Minutes of board meetings
Significant agreements or contracts relating to 
eCommerce
Contracts with outside service providers, 
specifically ISPs, hosting, etc.












WebTrust Work Program (cont.)
Client:
Closing date:______________________________ URL:_______________________________
Obtain an understanding of the client's eCommerce 
activities, its customers and systems (consider 
using Client Information Worksheet)
Obtain an understanding of the client's control 
environment, hiring policies, and supervisor of company 
personnel (consider using Control Environment Worksheet)
Apply preliminary analytical procedures by comparing account 
balances for the current period to similar amounts in 
the prior period (consider using Analytical Procedures 
Worksheet)
Obtain an understanding of the controls used by the client 
to monitor its own practices, policies, and procedures 
(consider using Self-Monitoring Worksheet)
Obtain an understanding of the client's order process as it 
relates to electronic commerce transactions (consider 
using Order Entry Worksheet)
Execution
Perform the following as a part of field work:
Obtain a management representation letter (the letter 
should be dated as of the end of fieldwork)
Obtain a sample of transactions for testing (consider using 
Transaction Walk-Through Worksheet)
Ascertain whether there are adequate business disclosures from 
a sample of transactions and consider whether proper 
compliance with disclosed criteria is met (consider 
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WebTrust Work Program (cont.)
Client: ___________________
Closing date: URL
Ascertain whether there are adequate privacy disclosures from 
a sample of transactions and consider whether proper 
compliance with disclosed criteria is met (consider 
using the Privacy Policies Worksheet)
Ascertain whether there are adequate consumer dispute 
resolution disclosures from a sample of transactions and 
consider whether proper compliance with disclosed criteria 
is met (consider using the Dispute Resolution Worksheet)
Ascertain whether legal and other regulatory issues impact 
the commerce site and whether adequate disclosure has 
been given (consider using the Legal/Regulatory Worksheet)
Test the site's compliance with its own disclosures against 
a sample of transactions and consider whether proper 
compliance with disclosed criteria is met (consider 
using the Practices Test of Transactions Worksheet)
Obtain sufficient understanding as to the adequacy of the 
client's credit card processing system and consider its impact 
on the engagement (consider using Credit Card System 
Worksheet)
Test the site's compliance with its own controls over and 
procedures regarding transaction integrity for electronic 
commerce transactions (consider using Transaction Integrity 
Test of Transactions Worksheet)
Consider the adequacy of the site's information protection 
controls (consider using Information Protection Worksheet)
Obtain sufficient understanding of the site's layout and system 







WebTrust Work Program (cont.)
Client:
Closing date URL:
Evaluate any weakness in the site's security and consider its 
impact on the engagement (consider using the Site 
Security Worksheet)
Evaluate the site's firewall and corresponding configuration 
and consider its impact on the engagement (consider 
using Firewall Worksheet)
Evaluate the site's overall disaster recovery program for 
electronic commerce transactions and consider its 
impact on the engagement (consider using Disaster 
Recovery Worksheet)
Test the site's transactions against the disclosed 
practices and procedures for information protection and 
consider its impact on the engagement (consider 
using Information Protection Test of Transactions 
Worksheet)
Consider the adequacy of the client's policies and procedures 
for monitoring changes, updates, and notification of the CPA/CA 
and evaluate the impact on the engagement (consider using 
Change Notification Worksheet)
Consider other matters and their impact on the 
engagement (consider using Other Matters Worksheet)
Ascertain that all open work paper items, "to dos" and other 
items have been completed and that any differences of 
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Client:
WebTrust Work Program (cont.)
Closing date:_______________________________ URL:_______________________________
Seal Issuance
Obtain a copy of the management's assertions and 
ascertain if appropriate for seal issuance
Obtain EID from the AICPA for obtaining the class 3 
server certificate from VeriSign.
EID Number:
Have the Webmaster generate a certificate signing 
request (CSR) for the specific type of server used.
Have client apply for a server certificate from VeriSign
Prepare accountant's report










Describe the industries in which electronic commerce activities are occurring:
List any AICPA guides or other publications that are authoritative sources for the industry(s) in 
which the client operates and any specialized practices unique to this industry(s): 
What goods, services, or information are being sold at the company website?
Who represents a typical customer?_______________________________________________________________
What is the typical form of payment?
List the main members of management and their title:




Indicate how long the company has been involved with electronic commerce: 
Describe any concentrations (major customers, suppliers, or seasonal periods):
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Client Information Worksheet (cont.)
Client:
Closing date:______________________________ URL_______________________________
Describe the information systems used for the electronic commerce transactions: 
Describe any contingency plans the client has in place should the system(s) used become 
damaged or not accessible: _____________________________________________
Describe any functions related to the eCommerce cycle that are outsourced to a third party:
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Client Information Worksheet (cont.)
Client:
Closing date:______________________________ URL:_______________________________
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General Control Environment Worksheet
Client:
Closing date: URL:
Describe the factors that contribute to a control environment and are generally conducive to 
reliable business practices and policies:
Managements "tone at the top": ____________________________________________________
Hiring, development, and retention of competent personnel: 
Emphasizing the importance and responsibilities of sound business practices and 
effective control: _______________________________________________________________
Supervising business activities and control procedures: 
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General Control Environment Worksheet (cont.)
Client:
Closing date:______________________________ URL:_______________________________
Employing a suitable internal auditing or other internal reporting mechanism that 











Instructions: The following ratios can be used in the evaluation of a client site and should not 
be computed just for the exercise. Choose the ratios that will provide the most meaningful 













Return on net sales 





Completed by: __________________________________________Reviewed by:
Date: __________________________________________ Date:






















Note: Be sure to include some backorder information in the sample to be tested. Use additional sheets 
if necessary.








Describe the process management uses to monitor the effectiveness of its own business practices and 
information privacy policies, specifically to provide reasonable assurance that --
> The eCommerce transactions are performed in accordance with disclosed practices.
> Its disclosures at the website remain current and continue to fulfill WebTrust Criteria.
> Reports of noncompliance are promptly addressed and corrected.
Describe the process management uses to monitor the effectiveness of its control for transaction 
integrity, specifically to provide reasonable assurance that --
> Transaction integrity control continues to meet WebTrust Criteria.






Describe the process management uses to monitor the effectiveness of its controls over information 
protection, specifically to provide reasonable assurance that --
> Information protection controls remain effective/current.
> Information protection controls continue to meet WebTrust Criteria.
> Reports of noncompliance are promptly addressed and corrected.
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Business Practices Disclosures & Information Privacy Disclosures
Client: _____________________________________________
Closing date:_______________________________ URL:__________________________________
Instructions: Describe the disclosures related to the WebTrust Principles and Criteria from the 
client web site. In the date column, put the date the disclosure was added/changed at the 
web site.
Descriptive information about the nature of the goods that will be shipped or the services 
that will be provided.
Date
Condition of the goods -- new, used, or reconditioned:
Description of the services to be rendered (or service contract):
Source of information sold (where obtained or how compiled):
Other relevant descriptive information:
Sources for verification of the preceding information:
Supplier invoices










Time frame for order fulfillment:
Time frame for informing customer of backorder or other order exceptions:
Normal delivery and any customer options:
Customer payment methods and options:
Procedure to allow customer to cancel any recurring charges:
Return policies:
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Other relevant terms and conditions:
Sources for verification of the preceding information: 
Company sales processing policy 








Where (on its web site or in information provided with the product) customers can obtain 
warranty service and support related to the goods and services purchased on its web site.
_________ Date_________
Description of warranty disclosure: __________________________________________
Information to enable customers to file claims, ask questions, and 
register complaints, including the following:
Street address:
Telephone number (number to reach an employee in a reasonable amount of 
time -- not only a voice mail system):
Days/hours of operation:
Other relevant information for customers:
Sources for verification of the preceding information: 
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Privacy Disclosures & Policies
Client:
Closing date:_______________________________ URL__________________________________________
Descriptive information regarding the site's privacy policies. These practices should include 
(but not be limited to) the following disclosures:
Disclosure of the specific kinds and sources of information being collected and maintained:
Disclosure of the uses of collected information:
Disclosure of third-party distribution of information (if any):




Privacy Disclosures & Policies (cont.)
Client:
Closing date: URL:
Disclosure of the consequences of an individual's refusal to provide specific information (if any): 
Disclosure of how erroneous or incomplete information can be reviewed, changed, or removed: 
Disclosure of how to resolve complaints related to accuracy, completeness, and distribution of 
customer information:____________________________________________________________________________________
Disclosure of the site's cookie policy including customer's refusal to accept a cookie: 
Sources for verification of the preceding information: 
Direct observation at web site
Completed by:  Reviewed by:
Date:  Date: 
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Disclosure of the management's commitment to use a third-party dispute resolution service:
Identification of the third-party dispute resolution service:
Disclosure of the dispute resolution process (starting with the entity):
Disclosure of the action to be taken with regard to private customer information (if subject of the 







Legal & Regulatory Issues
Client:
Closing date:______________________________ URL__________________________________________
Describe the local, national, or other laws or requirements affecting business terms 
and conditions (customer rights, and "lemon laws"):
Describe the entity's policies and procedures to provide reasonable assurance that it 
complies with such laws and requirements: ______________________________
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Instructions: From the information obtained in the "Transaction Walk-Through" evaluate the client's 
disclosures with the actual results.
Tested by Date
Time frame for order fulfillment
Exceptions noted
Time frame for informing customer of backorder or other 
order exceptions:
Exceptions noted ____________________
Normal delivery and any customer options:
Exceptions noted _______
Customer payment methods and options:
Exceptions noted ______




Business Practices Disclosures 
Test of Transactions (cont.)
Client:
Closing date:_________________ _____________ URL:__________________________________________
______ Tested by____________________ Date
Return policies:
Exceptions noted











Instructions: Describe the controls related to the WebTrust Principles and Criteria from the 
client web site.
Describe the controls maintained by the entity to ensure the integrity of electronic 
commerce transactions
Order entry stage
Describe the client controls in place to provide assurance that:
Each order is checked for accuracy and completeness 
Sale prices and all other costs are displayed for the customer before processing
Customer gives a positive acknowledgement BEFORE order is processed
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Describe the client's controls in place to provide assurance that:
The correct goods are shipped in the correct quantities in the time frame agreed
Services and information are provided to the customer as agreed on the order
Backorder and other exceptions are communicated to the customer as disclosed
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Transaction Integrity Controls (cont.)
Client:
Closing date: URL:
Billing and Accounting Stage
Describe the client's controls in place to provide assurance that: 
Orders are billed and settled as disclosed/agreed
Billing or settlement errors are (or can be) quickly corrected 
Follow-up on prior orders can be performed __________________________________________







The purpose of this form is to assist the accountant in documenting the order entry process.
Describe how customer identifies him/herself on the web site
Describe the process by which a customer places an order. Items included (but not limited to):
CGI scripts, encryption, shopping cart utilization. __________________________
Describe interface between the web site and the company order-processing system (e.g., manual, etc.)
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Credit Card System Evaluation
Client:
Closing date:______________________________ URL:_______________________________
Credit card processing system used by client:
Merchant bank used by client and history with system:
Describe the credit card processing procedure:
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The web site does not store credit card information on the customer 
computer -- or if it does the information is encrypted.
The web site does not store credit card information on the company's 
computer -- or if it does the information is encrypted or is not 
displayed to those without proper access.
Credit card information is purged at the conclusion of the specific 
transaction -- BEST PRACTICES.
Customer credit card numbers are validated either online with 
a merchant bank or by using the check-digit test.
The system allows for credits to be posted.
When a credit is posted special access or other control is used to 
assure that credits are being processed for the correct accounts 
and transactions.
The credit card system allows for customer charge backs that 
follow similar procedures and controls for customer credit posting.
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Instructions: From the information obtained in the "Transaction Walk-Through" evaluate the client's 
disclosures with the actual results.
Tested by Date
Each order is checked for accuracy and completeness
Exceptions noted _________________
Sales prices and all other costs are displayed for the 
customer before processing
Exceptions noted ________________
Customer gives a positive acknowledgement BEFORE order 
is processed
Exceptions noted ______________________
The correct goods are shipped in the correct quantities in 




Transaction Integrity Controls 
Test of Transactions (cont.)
Client:
Closing date  URL
_____ Tested by__________ Date
Services and information are provided to the customer as 
agreed on the order
Exceptions noted _______________________________
Backorder and other exceptions are communicated to the 
customer as disclosed
Exceptions noted ____________________
Orders are billed and settled as disclosed/agreed
Exceptions noted _____________
Billing or settlement errors are (or can be) quickly corrected
Exceptions noted _______________________











Instructions: Describe the controls related to the WebTrust Principles and Criteria from the 
client web site.
Describe the steps taken to ensure the protection of private customer information:
Transmission over the Internet
Describe the controls maintained by the entity to protect transmission of private customer information:
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Describe how information obtained is protected from outside access:
Describe the controls that ensure that customers entering the web site can only perform 
inquiries, execute transactions, and obtain other information about the customers' transaction:
Describe the controls that protect private customer information from intentional disclosure to the 
entity's private customer information:
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Information Protection Controls (cont.)
Client:
Closing date;______________________________ URL:_______________________________
Describe the controls maintained by the entity to protect private customer information from 
misuse by employees: _________________________________________________________________________
Computer Access
Describe the controls maintained to protect against unauthorized access to the customers' 
computer and unauthorized access modification of customers' computer files:
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Information Protection Controls (cont.)
Client:
Closing date: URL:
Describe the controls the client has in place to ensure that permission is obtained before 
storing, altering, or copying information from the customer's computer (including "cookies"):
Describe the controls the client has in place to ensure that transmission of viruses TO the 
customer is prevented: _________________________________________________________________________
Describe the controls the client has in place to ensure that transmission of viruses FROM the 
customer is prevented:_________________________________________________________________________
Completed by:  Reviewed by:
Date:  Date:
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Instructions: This document will assist the accountant in understanding the client's system, software, 
and other peripherals as it relates to the overall security of the site.
Describe the server hardware (include CPU, memory, and peripherals):
Describe the router and firewalls used (include brand name, model, and version):
Describe the configuration of the server in relation to the firewall (e.g., Judas, Sacrificial Lamb, DMZ, etc.): 
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Are current versions of all software installed?
Are current patches of all software installed?







Explain any "No" answer from above:
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Client has an established security policy
Transmission of plain text passwords over the network 
is prohibited ______________
Security tools (COPS, Tripwire, etc.) are used regularly
Client has a policy to acquire/develop software that 
is free of bugs and security holes
Client has a policy to track current software for security holes, 
bugs and has applied all patches
Client has adequate system, firewall, and other logs
Client has adequate system and network monitoring
Policies:
Who is allowed access and their access level?
Who is accountable for security, upgrades, backups, and maintenance?
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What kind of material is allowed on server pages?
Who has access to pages and data?
What testing/evaluation is done on software, pages, scripts, etc., before they go "live"?






What is the procedure for handling security incidents?
What is the process used to monitor, evaluate, and update the security policy?
Passwords:
What is the structure (length and character composition) of the password?
What is the life span of the password?
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Client:
Closing date:
Who is responsible for password setup?
Site Security (cont.)
URL:














Examine log files for connections from unusual locations or unusual activity.
Findings:____________________________________________________________________________________
Look for setuid and setgid files (UNIX only) everywhere on the system and delete unneeded copies.
Findings:____________________________________________________________________________________
Check system binaries to make sure they haven't been altered.
Findings:____________________________________________________________________________________
Check for unauthorized copies of network monitoring programs or packet sniffers and delete if found.
Findings:____________________________________________________________________________________
Check for unauthorized server services.
Findings: _______ _____________________________________________________________________________
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Check for unnecessary server services and eliminate. 
Findings:
Examine the password file for unauthorized changes or modifications.
Findings: ____________________________________________________________________________________
Examine the system configuration files for unauthorized changes or modifications.
Findings: ____________________________________________________________________________________
Examine the entire system for hidden or unusual files and delete if necessary.
Findings: ____________________________________________________________________________________


















IP packets are not passed between the two networks unless 
packets have the firewall system as their destination or origin
Firewall hides structure of internal network from outside network 
Firewall provides for static routing only (no dynamic routing permitted) 
Only OUTBOUND FTP, Mosaic, and Gopher on protected systems
User authentication does not rely solely on user ID/passwords
External FTP is prohibited
Services not required (rlogin, rwho, etc.) are turned off
External users are prohibited from logging in as root
The firewall rejects ALL unknown protocols
The firewall provides DNS services to outside network 
systems in the protected network
The firewall distinguishes between internal users (those 
coming from the internal network) and external users
The firewall is configured to exercise tighter control on
functions that originate from external systems than 
those that originate from internal systems
The Telnet "open" command has been eliminated
The firewall is configured so that outgoing mail 
appears to come from the firewall
Only users who need access to/from the internal 








All nonrequired services have been deactivated
Firewall logs are configured to capture successful and 
unsuccessful attempts to use the system
The firewall is configured to verify that the Trusted
Computing Base has not been modified
The firewall provides high levels of performance -- speed 
is limited by the LAN, not the firewall
Other






Appendix C: Sample Forms
Disaster Recovery & Physical Access
Client: __________________________________
Closing date:______________________________ URL:_______________________________
Note: This document is NOT intended to provide a comprehensive disaster recovery program. It is intended 
to provide guidance to the accountant. It is recommended that the accountant assist the client in 
developing a comprehensive disaster recovery program that includes eCommerce components.
Yes/No Completed By
Does the entity have a disaster recovery program?
Does the entity have a tape back-up system?
Is the entire system backed up daily?
Is the tape back-up done on a single tape?
Is there a tape rotation policy? ___________________________
Are tape back-ups stored off-site? ___________________________
Are tape back-ups tested (both read and write) monthly?  
Are work stations logged out before the tape back-up routine? 
Is there a complete listing of all critical hardware including configurations? 
Are copies of all software stored in a protected cabinet?
Does the entity have a contingency plan in place to obtain needed hardware 
or infrastructure in case of emergency?
Does the entity have a current virus-scanning software?
Is the virus-scanning software updated at least monthly? 
Are all work stations using a virus-scanning software? ___________________________
Is all incoming media scanned for viruses before use? ___________________________
Does the entity have an incident response policy?
Is physical access to critical hardware controlled?
Have off-site resources been identified?
Does the entity have a UPS system?
Does the entity have any equipment to protect against surges and spikes?
Does the entity have any redundant storage on its server(s)?
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Disaster Recovery & Physical Access (cont.)
Client:
Closing date:______________________________ URL:_______________________________
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Instructions: From the information obtained in the "Transaction Walk-Through" evaluate the client's 
disclosures with the actual results.
Tested by Date
Transmission over the Internet protects private customer information
Encryption or other method tested
Exceptions noted
Site domain name and IP address verified
Exceptions noted ______
Site's digital certificate verified
Exceptions noted
Protection of information obtained
Packet filters are implemented Internet Gateway Routers 




Information Protection Controls 




Anti-spoof filters are used on the routers to prevent spoofing 
of trusted sources
Exceptions noted ________________________
Commercial firewall properly configured and tested for 
possible security weakness
Exceptions noted __________________
Shared user IDs are prohibited
Exceptions noted
All system level access to all production systems is provided 
via a strong identification and authentication mechanism
Exceptions noted _________________________
User passwords on UNIX systems use a shadow file
Exceptions noted ______________
194
Appendix C: Sample Forms
Information Protection Controls 




Protection from disclosure to third parties
Customers who decline permission to have information 
passed on to third parties are removed from the database 
before database is shared with third parties
Exceptions noted _____________________
Customer database is restricted to employees who have job 
functions that require access to the database
Exceptions noted _______________________
Employees are assigned only the privileges necessary to 
accomplish their tasks
Exceptions noted ___________________
Audit trails contain sufficient data for intrusion detection, 




Information Protection Controls 




The identification and authentication audit trail identifies 
login time and logoff time
Exceptions noted ____________________
System logon IDs are reviewed periodically for business need
Exceptions noted _______________________
Suspicious activity is reported to system security officer 
(this could be an automated process)
Exceptions noted ____________________
Access to/from customer's computer is controlled




Appendix C: Sample Forms
Information Protection Controls 




Site has a "cookie policy" that it follows
Exceptions noted _____
All systems have current virus-scanning software installed 
that runs in active memory
Exceptions noted _____________________
Detected computer viruses are reported to the I Incident 
Response database.
Exceptions noted ____________________
All system software versions and patches are current
Exceptions noted _________________





Information Protection Controls 




Monitoring statistics for performance measures are analyzed 
in a timely manner
Exceptions noted _______________________
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CPA Notification of Change
Client: __________________________________________
Closing date URL:
Describe and document the client's policies and procedures regarding notification in 
advance of its:
Electronic commerce activities _________________________________
Business practices and related disclosures of business practices 
Controls over transaction integrity ____________________________________________________
Controls over information protection____________________________________________________
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CPA Notification of Change (cont.)
Client:
Closing date: URL:
Describe and document the client's policies and procedures regarding notification in 
advance of its:







Appendix C: Sample Forms
Other Matters
Client: ________________________________
Closing date  URL
Consider the impact of any other matters (such as those listed below), which would be 
relevant in evaluating a web site's conformity with the WebTrust criteria
Changes to the organizational structure
Problems in meeting customer orders or commitments
High number of customer complaints or returns
Instances of fraud and/or breaches of controls involving:
employees with electronic commerce responsibility
contractors and others who provide service and support to the website
unauthorized third parties
systems and other electronic commerce infrastructure






Closing date  URL:
Describe here any issues that need to be followed up with management








The following websites provide a sample of the good information you can use 
in a WebTrust engagement. This list is not all-inclusive, and there are new 
sites being formed every day. We also have made every attempt to verify the 
links to these sites; however, as is the case with the Internet, the site may be­
come unavailable at a future date.
www.aicpa.org AICPA home page
www.aicpa.org/webtrust/index.htm The AICPA site for WebTrust. From here you can find further 
links to the Principles and Criteria and the Yankolovich study
http://ciac.llnl.gov/ciac/CIACWelcome.html Computer Incident Advisory Capability—provides information 
regarding computer security incidents, hoaxes, and viruses
http://www.obscure.org/~jaws/security.html Computer security and privacy site with links to other sites
http://kumite.com/myths Computer Virus Myths
www.forrester.com Forrester Research
http://www.verisign.com/webtrust/siteindex.html Versign’s index of all WebTrusted sites (be sure to visit 
Verisign’s home page for other good information
www.icsa.net International Computer Security Association—a great site to 
visit. They have a couple of good downloads of information 
(firewall buyers guide and others)
www.bbb.com Better Business Bureau—learn a little about the competition
www.rsa.com RSA Data Security—good site to learn about cryptography
www.cookiecentral.com Helpful information on cookies
www.internic.net Internic home page—go here to verify domain names and IP 
address. Lots of other helpful information here too.
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www.cert.org CERT Coordination Center studies Internet security vulnera­
bilities
http://csrc.ncsl.nist.gov National Institute of Standards and Technology—source for 
security information and resources
www.lsli.com Livermore Software Laboratories—has a tutorial for firewalls 
and the supporting technology
www.truste.org Trustee’s site and information about privacy on the Internet
www.dnb.com/dunsno/dunsno.htm Dun & Bradstreet’s site to obtain and update company duns 
number—important in setting up a WebTrust seal
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You, as practitioners, might find it useful to review the Seal Program Comparison, a grid 
presenting features of the respective seal programs, which we have included on the next 
page for you. The grid highlights the competitive and technical differences between 






For a more complete listing visit http://www.con.wesleyan.edu/~triemer/network/docservs.html.
Port Number TCP Use UDP Use
0 Reserved Reserved
25 Any private mail system Any private mail system
35 Any private printer Any private printer
37 Time Time
42 N/A Host name server
47 FTP FTP
50 Remote mail checking Remote mail checking
53 Domain name server (DNS) Domain name server (DNS)
71-74 Remote job service Remote job service
80 WWW WWW
92 Network printing protocol Network printing protocol
107 Remote telnet service N/A
115 Simple file transfer protocol (SFTP) Simple file transfer protocol (SFTP)
169 Send Send
190 Gateway Access Control Protocol (GACP) Gateway Access Control Protocol (GACP)
193 Spider Remote Monitoring Protocol Spider Remote Monitoring Protocol
201-208 Apple Talk Apple Talk
221 Berkley rlogind with SPX auth Berkley rlogind with SPX auth
406 Interactive Mail Support Protocol Interactive Mail Support Protocol
531 Chat Chat
532 Readnews Readnews








Appendix H: VeriSign’s Digital ID Enrollment Process
APPENDIX H
VeriSign’s Digital ID Enrollment Process
DRAFT
Licensees should be familiar with the following steps to expedite the seal process. We recommend that 
licensees not only become familiar but serve as a technical resource to clients and work closely with the 
web master/Technical personnel who will be completing these steps
Obtaining an Enrollment ID number
  Licensee has successfully completed this first step.
Examination of site has successfully been completed
  Licensee is to confirm that the web master is qualified and has a full understanding of web servers as 
well as how digital IDs function.
Prior to Enrollment—-Web master/ Technical Contact
♦ Note: Web master will apply for the digital Id. Before beginning, the web master should assemble the 
following information:
  Accountant’s name, address, phone number and AICPA firm member number (ex. 3-10000000-001). 
Technical contact information- First Name, last name, title, Company, Address, City, State/Province, 
Zip or Postal Code (11220-0433), Country (ex. US), Work Phone, Fax, E-mail Address (check for ac­
curacy).
Domain Name - If not available, see Step 1 (Confirm Domain Name)
  Dun and Bradstreet number - If not available, see step 2 (Getting a D-U-N-S number)
 Certificate Signing Request (CSR) - If not available, see step 3 (Generating a CSR) 
Server software platform
Platforms known to work include:
■ Netscape Enterprise Server 2.0 and later version
■ Microsoft IIS Server 2.0 and later
■ C2 Net Stronghold Apache Servers
■ Oracle Web Servers (later versions only)
■ 00- Lotus Domino (after 4.6.2)
♦ Servers known not to work include:
■ Lotus Domino prior to 4.6.2
■ Earlier versions of the Oracle Web Server
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Final Preparation before Enrollment
Before starting to enroll, the web master / technical contact should :
• Install Web Server Software
• Ensure that the Proxy Setting enables the site to create a secure connection outside of the 
firewall
• Have the Enrollment ID number easily accessible
• Review Legal Agreement, a copy of this document can be found at:
type in: http://digitalid.verisign.com/server/WebTrust/trustintro.htm
ENROLLMENT (To be completed by the Web master/technical contact)
  Step 1: Confirm Domain Name
If the Web master needs to find the Domain Name:
Start by typing in:
http://digitalid.verisign.com/server/WebTrust/trustStep1.htm
Note: Your InterNIC domain must be registered to the organization enrolling for the ID (ex. aicpa.org 
must be registered as AICPA-DOM).
■ This information can also be found by visiting:
Type in: http://www.networksolutions.com
Enter the domain name. If the organization’s website is at www.nice.com, the organization’s domain 
name is nice.com




Ocean Spray, NY 11001
Domain Name: Nice.Com
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Step 2: Proof of Right
Type in:
http://digital.id.verisign.com/server/WebTrust/trustStep2.htm
In this step, the Web master/technical contact confirms that the organization has the legal right to 
conduct business under the name specified in the enrollment request. The company must submit “Proof 
of Right” at the time of enrollment. The following are valid methods:
■ Entering the organization’s Dun & Bradstreet D-U-N-S number at the time of enrollment.
(This will be the most effective way and VeriSign will also issue the WebTrust Server ID several days 
sooner.)
■ Searching for the organization’s D-U-N-S number or applying for one online if the organization does 
not have one.
■ To search or to get a D-U-N-S number (free) go to:
http://digitalid.verisign.com/server/dnb_query.htm
If obtaining a D-U-N-S number is not possible at the time, you can alternately fax a copy of the following 
documents to VeriSign.
• Articles of Incorporation
• Business License
• Fictitious Business License
• Official Filing with the Security & Exchange Commission
If the WebTrust Server ID is for a government organization or an agency, fax the following:
■ The Act or Charter (or specific page within) that establishes the organization within the government.
If the WebTrust Server ID is for a University, fax the following:
■ Articles of incorporation (many domestic Universities are incorporated).
Write the Domain name on the document and fax it to VeriSign at 650-961-8870.
NOTE: Faxing any of the above documents instead of providing a D-U-N-S number may delay the 
WebTrust Server ID application up to one week. It is therefore suggested that a D-U-N-S number be 
used instead.
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Step 3: Certificate Signing Request (CSR)
Type in:
http://diqitalid.verisign.com/server/WebTrust/trustStep3.htm
The CSR is an encrypted file that contains the organization’s public key, name, locality and URL.
The CSR must be submitted at the time the request is made for the WebTrust ID.
When generating a CSR, a Web Server software must be used. The Web Server will create two files 
when generating a CSR: a Private Key and the CSR.
Instructions on generating a Key Pair and CSR is available, please see below.
If the server type is:
Microsoft IIS 4.0 go to:
http: digital id. verisign. com/server/help/insMicrosoftCSR_4. htm
Microsoft IIS 3.0 and 2.0 go to:
http: digitalid.verisign.com/server/help/insMicrosoftCSR_2_3.htm
If the server type is:
Netscape Enterprise Server 2.0 go to:
http: digitalid.verisign.com/server/help/insNetscapeCSR.htm
  Detailed installation instruction is available for other server types such as:
• Apache Freeware
• IBM







For instructions, type in:
http://www.verisign.com/server/support/install/secure/did.html
Note: If the server you are using is not listed, please refer to the documentation that came with the 
server or contact your server vendor.
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Recommendation
Due to known vulnerabilities of key length up to 512-bits, use a CSR with a key length longer than 512 
bits (1024 bits is highly recommended).
Note: older web servers are not capable of generating a longer key.
Trouble Shooting
  Microsoft IIS Software platform
Due to a slight misconfiguration in the IIS Key Manager Software some customers are encountering 
the error “Invalid Password”. If you encounter this message, follow the appropriate steps below
Web server type Microsoft IIS 4.0 go to:
http: digitalid.verisign.com/server/help/insMicrosoftCSR_4.htm
Web server type Microsoft IIS 3.0 and 2.0 go to:
http: digitalid.verisign. com/server/help/insMicrosoftCSR_2_3.htm
Following these steps will prevent you from getting this error message. There is a possibility that not 
following these steps will lead to the certificate not working properly, and your installation will be 
delayed.
If after following these steps, the Web master/technical contact finds that the certificate will not 
install, verify the following:
■ That the certificate is not being created and installed through a remote Key Manager, it must be 
created and installed through a local server.
■ The computer you are logged on to must have an administrator level account.
■ If neither of the above appears to be the problem then you can create a test request using 
Keygen.exe and install the certificate using Setkey.exe. Go to 
 for detailed instructions.http://digitalid.verisign.com/server/help/insMicrosoftCSR_4.htm
If you are unable to use Keygen.exe or Setkey.exe, call Microsoft Technical Support at 
1-800-936-3500. If an error message appears when using Keygen and Setkey this may be due to 
configuration issues. Please contact Microsoft Technical Support at 1-800-936-5900. Please be 





Remember the password you enter. You will need this key to perform actions that access your private 
key material.
* **Every web site that has a distinct DNS name must also have an encryption Key installed. However, 
each website for SSL (secured sockets layer) must have a distinct IP address as well.
* **Before closing the Key Manager you must commit the changes. If you accidentally close without 
committing the changes you delete the partial key in Key Manager and recreate the request.
 Remote Server: Generating a Key Pair and CSR
To generate a key pair and a Secure Server ID on a remote server use the Key Manager Tool 
(keyring.exe) with IIS 2.0.
Note:
• Key Pairs are not encrypted when sent across the network.
• Since the private key is at risk, so is the sites SSL identification (stated in the certificate).
• Due to the vulnerability of the key pair the possibility of future interception and decryption of all
communications to and from that computer will be at risk.
Protection
In order to protect the private key, paramount to SSL you should either:
A) Generate the key locally on the computer where is to be installed.  
B) Transfer the key via diskette. Save the key from the remote machine and hand deliver for instillation. 
Installation will be done from the diskette.
C) If you are in a secure environment and it is a trusted network then you can transfer the private key via 
the network.
Netscape Enterprise Server
For detailed step by step instructions go to:
http://digitalid.verisign.com/server/help/insNetscapeCSR.htm
Note: Key Pair File
It is important to create a back up pair file. The information should be stored in a secured place. It is 
recommended for it to be copied on to a floppy disk and stored in a safe or safe-deposit box.
Once the CSR has been generated the software server will either e-mail the CSR or save it on to 
your hard disk (created a request file).
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Step 4: Submitting the CSR
Type in:
http://digitalid.verisign.com/server/WebTrust/trustStep4.htm
An ASCII text editor (such as NotePad) will be needed in order to open the file. Word processors such 
as Word that will insert formatting or control characters are not to be used for this file.
Copy the entire CSR file including the lines containing the beginning and end into the field on the right.
239
WebTrust Practitioners ’ Guide




The following information will be reflect the information supplied with the CSR, this information must be 
checked for accuracy. If any of the information is not correct you must submit a new CSR with the 
correct information.
Common Name-The name of the website that will be secured.
Organization-This must be the same as the registered owner of the domain name.
Organizational Unit- (Optional) Used to differentiate organizational divisions and DBA names.
City/Location- The city or locality in which the organization does business
State/Province- The state or province where the organization does business. Abbreviations will not be 
accepted, the name must be typed in full (required for all organizations outside the US and Canada).
Country-The two-character ISO country code (ex US for United States). Required for all organizations 
outside of the US or Canada.
  Enrollment Information
Enrollment ID#
NOTE: The input screen is case sensitive. Please ensure that you enter the first four letters of 
your EID in lower case.
CPA/CA’s Firm Number:
Seal Type:
■ CPA WebTrust Seal
■ CA WebTrust Seal
Server Software Vendor:
■ Select your server software
Challenge Phrase:
Enter a word that would be easy for you to remember but difficult for any one to figure out.
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This field will be needed when submitting a renewal or revocation for the WebTrust ID. The word may also 
be requested when speaking to a VeriSign support staff. It is important that you remember this word and 
if needed write it down and store it in a safe location.
Technical Contact Information
Enter the information of the person whom the WebTrust ID should be sent to. The person must have ad­
ministrative access to the web server. The person could be a web master or technical support represen­
tative at your Internet Service Provider (ISP).
The person listed as the Technical Contact will also be responsible for notifying VeriSign if the WebTrust 
ID is compromised.
Renewals will also be sent to the Technical Contact as well as the Organizational Contact.
The following information will be required:
First Name, last name, title, Company, Address, City, State/Province, Zip or Postal Code (11220-0433), 
Country (ex. US), Work Phone, Fax, E-mail Address (check for accuracy).
Organizational Contact Information
This must be the person in the organization responsible for the WebTrust ID. The organizational contact 
should be able to provide organizational information on request. This should be someone with a high-level 
status within the organization. The Organizational Contact will also be contacted by phone prior to issuance 
of the WebTrust ID.
The organization’s contact should be someone other than the Technical contact. The organizations con­
tact will also receive a renewal notice.
Certified Accountant Contact
Enter the information form the person responsible for certifying the company’s web site.
The following information is required:
First name, last name, title, company, address, city, State/ Province, Zip or Postal Code, Country, Work 
Phone, E-mail Address. The information you have entered must be checked for accuracy.
WebTrust Index
The following information will be listed on the WebTrust index.
Keywords
Enter up to five words that best describes the organization
Category




Enter 20 words describing the site. The Web master may want to consult the marketing department.
D-U-N-S Number
Enter the organization’s D-U-N-S number (go back to step 2 to of this document if not available)
The application will be delayed if submitted without this number.
Subscriber Agreement
Please read the subscriber agreement if you have not done so.
If the terms and conditions are accepted, click on the accept button to submit your request for the W'ebTrust 
Server ID.
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Step 6: Processing
VeriSign will do the following:
This is the final step before the organization obtains their WebTrust ID.
All the information provided would be checked for accuracy.
Proof of Right: Checks with the company and a reputable third party (such as Dun & Bradstreet) to confirm 
that the organization has the right to the requested WebTrustGlobal Server ID and meets the US Com­
merce Dept. Requirements for use of strong encryption.
EID: Confirms that the Enrollment ID was given to you by the CPA or CA is valid.
WebTrust ID: It takes 3 to 5 business days to issue.
Problems that may cause delays are:
Inaccurate of incomplete information:
No D-U-N-S number( see step 2 of this document for full details) 
Wrong EID
VeriSign will e-mail the technical contact an email confirming receipt of your application. 
The e-mail will contain a PIN number that can be used to check the status, go to:
If a confirmation is not received, please e-mail VeriSign at ca_support@verisign.com or call VeriSign’s 
Technical Support line at 650-429-3338.
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